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Abstract 
IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON MIGRATION PATTERNS IN TURKEY 
 
By Yilmaz Simsek, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2006 
 
Major Director: Dr. Judyth Twigg, Professor, Political Science, L. Douglas Wilder 
School of Government and Public Affairs. 
 
This study is among the first studies that evaluate the social impacts of 
terrorism in a specific country for a 10 year period. It tests the effects of terrorism 
on domestic net-migration in Turkey, especially in the terror infected provinces of 
the Eastern and South Eastern regions of the country between the years 1992 
and 2001. Terrorism has impacted people not only physically, but also 
psychologically. When faced with “future uncertainty” or the “fear of terrorism,” it 
is natural for people to leave their home towns, and to migrate to somewhere 
else where they feel safe. In order to explore the real impact of terrorism on 
immigration, this study used “terrorism incident rate” per 10,000 people and the 
“rate of people and security forces killed” per 10,000 people as independent 
variables. It also examined the major economic effects of migration; 
unemployment rate and the GDP were used as control variables. In addition, the 
rate of killed terrorists, population density, and the distance to Istanbul and to 
Mersin were also added to the models.  
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A control-series regression analysis was performed to relate the terrorist 
incidents’ impact on the citizens’ inclinations to leave their home towns in all 
provinces and in high terrorism incident provinces of East and Southeast regions 
of Turkey. Results show that the net-migration in high terrorism incident 
provinces is higher than the net-migration in other provinces. Findings also 
confirm that there was a positive relationship between net-migration and terrorist 
incidents and that relationship was higher during 1992-1995, when the number of 
terrorist incidents hit its all time highest level. Other than terrorist incidents, 
results moreover confirm that net-migration is positively related to the number of 
“people and security forces killed”. 
In addition, results also confirm that population density and distance were 
related to net-migration. Economic variables, such as GDP and unemployment 
also related to net migration. However, their impacts varied from model to model. 
While the GDP was negatively related to net-migration in the models with all the 
provinces; unemployment was positively related to net-migration in the models 
with only high terrorism incident provinces.
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism was mostly ignored until the September 11th terrorist attack on 
the USA. It is now one of the primary concerns of government and people around 
the globe. Because it is currently a popular subject to study, the number of books 
and articles about it are growing exponentially. However, many of them are 
similar in theme as they strive to find out the root causes of terrorism. They either 
try to find out the causes for it or they attempt to profile the terrorists. Conversely, 
this study is different from the other terrorism related studies because it will not 
examine the causes of it, but focuses instead on the social impact of it. This 
study examines the affects of terrorism on people by examining the relationship 
between terrorism and migration. Specifically, it studies the impact of terrorist 
incidents on migration patterns in provinces with especially high terrorist incident 
rates, specifically in the East and Southeast parts of Turkey. In order to 
investigate terrorist incidents’ impact on people’s motivation to leave their 
hometowns, this study utilizes annual “net-migration rates,” “terrorism incident 
rates,” and specific economic indicators of those provinces between 1992 and 
2001.  
Since civilization began, terrorism has been a problem for societies 
because it seeks to undermine the political order by devastating liberal and 
democratic organizational structures (Hudson, 1999). Because terrorism 
generates a state of fear and horror, it is considered a planned political 
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act/strategy aimed at civilians by sub-national groups (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2004). Therefore, it aims to create more and more people who share 
the same sorrow as victims. Also, it always reasons to justify its continual cycle of 
violence and physical harm.  
Besides the physical effects, terrorism also has a psychological impact on 
people that can cause political change (Crenshaw, 1986; Frey and Luechinger, 
2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). “Fear of terrorism” is one of its major 
effects. After experiencing one terrorist incident, individuals are more likely to 
expect another one.  This fear not only effects individuals, but also effects 
organizations by reducing the motivation and their economic activities. After 
losing a loved one in a terrorist incident or after experiencing a terrorist threat to 
one’s life, it is unusual for an individual to just carry on and quickly restore things 
to normal. The continuing negative effects of the 9/11 show its impacts on both 
individuals and organizations. 
Furthermore, fear and future uncertainty, as a result of terrorism, may 
motivate people to leave their home towns. Intensity and duration of this 
motivation will depend on the environment created by the terrorists and the 
terrorist incidents. Currently, there are more than a million relocated or internally 
displaced people (IDP) in Turkey. This number is a good indicator of the 
relationship between terrorism and recent migration patterns. Studying this social 
result of terrorism is important and can help us to better understand another 
important impact of terrorism on our society. 
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Problem Statement 
During the Cold War years, Turkey witnessed waves of terrorist activities. 
These activities continued throughout the 1990s. The terrorist organizations 
weakened Turkey's political center and challenged democracy in Turkey 
(Kramer, 1999). No party gained a political majority between 1991 and 2002. 
Therefore, the governments in 1990s had to be based on short-lived, weak 
coalitions. In the meantime, critical problems resulting from rapid economic and 
social transformation over the past fifteen years worsened. During the 1990s, 
there was an uncontrolled urbanization, continual high unemployment and 
inflation (Kramer, 1999). 
During 1990s, even though terrorist activities had decreased in most 
regions throughout the country, they had dramatically increased in the East and 
Southeast region(s). That part of Turkey is a very mountainous, low populous 
rural region which has borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran.  
Sahin and Yener (2000) list some of the problems facing the region. They 
include economic decline, high unemployment rates, lack of teachers, and the 
failure of schools. They also mention that there is a high illiteracy rate, especially 
in rural areas, and a low female student population. According to the general 
proficiency examination, OSS, students in the Southeast are not as of successful 
as other regions in nationwide (Sahin and Yener, 2000). Deichmann, Karidis, and 
Sayek (2003) point out that the number of teachers and medical doctors are also 
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in very limited supply in the South East part of Turkey. The population per 
medical doctor ranges in Ankara (1 to 392) is almost 13 times better than that of 
Sirnak in South Eastern Turkey where it is about (1 to 4897). The main reason 
for this scarcity of medical doctors is the “fear of terrorism” that the regional 
residents feel all the time.  
Separatist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL, PKK here after) was the primary terrorist 
organization in the region. It was established as a Marxist-Leninist political party 
in 1978 (Cornell, 2001). However, after its class-based characteristics were 
discovered, it lost the sympathy with foreigners and has since changed its image 
to that of a Kurdish nationalist organization (Cornell, 2001; Radu, 2001). In 1993-
1994, PKK was at its peak with 10,000 estimated forces. According to a well-
know web-site, it instigated about 21,866 terrorist actions between 1984 and 
2000 (Terrorist Organizations in Turkey, n.d.). In these incidents, 5,546 security 
guards, 4,561 citizens, and 18,958 terrorists died. It caused significant 
destruction in the East and Southeast of Turkey. However, its estimated total 
strength inside the country declined after 1999 when its leader was captured at 
the Greek ambassador's residence in Nairobi, Kenya (Kaminaris, 1999; Radu, 
2001).  
All these terrorist incidents made people fearful about living in the region. 
For example, in the late 1980s, the central government, as an employer, could 
not find an employee willing to work in the region of his own free will. Therefore, it 
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required every government employee to work in the region for some part of his 
active employment life (Devlet Memurlari Kanunu - 657/72, 1965). The 
government also required that new employees work in this region first. Through 
these policies, the central government tried to increase the number of employees 
in the region and reduce the social and economic imbalances between these 
regions and the rest of the country. However, there was a side effect of this 
strategy. Terrorists started focusing their activity on governmental institutions, 
including the public schools (Terrorist Organizations in Turkey, 2004). After this, 
all government employees working in the region were paid almost twice as much 
as other government employees. This was still not enough to make the region 
attractive for either government employees or many people of the region.  
In addition to creating fear, the high number of terrorist incidents impacted 
economic activities and investments in the region. For instance, villagers of the 
region could not been allowed to drive their animals far from their residences. 
This restriction caused economic difficulties because it limits the main economic 
engagement of the regional people. Thus, during 1990s, increasing number of 
terrorist incident in the region caused not only “fear” and “future uncertainty” but 
also economic difficulties, which might have motivated people to leave the 
region.  
As a consequence, many people from the region left their places of origin 
and tried to start a new life either around big cities in the region or in the western 
part of the country. For most of them, leaving their places of origin was either 
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inevitable or mandatory. These rapid migration movements caused some social 
problems in the destination regions as well. Some of the cities, like Diyarbakir, 
tripled its population in a decade, which resulted in a high demand on schools, 
social areas, homes and a new infrastructure (Duzel, 2005). Also, as most of 
those terrorism-related migrants were farmers, their adaptation to the city life was 
not an easy one (Duzel, 2005). In order to earn money, children had to work in 
factories as unreported labor or in the street as street hawkers. Unfortunately, 
this new street life was also their new “school” in which they learned criminal 
behavior from their peers (Duzel, 2005). 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to find out if there is a relationship between 
migration patterns and terrorist incidents in provinces of Turkey, especially those 
located in East and Southeast regions, infamous for terrorism related killings, 
bombings, waylays, and kidnappings, during the period of 1992-2001 (May and 
Morrison, 1994; Bariagaber, 1997). According to push-pull model, which explains 
migration as a consequence of all factors at the origin and the destination, there 
can be many push and pull forces other than the economic ones (Ortiz, 1998). 
After reading the literature about push-pull forces of migration, it is suggested 
that a “security need” could be one of the push forces, that cause people to leave 
their home towns.  
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Therefore, this study is going to try and determine if the terrorist incidents 
had any push effect in net-migration patterns in Turkey, especially in Eastern and 
Southeastern regions. The study will control for economic related pull forces. It 
will focus on the impact that a number of extremist incidents in Turkey have had 
on motivation to leave their provinces. If any relationship between the terrorism 
related incidents and migration patterns is found, affectivity of those incidents will 
also be measured.  
 
Significance of the Study 
Effects of the terrorism are not limited to physical or political damage. It 
has the potential to inflict countless other forms of damage on people, societies, 
governments, and systems. Although the political and physical impacts of 
terrorism are well covered in the literature, the social effects of it still need further 
study. The studies related to the social effects of the terrorism are generally very 
limited. It may be either the lack of popularity of the subject or scarce data 
sources to help researchers. Just before September 11, terrorism was no more 
than a subject in the evening news for many people. Also, researchers did not 
have access to sufficient data, as the data was either confidential, or unavailable 
for a variety of reasons including security concerns.  
Different than most other terrorism related research, this research aims to 
show the impact of terrorism on migration, which is usually explained by 
economical aspects. It attempts to show that fear and future uncertainty, caused 
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by terrorism, is a major factor in out-migration. By comparing the relationship 
between terrorist incidents and the number of net-migrants of a province, this 
study also tries to seek a more effective in exposing the social impacts of 
terrorism on people. Thus, this paper is not about the causes of terrorism, but the 
impacts of terrorism on the migration patterns of those affected directly by it. 
In order to have a safer society, governmental agencies habitually focus 
on protecting the public from terrorist incidents and catching the terrorists before 
they act. However, they do not give much importance to how the society is 
affected by the terrorist incidents. Finding a relationship between terrorism and 
migration may help government officials to produce new policies to help people 
affected by terrorism and to stop terrorism related out-migration.  
  
Definition of the Terms 
Terrorism 
Terrorism, which is now a universal problem, is not a recently developed 
term, but it does not have an internationally accepted ironclad definition either 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2004). According to Crelinsten (1998) it is “the 
combined use and threat of violence, planned in secret and usually executed 
without warning…to intimidate or to impress a wider audience (p.392).” The U.S. 
State Department defines it as a “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 
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agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Council on Foreign Relations, 
2004).  
Terrorism as a word originally comes from Latin, “terrere,” which means 
great fear and dread or to be filled with fear (Juergensmeyer, 2003). In today’s 
meaning, it was first used in French as “terreur” during the French Revolution. 
Then, it transformed to English as terror. Later, it referred to the revolutionaries in 
Russia in 1866. After the World Wars, it was first used in reference to the Jewish 
tactics against the British in Palestine in 1947 (Online Etymology Dictionary, 
2004). 
Even though it was first used during the French Revaluation, the history of 
terrorism began at least 2000 years ago (Hudson, 1999). Since then, 
perpetrators, victims, targets, grounds, reasons and justifications for the use of 
terror have changed, but the methods of terrorism have continued to be much the 
same down through history.  
The history of terrorism began a century before the Common Era, during 
AD 66-72 (Hudson, 1999). It was carried out by religious fanatics in Jerusalem. 
The performers were the members of a Jewish Sect, Zealots, called siccariis. 
They wanted to have special privileges from Roman Empire, and considered the 
Romans and cooperating Jews as their enemies. They engaged in very public 
acts of murder using daggers. As is still true today, one of the early aims of the 
terrorists was to demoralize the public through violence, threats, and force 
(Yayla, 2005). 
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According to Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991 (article 1), it was defined as:  
any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the 
Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, 
social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible 
unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the 
existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or 
destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating 
fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and 
external security of the State, public order or general health by 
means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, 
oppression or threat (Turkish Anti-Terror Law, 1991, article 1). 
 
The goal of the Turkish Law was to protect the state and its citizens from 
any type of damage or harm (Yayla, 2005). As defined, terrorism requires a 
political aim, group involvement, and violence. For the purpose of this law, an 
organization should be formed by at least two people coming together for a 
shared purpose (Turkish Anti-Terror Law, 1991, article 2). Definitions of terrorism 
outlined by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. State Department, 
and the US Code of Federal Regulations have similar language; they all use the 
words violence, threat, and force to define terrorism (Yayla, 2005).  
Using violence, threat, and force is also common in academic definitions 
of terrorism as well. Whittaker (2003) defines it as the use of force, the 
threatened use of force, use of violence, a special mode of violence, and a 
strategy of violence in order to bring a political change and promote desired 
outcomes. Garrison (2003) defines it as “the use of violence to create fear in the 
larger audience in order to create change in that larger audience (p.40).” 
Likewise, Hoffman (1999) defines it as employing violence for political ends. For 
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him, it is “inherently political in the most widely accepted contemporary usage (p. 
2).”  
Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1984) surveyed a frequency analysis 
among the most used 109 definitions of terrorism. According to them, the top five 
most repeated words are “violence, force” (83.5%), “political” (65%), “fear” (51%), 
“threat” (47%), and “(psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions” (41.5%). 
There may be no globally accepted definition of terrorism, but the Schmid and 
Jongman (1984) analysis can help researchers to distinguish terrorism from other 
kinds of violent crimes.  
It also should be distinguished from traditional warfare because of its 
selected targets, mostly civilians (Garrison, 2003). According to Claridge (1998), 
“it is not the nature of the perpetrator, or the type of violence that is used that 
makes an act a terrorist act, it is the effect that it has on the immediate victims, 
and upon a wider audience (p. 66).” Besides, a terrorist does not perform for 
individual satisfaction or gain, so s/he can be distinguished from the traditional 
criminal. In contrast, of a terrorist believes in what s/he is doing. Terrorism is a 
rational political act in an organization designed to achieve (a) desired goal(s) 
through the use of violence. For its specific outcomes, it seeks specific targets, 
like society, so it is expected that it will have social impacts.  
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Migration 
Migration is a move from one place to another (Meriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary, 2006). According to Encyclopedia Britannica (2006), it is a “change in 
location.” Encarta (2006) defines it as “the movement of people, especially whole 
groups, from one place, region or country to another, particularly with the 
intention of making a permanent settlement in a new location.”  
Migration is a lasting change of one’s usual residence (Lee, 1966; Long, 
1988; McHugh and Hogan, 1995). This definition distinguishes migration from 
mobility, such as going back and forth on neighboring trips, short-term 
employment and vacations. Similarly Lucas (2000), who points out that migration 
is a change of residence, differentiates migration from residential mobility, the 
latter referring to a change of residence within an administrative boundary, such 
as moving from one dwelling to another within the same town or province. 
However, Lucas (2000) has two questions that help define migration. First, what 
is the meaning of residence?  Secondly, how long must one live away to be 
accepted as a migrant?  
According to Yuce (2003), migration is an interdisciplinary subject of study 
involving historians, demographers, geographers, educational sciences, 
economists, sociologists, political scientists, administrators, and policy makers. 
Therefore, it may have different definitions by different disciplines as each looks 
at different aspect of it. Demographers and geographers are concerned about 
popular movements between places, change in societies, regions, and 
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communities after migration; economists look at the economic causes of 
migration, economic loss and the potential benefits, and its impact on labor 
markets; and political scientists study migration policies, political involvement and 
rights of immigrants, and political improvements (Yuce, 2003).   
Yuce (2003, p.9) mentions a few short but significant definitions. The first 
one describes migration as “people changing places;” the second one is “shifting 
between different groups because of changing places;” the third one is “leaving 
the current domicile and moving into a new domicile at a certain distance;” and 
the last one is “changing the domicile voluntarily or by force for the short or long 
term.” The last description is very similar to Lee’s definition of migration (1966). 
Pazarlioglu (2005) defines migration in its different aspects. For him, it is a 
process, which requires individuals to move from their birthplaces towards new 
places by giving up their cultures, relatives, and even most of their valuable 
possessions. He also defines it as a move between geographical places. 
Moreover, it is an arrival to a new socio-culture and geographic environment for 
an individual who has left his old socio-culture and geographic environment. 
Also, migration is considered a permanent or long term change in place of 
residence that includes  crossing out of the old administrative boundaries and 
into new ones (Pazarlioglu, 2005).  
In this study, migration refers to permanent change of residence through 
the move from one province to another. In-migration is used to denote a move to 
a new province or place to live, and out-migration is used to denote a move from 
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the native city or living place. Net-migration is the difference between in-migration 
and out-migration.  
The traditional definition of migration, “moving over an administrative 
boundary,” eliminates from consideration most of the local mobility (Bogue, 
1959). Therefore, this study chooses “il”, province in English, as an 
administrative boundary. Here, province does not refer a state or sub-national 
entity because Turkey is itself a unique state. Province in Turkey refers to a 
geographical administrative unit which includes a city center and several 
townships around it. It is akin to a county, within a region.  
 
Theoretical Background 
This study’s point of view is going to be “push and pull model,” especially 
as relates to motivations and forces of migration. Migration literature utilizes 
many different models to explain migration patterns, but they generally 
emphasized either the pull side or the push side of migration. According to push-
pull model, any force that impacts on a migration pattern can be either a push or 
a pull force. In general, push-pull model can explain all impacts on migration 
decision. 
In specific, some economic theories, such as neo-classical theory, explain 
migration with an emphasis on the pull side.  However, there is no specific theory 
explaining migration with an emphasis on the push side, which is related to this 
study. Since terror and violence related migration can be seen as a response to a 
  
15
 
need for safety out-migration from the terror infected areas will be explained 
through Maslow’s motivation theory. Actually, the broad perspective of push-pull 
model can cover safety related (motivational side of) out-migration. However, it 
can also be beneficial to remind the reader theory of motivation in specific.   
 
Migration in General: the Push-Pull Model 
The push-pull model encompasses all the forces of migration in general. 
According to the theory, migration is a result of push factors at the origin and pull 
forces/factors at the destination (Ortiz, 1998). It proposes that conditions push 
people out of their place of origin to new places of destination that simultaneously 
exercise a positive attraction or pull. The push-pull model is so extensive that 
both economic and social factors of migration can also be understood as push-
pull forces.  
Economic theories of migration explain migration by means of supply and 
demand with a little more emphasis on pull side. This allows them to be covered 
by the push-pull model. From an economic perspective, most people move for 
economic reasons (Todaro, 1976; Borjas, 1988). Economic models of migration 
have a tendency to be based on utility maximization. It is proposed that the 
migrants rationally choose the best possible allocations of time in their hometown 
and in the destination place.  However, it should not be forgotten that seeking an 
economical benefit for reputation, appreciation, or achievement, can be 
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secondary, when comparing to the need for security (Maslow, 1943; Maslow, 
1970; Huitt, 2004).   
Unlike economical approaches, social theories of migration, such as social 
capital and social network, do not believe that people make individual decisions 
to leave their hometowns (Massey, 1987; Ortiz, 1998). They generally explain 
migration only by pull effects like having relatives in destination area. According 
to them, in order to minimize the risks of migrations, people prefer to move into 
an embedded relationship structure; couples, households, communities, or 
societal units are the central unit of decision making (Massey, 1987). Since this 
study tries to measures the impact of the terrorist incidents, as a push effect, on 
migration, social theories of migration are not going to be used because they only 
explain migration by pull forces which are mostly related to in-migration or 
migration to destination areas. In any way social factors of migration is also 
covered by push-pull model (Goetz, 2005). 
As in the behavioral framework of neo-classical theory, the push-pull 
model describes migration as a result of a series of rational and calculated 
choices by an individual (Todaro, 1976; Marshall, 1978; Piore, 1979). The push 
side of the theory explains all the motives as to why people migrate out their 
hometowns. These factors force people to become migrants in search of a better 
life.  Some examples of push forces are war, civil war, conflict, societal disorder, 
famine, low-wages, lack of farmland, poverty, unemployment, and a general lack 
of economic opportunities (Lee, 1966; Todaro, 1976; Borjas, 1988). The Great 
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Depression between 1929 and 1939, the energy crisis of the 1970s in many 
mining-dependent rural counties in USA, and famine and civil war in Africa during 
the 1980s and 1990s are among good illustrations of push forces (Goetz, 2005).   
Among those push factors, conflict, civil war, and societal disorder are 
most likely to have impact on migration decision because they take away the 
most basic need, a desire for safety. In a civil war or societal disorder people 
suffer from fear and anxiety. Similarly, terrorism causes fear and anxiety. 
Therefore, terrorism related chaos, fear, and anxiety can be important push 
forces.  
The pull side of the theory explains all the motives as to why people 
choose to migrate to a destination. An example might be a high demand for low-
wage labor and the resulting opportunities such as employment. These factors 
pull people to migrate for a higher standard of living. Some examples of pull 
forces are safety and peace, availability of jobs, food, wealth, and the local 
amenities of the destination area (Lee, 1966).  
 
Migration in Specific: Motivational and Economical Perspectives 
In fact, the push-pull model of migration is broad enough to explain 
migration patterns, but it is so general that it may need to be supported by other 
specific theories. Therefore, this study is also going to use Maslow’s motivation 
theory and neo-classical (economic) model in addition to push-pull model. 
Actually, there is no single theory to explain the direct impact of terrorism or 
  
18
 
violence on migration, but Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1943) explains the 
importance of the need for safety. This is among one of the most important 
needs and is often the force that drives people to relocate, during life threatening 
terrorism incidents. As explained in Maslow (1943), “safety need” can be the 
most important need under specific conditions. However, it is thought that if the 
out-migration theoretical framework described might be problematic if it only 
focuses on the motivation of security/safety need.  
Other than the motivational side, the migration generally has economic 
perspectives, which may cause either push or pull effect or both. Traditionally, 
migration is rooted in neo-classical theory and augmented with the push-pull 
model of migration. Especially for out-migration, there is an emphasis on 
economic conditions in the place of origin as a determining factor to leave the 
place. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate the economic elements of 
migration theory to reflect the real dynamics. It is for that reason that this study 
looks at issue of migration from an economic perspective as well.  
 
Theory of Motivation: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs 
Abraham Maslow (1943) posits a hierarchy of needs, in which the needs 
at the bottom are the most urgent and require being satisfied before attention can 
be paid to the others. Maslow’s motivation theory has been criticized for its lack 
of an integrated conceptual structure and evidence to support his hierarchy 
(Wahba & Bridgewell, 1976; Mook, 1987; Heylighen, 1992; Soper, Milford & 
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Rosenthal, 1995; Huitt, 2004). However, it has become one of the most popular 
and often cited theories of human motivation. Before Maslow, researchers 
generally separately focused on three factors, (1) what energizes, (2) directs, and 
(3) sustains human behavior (Huitt, 2004). After blending a large body of 
research, Maslow developed a theory of personality that has influenced a 
number of different fields.   
According to Maslow, individual behaviors are motivated by needs that 
motivate or drive behavior. A motivating behavior depends on two principles. 
First, a satisfied need is not active anymore; and second, needs are in a 
structured hierarchy. For Maslow (1943) each need is related to another one; 
people need to position themselves in hierarchies of prepotency. In other word, 
each inferior need must be met before moving to a subsequently superior level 
within the needs hierarchy. Although Maslow mentions that the emergence of a 
need typically rests on the satisfaction of the previous one, he also identified that 
not all personalities followed his anticipated hierarchy (Heylighen, 1992; Huitt, 
2004).  
His theory of personality has two parts. The first part is a “theory of human 
motivation” or “deficiency needs.” This is characterized by a hierarchy of needs. 
The second part is “self-actualizing”, which is supposed to emerge when all 
deficiency needs are satisfied (Heylighen, 1992; Huitt, 2004). On the one hand, 
the first part of the theory, which is related to this study, is so clear that we all can 
understand what Maslow says. It accurately describes many realities of our 
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personal experiences that we have never put into our own words. Self-
actualizing, on the other hand, is a bit harder to understand, and having met all 
one’s basic needs does not always result in self-actualization (Heylighen, 1992).  
Maslow sees most needs are essential for survival and categorizes these 
needs from the most fundamental to the highest self-actualization. The needs are 
listed as follows:  physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem, and self-
actualization (Starling, 1998; Huitt, 2004). According to a Stanford research the 
percentages of the U.S. citizens living at each of the five levels of Maslow’s 
Hierarchy is as follows:  10% lives on the first (physiological needs) level, 15% 
lives on the second (safety needs) level, 43% lives on the third level, 30% lives 
on the fourth level, and only 2% lives on the fifth (self-actualization needs) level 
(Starling, 1998). 
The “physiological,” first level, needs are the starting point for the 
motivation theory. They are referred to as physiological drives or biological needs 
and each person tries to maintain homeostasis. These specific needs include a 
need for air, water, food, and a constant body temperature (Heylighen, 1992; 
Huitt, 2004). Because they are at the lowest level, they are the strongest needs. 
Therefore, if a person were deprived of all their needs, hunger for food would 
become the primary need to be satisfied (Maslow, 1943). If the physiological 
drives become dominate, all other needs are just pushed into the background by 
organism. “For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, no other 
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interests exist but food (Maslow, 1943, p.374).” For him, nothing else is going to 
be more important than his hunger.  
When the physiological needs are largely taken care of, the needs for 
safety become active (Starling, 1998). Safety needs also include the need for 
security, stability, protection, order, law, structure, and freedom from physical 
harm, anxiety, fear, and chaos (Maslow, 1970). Maslow (1943) describes the 
“organism as a safety-seeking mechanism” (p.376). Therefore, for an average 
person, safety generally seems to be the most important need (Maslow, 1970). In 
fact, most of us deal not with lack of water or food, but with our personal fears 
and anxieties.  
Except in times of emergency, adults have almost no awareness of their 
security needs. Children, on the other hand, generally show the signs of 
insecurity and the need to feel safe (Thompson, Grace, & Cohen, 2001). For 
children, safety needs can be seen as a direct reaction of bodily illnesses, such 
as, vomiting, colic or other sharp pains (Maslow, 1970). After a fear, nightmare, 
physical assault, death within the family, or an illness, a child’s need for safety 
and protection is higher than an adult, according to Maslow (1943). Generally, 
the typical child in a society favors a safe, orderly and predictably organized 
world, and powerful parents to protect and shield him from danger and harm 
(Thompson et al., 2001). However, a typical healthy, auspicious adult is 
principally satisfied in his safety needs, developed during his early childhood 
(Starling, 1998). 
  
22
 
Members of a quiet, nonviolent, well running peaceful society normally feel 
safe enough from violence, crime and terror. Therefore, they do not have any 
safety needs as active motivators. However, in a society with common terrorist 
incidents, the need for safety can be seen as an active and dominant motivator of 
an individual, and it may activate organism’s resources for an urgent action 
(Maslow, 1943). As Starling (1998) mentions individuals are subconsciously 
aware of their safety needs but, under certain conditions they become conscious 
of their need for safety. According to Maslow (1943, p.379), “war, disease, 
natural catastrophes, crime waves, societal disorganization… and chronically 
bad situation” are among those conditions that the human being may increasingly 
interested in safety and security.  
If there is a strong need for security, we cannot expect an individual 
behave within “bounded rationality,” as theorized in economic migration models. 
After numerous terrorist incidents, it is unrealistic to expect an individual to still be 
a rational decision maker, who is assessing migratory alternatives and thinking 
about the consequences of leaving his hometown. He is reacting to the fear of 
death, the fear of being terrorized and about future uncertainties. All of his 
planning and actions are related to an urgent need for security or safety. These 
must be satisfied before any higher level of need can be dealt with.   
According to motivation theory, if the first two layers of needs are well met, 
then a next level of need begins to emerge and becomes dominant (Huitt, 2004). 
Those levels of need are respectively going to be love, affection, belongingness, 
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esteem, and finally the need for self-actualization (Starling, 1998; Huitt, 2004). In 
a society, an individual normally tries to overcome his feelings loneliness and 
alienation.  Individuals have a need for self-respect, positive self-esteem, for 
success and the respect of others. Ultimately, he wants to be self-actualized 
finding “himself” through the discovery of what he is best suited for (Maslow, 
1970). Unless these needs are satisfied, the person feels weak and worthless. 
Satisfying these needs makes the person feel self-confident and valuable. 
In sum, if an individual is deprived of a lower level need, s/he is not going 
to be satisfied until that need is met. Under the threat of terrorism or a perceived 
lack of safety, it is difficult to imagine that people have any interest in higher level 
needs, such as recognition, reputation, glory, fame, dignity, appreciation, 
attention, dominance, confidence, competence, mastery, and achievement. 
Therefore, the need for safety and security may be a very real push force that 
drives terror victims to leave their home of origin in order to satisfy their security 
needs.  
 
Neo-classical Model 
This model of migration is similar to the push-pull model, but it has a 
specific focus on pull side of migration. It explains migration in relation to supply 
and demand in the labor market (Martin, 1995; Martin and Taylor, 1998). In fact, 
push and pull forces cover all the factors in neo-classical model because they 
can all be divided into either push or pull forces. 
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This theory states that “people move to improve their income” (Massey, 
Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino, and Taylor, 1994, p.699). It features 
personal decision-making as the motivation for migration, and is further 
supported by the theory of equilibrium and the market’s natural tendency towards 
it (Todaro, 1980). According to the theory, individuals look for higher wages and if 
found then migrate out their original region and its lower-wages (Todaro, 1980; 
Borjas, 1988). In short, the main cause of migration is due to the individual 
seeking higher wages or net economic advantages (Mueller, 1982). It is assumed 
that migration is mainly effected by these higher wages, and that all the other 
factors of migration ultimately play a relatively minor role (Massey, et al, 1994). 
Therefore, if the wage gap between the regions were to be closed, it would very 
possibly end the migration.  
Neo-classical model has two points of view: macro-economic and 
behavioral. The macro-economic framework is the most well-known theoretical 
standpoint applied to migration (Lewis, 1954; Boserup, 1970). Based on the 
equilibrium theory, macro economic framework developed from neo-classical 
economic theory (Todaro, 1976). It sees migration as a result of the difference of 
labor supply and demand between two or more countries/regions. This means 
that a region that has a large supply of labor pays relatively lower wages then a 
region with a low supply of labor that must offer higher wages.  
From a behavioral framework, an individual might decide to migrate based 
on the calculated costs and benefits of that migration. He makes his rational 
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choice considering the economic, social and cultural sides of his migration. Thus, 
he might move to the new region where he can gain maximum returns (Borjas, 
1988). Consequently, the migration is a result of decision taken under forces of 
“push and pull.”   
Besides wage differences, there are some other factors that impact on the 
decisions of immigrants, such as occupation, financial conditions, age, family 
links in the target area, and the unemployment rate (Borjas, 1988). In fact, neo-
classical model has “push and pull” factors concerning migration from both the 
macro-economic and individual perspectives. As you can see, both forms of the 
neo-classical models stress the significance of rational decision-making as a way 
to maximum returns. However, if the security or safety need cannot be satisfied, 
it is expected that people will not make their decision to migrate based “bounded 
rationality” (Simon, 1997). 
 
Research Questions 
The main questions to be answered in this context are:   
• Is there a relationship between terrorism and net-migration in Turkey? 
• What influence does the terrorism related incidents have on inclinations to 
leave the cities within terrorism infected [Eastern and Southeastern] 
provinces of Turkey?  
  
26
 
Below are the hypotheses of this study. They are going to be mentioned in 
literature review (chapter three) and explained in depth in methodology (chapter 
four). 
H1: net-migration is higher in the areas with high terrorist incidents than 
those with low terrorist incidents. 
H2: the higher the terrorist incident rate, the higher the net-migration. 
H3: the higher the number of deaths caused by terrorism, the higher the 
net-migration. 
H4: in high terrorist incident provinces, the less the province’s average 
GDP per person, the higher the net-migration.  
H5a: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the less the GDP per 
person, the more the terrorist incident rate. 
H5b: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the higher the 
unemployment rate, the more the terrorist incident rate. 
The hypotheses are going to set into play an examination of the 
relationship between inclinations to leave the provinces and the number of 
terrorist incidents. This will be accomplished by examining variables such as 
number of deaths caused by terrorism. The hypotheses will set the stage that will 
allow this study to examine the effect of terrorism on shaping migration patterns. 
The hypotheses will also allow this study to control for other variables (i.e. 
unemployment) and their impacts on migration patterns. 
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Research Design 
In order to answer the research questions, this study is going to use 
secondary data and conduct a quasi experimental design. The intention is to find 
a relationship between terrorist incidents and citizens inclinations to migrate from 
the South East region of Turkey. A multiple regression analysis is going to be 
performed. In this study, the time frame for the analysis is going to be 1992-2000. 
The unit of analysis is going to be provinces of Turkey, especially the ones with 
high terrorism incidents located in the East and Southeast regions of the country. 
Net-migration rate is going to be used as dependent variable to find out 
inclinations to leave the area. Independent variables are going to be the number 
of terrorism related incidents and casualties (the number of people killed and the 
number of security forces). Additionally, as in push-pull model, there are going to 
be some economic (control) variables that are going to be used to avoid 
associating incorrect explanatory power to some of the independent variables 
(Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Those variables are going to be as 
follows: density of population (per square km), GDP per person, unemployment 
rate, electricity usage per person to show industrialization, average distance to 
industrialized provinces, ratio of population to the nationwide population, ratio of 
terrorist incidents to the nationwide terrorist incidents, and agricultural areas. 
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Overview of Following Chapters 
This study contains five chapters. Chapter one, begins with a short 
introduction. It then explains the problems of terrorism, underdevelopment, and 
migration. The chapter also articulates the purpose of the study, the predicted 
relationship between migration patterns and terrorist incidents. The theoretical 
background of the push and pull model of migration and Maslow’s motivational 
theory are also explained.  
As was mentioned above, security needs that arise after being terrorized 
is one of the most basic needs of all individuals. Here, the need for security, as 
presented in Maslow’s motivation theory, is going to be discussed as one of the 
push forces of migration mentioned in push-pull model.  
The second chapter deals with the background information concerning the 
terrorist groups and their incidents in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. This 
discussion is too broad to be included in chapter one. Therefore, it has been 
separated as an individual chapter. This chapter provides a “warm-up” before the 
literature review. It provides important information about the region’s, geography, 
economy, terrorism, terrorism related problems, underdevelopment and the 
poverty level of the region. As will be discussed further the provinces of the East 
and Southeast regions of Turkey not only suffered from terrorism but also 
suffered from economic deprivation, that is typically associated with terrorism.  
Chapter three contains the literature review of this study. It is going to 
provide general information from books and scholarly articles in relation to “push” 
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effect of the conflict and the overall impact of terrorism on society. As will be 
seen, hypothesizes found in next chapter are derived from this chapter. Since 
literature specific to this study is rare, literature related with conflict and violence 
associated migration are also included.  
Chapter four focuses on the research design and the methodology of the 
study. Here, the goal of the study is explained again. Thereafter, the exact 
method of the study, a secondary data analysis, is described. Then, hypotheses 
are going to be articulated along with the instrumentation, variables, data 
collection, data analysis method, and the process of multiple regression.  
Chapter five contains the findings of the study. The results of the data 
analysis are discussed in this chapter. It will explain if and how the regional out-
migration is related with the terrorist incidents of the region. This chapter also 
discusses the migration patterns of all the provinces in Turkey.  
Finally chapter six is a review of the study and offers future 
recommendations. Rapid movements of migration in 1990s have been 
associated with social problems in destinations areas. In addition to inadequate 
infrastructure within the destination areas, rising unemployment and crime rates 
are growing problems associated with this rapid migration movement. This final 
chapter also contains suggestions to the policy analysts as to how they may 
choose to approach these growing problems. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
This part of the study was to be included in the first chapter as a brief 
overview; however, because of its importance to understanding where the 
hypotheses and variables came from it was written as a separate chapter prior to 
the literature review. In relation to the research questions for this study, this 
chapter helps to explain the relationships between migration from the region, the 
economic conditions and the surrounding armed conflicts.  
Initially, the chapter briefly explains the political condition in Northern Iraq 
just after the US 1991 Desert Storm operation. The chaos in Northern Iraq 
helped PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the separatist terrorist organization) to 
have more power, so they were able to use the area as a base and this allowed 
them to increase their terrorist attacks in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. 
Secondly, this chapter provides further geographical information about Turkey 
and the [East and Southeast] regions. Finally, it discusses the following issues: 
conflict related state of emergency rule, pressure, village guard systems, and a 
weak economy as indicators of relocation movements. 
 
Overview of Politics in Northern Iraq 
Just after the 1991 gulf war, as a result of the US Desert Storm operation, 
both Mesud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Celal/Jelal 
Talabani’s Marxist Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) asked for autonomy in 
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Northern Iraq (Wilkenfeld, 1994). At the same time, KDP and PUK maintained a 
low-level war against Iraqi government and each other. This produced chaos and 
violence everywhere in Northern Iraq, which in turn forced many refugees to the 
neighboring countries, including Turkey. In April 1991, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimation of Iraqi refugees in Turkey was 280,000. 
They had maintained camps close to Turkish and Iraqi borders but started to turn 
back to Iraq in May 1991 (Wilkenfeld, 1994).  
In July 1992, after a meeting supported by the US Secretary of State, KDP 
and PUK agreed to merge their guerrillas into one unified force of 30,000 
commanded by Kurdish National Assembly (Wilkenfeld, 1994). The Kurdish 
National Assembly also signed a peace treaty with PKK, which allowed PKK 
terrorists to retreat into Iraq. During that time, terrorist incidents by the PKK in 
Turkey were significantly increased because they were free to use Northern Iraq 
as a base for their terrorist camps and also for logistic support.   
After a disagreement over a tax collections in late 1994, KDP and PUK 
broke their agreement and asked Turkey to help set up a cease-fire. In 1995, 
Turkey brokered a truce, in which the PKK was no longer allowed to use 
Northern Iraq as a base (Fox, 1995). After the agreement, PKK began using 
suicide bombers against KDP and there were increasing clashes between PKK 
terrorists and KDP forces that resulted in noteworthy loses for the KDP (Young, 
1999). In 1997, there were again clashes between KDP and PUK. As a result of 
all those clashes, it is difficult to imagine a stable government or a healthy 
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economy in Northern Iraq, apart of the country that allowed the PKK to use their 
land as camps for its terrorists. 
 
Turkey: Country & Region 
Turkey, a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament, 
geographically bridges the old world continents of Asia and Middle East to 
Europe and lies in the westernmost end of Asia (Anatolia), separated from 
Europe by the Bosporus and Dardanelles waterways. In Turkey, the population’s 
mobility has always been very high, especially from rural countryside to urban; 
from poor agricultural regions to rich industrial areas and from East to West 
(Department of State Statistics, 1996). Emigration abroad is a small part of this 
movement. Census data shows that there has been a decrease in country’s 
general rural population from 81.9 percent to 43.7 between 1940 and 1990 
(Department of State Statistics, 1996).  
Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, as a region, is home to 1.947 million 
families, 14.5% of all families nationwide with 10.2% of the national income 
(Global IDP Database, 2005). It is also a geographically uninviting place to live. 
More than half of the land in the region is higher than 1000 meters. The 
countryside is mainly hilly and mountainous. The average altitude of the 
mountains in Eastern Anatolia is higher than 3,000 meters. The height of plains 
and plateaus in Southeast is 500-700 meters, and increases to 1900 meters in 
the East. The region as a whole has a harsh terrestrial climate.  
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By the 1970s, both leftist and rightist political extremists in Turkey had 
given rise to many terrorist organizations which caused 43,000 terrorist incidents 
between 1978 and 1982 (Rodoplu, Arnold, and Ersoy, 2003). After the cold war, 
and the 1982 military coup, the number of terrorist organizations and their 
incidents sharply decreased all over the country, except for the East and 
Southeast regions. Since the civilian rule in 1983, there have been some terrorist 
organizations and incidents in Turkey, but the PKK, has had [2-3 times] more 
incidents than the total number of terrorist incident of all other terrorist 
organizations around the country. Thus, the regional provinces should have a 
special interest in this study.  
The region is also economically underdeveloped, causing migrants, since 
the 1950’s, to move from rural areas to the urban centers, especially towards the 
Western part of the country (Zucconi, 1999). After the numerous terrorist 
incidents in the region, of the 1990s, terrorism might have been responsible for 
an increase in the migration process (Mutlu, 1995; Zucconi, 1999; Global IDP 
Database, 2005). This last statement is the main subject of this study and most 
of the hypotheses have been developed from it. However, as stated above, 
economic issues are also an important force causing people to migrate out of 
their region. Therefore, this study will also examine the related economic 
variables in order to control their impacts on migration driven by the fear and 
insecurities generated by terrorist activities. 
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Conflict, Migration, and Kurdish Identity 
The majority of people living in the region, especially in rural areas of 
provinces, are called Kurds. It is then important to look at the Kurdish identity in 
relation to the conflict and resulting migration patterns.  
As a word “Kurd” was first mention in the second century BC, as “Cyrtii”; in 
seventh century AD, during the time of the Arab conquest. It was used to denote 
nomadic people (Global IDP Database, 2005). Today, even though the main 
concentration of Kurds live in the rugged mountains of the Zagros, where the 
boarders of Iran, Iraq and Turkey meet, they remained in three world geopolitical 
blocs: the Arab World – Iraq and Syria; NATO bloc – Turkey; and the West Asian 
bloc – Iran, Turkmenistan, Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Mutlu, 
1995; Global IDP Database, 2005).   
In East and Southeast Turkey, many people call themselves Kurds. 
However, there are no official statistics on the total number of Turkish citizens of 
Kurdish origin living in Turkey (Celik, 2002; Global IDP Database, 2005). 
Excluding the Turkish, there are a number of other languages spoken in the 
region: Kermanji, Zaza, Gurani, and Sorani; each with many sub dialects. After 
the First World War, many regional, Kurdish, tribal leaders and members of the 
elites supported Turkey’s resistance movement and war of independence against 
the British, French, Italians, Greeks, and Armenians (Mutlu, 1995; Zucconi, 
1999). For example, at the Erzurum Congress, which was the Turkish resistance 
movement’s founding congress against the Allies in 1919, 22 out of 56 delegates 
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were Kurds (Zucconi, 1999). However, from 1925 to 1939 there were sporadic 
revolts in the region because the people of the region viewed the new, secularly 
formed Turkish Republic as a threat to their beliefs (U.S. Department of State, 
2001a). In response to these revolts, the Government banned the Kurdish 
language in publications until 1991 (Aliza, 1992). To this day, there has never 
been a unified nationalist Kurdish movement in Turkey (Zucconi, 1999).  
The Anatolian people lived together for more than ten centuries, so they 
have a common past, creating a Turkish identity (Mutlu, 1995). Rather than 
ethnic minority rights, the Turkish constitution is based on civic rights. It accepts 
civic nationalism, but not ethnic nationalism. In the Constitution, the term 
“Turkish” refers to being a Turkish citizen, and does not reflect any ethnicity. The 
1982 constitution (article 66/1) states that “any person who is connected to the 
Turkish State throughout the link of citizenship is a Turk.” Mutlu (1995) confirms 
that the constitution of the Republic of Turkey watches over individuals on equal 
footing before the law disregarding of their race, color, sex, language, conviction, 
creed, religion, or political opinion. Therefore, Kurds in Turkey are not separated 
out as “Kurds”. They can integrate with the rest of Turkish society (Zucconi, 
1999).    
In the Republic of Turkey, which relies upon the rule of law, one and all 
have the freedom to claim his or her rights through legal means (Mutlu, 1995). 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin reside throughout the country and can 
take part in all walks of economic, social, and political life on equal grounds with 
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other Turkish citizens. There have been senior officials of Kurdish origin in the 
Ottoman administration and in senior governmental positions of the present 
Republic of Turkey. Like the ex-President of Turkish Republic, Turgut Ozal, many 
rose to positions of power and authority (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). Ziya 
Gökalp, himself of Kurdish origin, is the leading ideologue of Turkish nationalism. 
According to him, a nation is not based on an ethnic, racial, political, 
geographical, or voluntary organization, but rather a society grows out of a 
shared cultural and learning experience (Zucconi, 1999). 
Kurds from the East and Southeastern part of Turkey, where we find 
underdevelopment and often poor economic conditions have often migrated to 
the cities in west part of the country. Since the 1980s, with the appearance of 
more nationalist militant movements and the authoritarian response by the state, 
living conditions of the people of these regions have deteriorated (Zucconi, 
1999). Therefore, it might be concluded that migration is not related to being of 
Kurdish origin, but to the economic conditions and the armed conflict. Election 
data below (table 1, 2, and 3) may help to understanding the role of Kurdish 
identity as concerns the issues of conflict and migration.  
 
Kurdish Identity in General Elections 
In 1991, there was a Socialist Kurdish party, Labor Party (HEP, a 
precursor to HADEP). It campaigned for parliament in the fall 1991 elections. 
Turkey’s election system does not allow parties with less than 10% of votes to 
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have seats in parliament. In order to have seats in parliament, HEP ran for the 
1991 elections as part of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP, an ancestor 
of today’s CHP). According to 1991 election results (table 1), the coalition 
government, headed by conservative True Path party (DYP) joined forces with 
SHP which had members from HEP. However, a vote for SHP in 1991 elections 
did not demonstrate support for the HEP.  Table 2 and 3, with an individual pro-
Kurdish party, show this distinction well. 
 
Table 1: 1991 General Election Vote Shares for Selected Parties 
1991 General Election DYP/ANAP RP    DSP SHP  
(including HEP)
Turkey 51.0 % 16.9 %    10.7 % 20.8 % 
All East & S.East provinces 45.2 21.8    3.3 28.6 
Provinces under Emergency R. 41.3 19.0    1.9 36.5 
SHP Max. (Sirnak) 34.2 2.5    1.1 61.2 
SHP Min. (Elazig) 52.5 29.3    2.4 15.5 
East & S.East provinces w/o E.R. 49.4 24.9    4.9 20.0 
SHP Max. (Kars) 43.9 7.1    17.2 31.1 
SHP Min. (Erzurum) 50.1 37.0    3.4 9.0 
Major cities 49.3 14.2    14.2 21.7 
SHP Max. (Ankara) 46.9 17.6    10.4 24.6 
SHP Min. (Istanbul) 46.3 16.7    17.6 18.8 
Source: Kocher, 2002, p.16 
 
In July 1993, the Constitutional Court (decision 1993/1) banned HEP from 
politics because of its connections with PKK, aimed at “changing the 
characteristic of the republic.” Directly after this action, another socialist Kurdish 
party was formed, HADEP. It also had covert connections with PKK (Sezgin and 
Wall, 2005). HADEP campaigned for both 1995 elections (table 2) and 1999 
elections (table 3).  
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Table 2: 1995 General Election Vote Shares for Selected Parties 
1995 General Election DYP/ANAP RP MHP DSP/CHP HADEP  
(pro-Kurdish) 
Turkey 38.8 % 21.4 % 8.2 % 25.3 % 4.2 % 
All East & S.East provinces 32.8 29.1 7.1 9.7 16.2 
Provinces under Emergency R. 31.2 26.4 5.1 7.6 24.2 
HADEP Max. (Hakkari) 31.3 6.0 2.2 4.6 54.2 
HADEP Min. (Elazig) 36.0 41.8 6.9 9.8 3.9 
East & S.East provinces w/o E.R. 34.6 31.8 9.1 11.9 7.8 
HADEP Max. (Igdir) 25.2 9.4 15.1 21.2 21.7 
HADEP Min. (K.Maras) 36.4 36.8 10.5 12.0 2.7 
Major Cities 38.6 20.8 7.8 26.8 4.0 
HADEP Max. (Adana) 34.0 16.7 14.3 26.6 6.7 
HADEP Min. (Antalya) 41.2 13.3 12.2 30.0 1.9 
      
Source: Kocher, 2002, p.16 
 
Table 3: 1999 General Election Vote Shares for Selected Parties 
1999 General Election DYP/ANAP FP MHP DSP/CHP HADEP   
(pro-Kurdish) 
Turkey 25.2 % 15.4 % 18.0 % 30.9 % 4.7 % 
All East & S.East provinces 29.8 19.3 12.2 12.5 19.1 
Provinces under Emergency R. 29.1 17.3 6.5 10.8 27.0 
HADEP Max. (Hakkari) 27.5 9.9 2.0 10.6 46.1 
HADEP Min. (Elazig) 15.6 24.5 13.6 8.8 4.9 
East & S.East provinces w/o E.R. 30.6 21.5 18.4 14.4 10.5 
HADEP Max. (Agri) 21.9 12.8 7.7 6.9 33.7 
HADEP Min. (Malatya) 13.2 25.3 19.8 20.2 2.3 
Major cities 25.9 15.3 12.8 40.5 4.3 
HADEP Max. (Adana) 21.2 10.3 23.6 33.9 7.4 
HADEP Min. (Antalya) 32.5 6.3 22.3 32.3 2.5 
      
Source: Kocher, 2002, p.15 
 
In 1999 election, voter participation was 83% in East and Southeast 
regions and 87% in overall Turkey. The proportion of valid votes was 95% in East 
and Southeast regions and 94% in overall Turkey (Kocher, 2002). The electoral 
results for the two campaigns of HADEP were quite similar with slightly better 
result in 1999. In contrast, PKK terrorism was decreasing between 1995 and 
1999. HADEP was unable to get a majority of votes in any province of Turkey. 
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The overall tendency in East and Southeast regions were toward a stable centre 
(DYP/ANAP) and far-right (RP in 1995 and FP in 1999). As shown in the election 
results, the Kurdish identity was not a dominant factor in the elections. Put 
simply, parties with PKK connections were not supported by the majority of 
voters.  
 
Terrorism in the Region 
After the 1961 constitution, the most liberal constitution that Turkey has 
ever had, many leftist organizations mushroomed in Turkey. During the 1970s, 
these leftist ideas were popular among people from East and Southeast. 
Migration from those areas to urban areas increased as did enrollment in higher 
education (Cornell, 2001). Policy was influenced by the victorious national 
liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Mutlu, 1995). Led by 
Abdullah Ocalan, PKK was formed as a radical socialist liberation movement 
during the late 1970s. PKK described the Eastern part of Turkey as an area 
under colonial regulation that exploited the lower classes (Gunter, 1990; Cornell, 
2001). PKK was first funded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After the 
Soviet Union, it was sponsored by Syria, Iran, Greece, and Greek Cyprus 
(Kaminaris, 1999; Cornell, 2001). 
In August 1984, PKK started carrying out revolutionary combat against 
Turkish security forces, with the declared aim of creating an independent national 
socialist state based on Marxist-Leninist ideology in so-called "Northern 
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Kurdistan," This area covered 22 provinces in the East and Southeast parts of 
Turkey (Mutlu, 1995; Kirisci, 1998; Zucconi, 1999; U.S. Department of State, 
2001a). In order to achieve its aims, PKK performed violent acts aimed at the 
people in the region. PKK tried to wipe out the ruling power of the state in the 
region and was successful in preventing investments that were essential for the 
region’s economic and social development (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). 
During the 1980s the PKK increasingly widened its area of influence by 
attacking and killing both security forces and civilians, including unarmed 
villagers, civil servants, doctors, teachers, and even mayors (Mutlu, 1995; Global 
IDP Database, 2005). Among those civilians, most were Kurdish descendent and 
were accused of collaborating with the state. In response, the Turkish National 
Police (TNP), Gendarme, and armed forces waged an increasingly intense war 
against terrorism; they targeted persons that they believe supported or 
sympathize with the PKK.  
People in the region were generally hostile to the PKK in the beginning 
and did not support its methods (Mutlu, 1995; U.S. Department of State, 2001a). 
However, some were sympathetic to it because they believe the PKK was the 
only agent that represented their voice in Turkey’s domestic agenda (U.S. 
Department of State, 2001a).  
In its struggle against the PKK, the Government of Turkey relied primarily 
on a military strategy, which included the evacuation of villages to secure certain 
areas. However, this strategy resulted in human rights abuses and risked 
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alienating the local population (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). Later, when 
government forced its citizens in the region to choose sides many people did not 
know about PKK and its violence. They decided to support it because they saw 
government’s oppression on an extensive scale, and thought that the PKK would 
protect their rights (Mutlu, 1995). Also, they though government would not kill 
them, but the PKK would.  
At the end of 1980s the PKK frequently massacred entire families. When 
the PKK attacked villages, many women and children were trapped in the fires or 
shot during armed fights. Often relatives of village guards were arbitrarily killed 
(Global IDP Database, 2005).  
In 1990s, the terrorist organization waged an increasingly violent terrorist 
insurgency in the region (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). Roadside explosions 
caused by remote controlled land mines or other improvised explosive devices in 
Batman, Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Mardin, Diyarbakir and Tunceli provinces occurred 
regularly. There were also a number of PKK raids on Gendarme stations and 
surprise attacks and ambushes of mobile security force patrols in rural areas of 
many provinces in the region.   
PKK was responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, including unarmed 
civilians. For example, in May of 1993, PKK members stopped a bus and 
massacred more than 30 young men near Bingol province in Southeastern 
Turkey (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). In October 1993, 11 children were 
intentionally killed in a PKK attack in the village of Daltepe, near the Siirt province 
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of the region. In the same month the PKK terrorists kidnapped 32 men, including 
6 juveniles, from Yavi, in the Cat district of Erzurum province, and took their lives 
(Global IDP Database, 2005).  
Since 1984, almost 100 teachers have been killed because public school 
education was being taught in Turkish. In late 1994, PKK terrorists kidnapped 
and killed 19 teachers, who were working in small villages in the Southeast 
(Global IDP Database, 2005). In March 1995 and April 1996, PKK leader, 
Abdullah Ocalan, openly threatened that PKK terrorists would increase bombing 
assaults on civilian targets in Turkey (Global IDP Database, 2005) 
The PKK also targeted the country’s economic infrastructure. It has 
attacked pipelines and other government investments in the southeast and 
selectively bombed hotels, restaurants and tourist sites (Global IDP Database, 
2005). In an apparent effort to generate publicity and discourage tourism, it has 
kidnapped Westerners and journalists, traveling in eastern Turkey. Therefore, 
visitors to the region were advised to travel only during daylight hours and only 
by major highways. In order to make the roads safer, the Gendarme and TNP 
forces monitored checkpoints throughout the region and restricted access to 
some roads at certain times. They also required escort vehicles to “convoy” 
visitors all the way through designated dangerous areas.    
Since the arrest of PKK leader in June 1999 and its declaration of 
unilateral cease-fire, the level of violence in south-eastern Turkey has radically 
decreased (Global IDP Database, 2005). In 2000, PKK violence against the 
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government and civilians slowed considerably and were no longer an important 
factor in the daily life of southeast residents.  However, according to the U.S. 
Department of State (2001a), thousands of militarily structured, heavily armed 
PKK terrorists are still located in neighboring countries near Turkey. Terrorist 
organization’s announcement of their aim to end the unilateral cease-fire and 
resume violent activities in June 2004 confirmed the information above.  
 
State of Emergency Rule (SER) 
According to 1982 Constitution of Turkish Republic (article 118), National 
Security Council (NSC), consists of the top military officers, governmental 
representatives and the President, gets decisions to “protect the peace and 
security of the society”. It was a custom that NSC decisions are to be priority 
consideration and generally agreed by the Board of Ministers, even if its 
decisions are in economic or educational fields (Zucconi, 1999). In 1987, by the 
advice of NSC, state of SER was announced for eleven provinces, Batman, 
Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Van, Bingol, and Tunceli, in 
the region and renewed every four month (Global IDP Database, 2005). By that 
Rule, all policy options related to the PKK terrorism left to the military in the 
region (Zucconi, 1999). At its peek, SER was sheltered 13 provinces, and, by the 
reduction of the terrorist threat, it was lifted (Global IDP Database, 2005). By its 
lift in last two provinces, Diyarbakir and Sirnak, in November 2002, it was 
completely terminated. 
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According to the SER, all security forces, including the army, operated in 
the Emergency Region (OHAL) under the authority of the OHAL Governor. The 
OHAL Governor answered to the Interior Ministry and functioned as a 
representative of civil authority. For that reason, the conflict with PKK terrorism 
was primarily an internal security matter (U.S. Department of State, 2001a). 
Serving an internal security function, the army forces, in support of the 
Gendarme and partially the TNP, performed operations against the PKK 
terrorists in OHAL. 
However, SER increased the military pressure in the region (Global IDP 
Database, 2005). Consequently, people of the region were forced into the center 
of the conflict. On the one side they faced bloody terrorists and on the other there 
was a military power with comprehensive initiatives based on SER. According to 
a village dweller in Hakkari province, villagers were like slaves of the security 
forces throughout day and slaves of the PKK terrorist during night (Kirisci and 
Winrow, 1997).  
 
Conflict, Pressure, & Relocation Movements 
In 1992, there was a policy of village evacuations for isolated rural hamlets 
and villages that were close to terrorist located in the mountains and near the 
borders. Those evacuations were performed by governmental forces for two 
main reasons (Parliamentary Report, 1997; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997; Zucconi, 
1999). First reason is to protect the people of the isolated rural areas and 
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hamlets in the region from the conflict between the security forces and the 
terrorist groups.  This was done because of the elevated risk and insecurity in 
many areas. This was often accomplished by bringing some of the hamlets and 
villages together under one name in a “central village.”  
The second aim was to stop the logistical support provided to the 
members of the terrorist organization, who obliged villagers to provide them with 
food and shelter and revenue through taxes. At the end on 1994, 1,046 villages 
and hamlets had been evacuated: 75 because of “security reasons,” 812 as a 
result of “PKK pressure,” and 34 for “economic reasons” (U.S. Department of 
State, 2001a). Since the central village strategy combined small villages and 
hamlets, which were inside the same provinces, this procedure did not have any 
impact on the net-migration patterns of the provinces. Therefore, this evacuation 
process will not be a factor in this study.  
Land mines and other forms of violence by the terrorist groups were 
among the major concerns of the government. These activities by the PKK 
terrorists had created an atmosphere of anxiety and insecurity through such 
tactics as raiding, looting, burning villages and by mining roads and fields (Kirisci 
and Winrow, 1997; Zucconi, 1999). Therefore, in conjunction with the 
evacuations, several limitations on agricultural activities were put into place, such 
as limited grazing and farming in the highlands. From the security forces 
perspective, those restrictions were necessary to distinguish the terrorists from 
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the villagers in rural mountainous fields. However, this policy also caused 
economic deprivation for the inhabitants of the region (Zucconi, 1999).   
During this conflict estimates of the numbers of people who emigrated 
ranges from 350,000, by the government to the NGOs’ estimates of up to 4 
million (Global IDP Database, 2005). This significant discrepancy was due to the 
government counting only the people who had been evacuated.  However, many 
uncounted people also migrated because of the pressure of the terrorist 
organization and/or the restrictions placed on them by the government.  
 A Parliamentary Report (1997), conducted to determine the problems of 
people who emigrated from the region, assessed that (as of 1997) 3 million 
citizens had migrated in or out of the Eastern and Southeastern part of the 
country during the 15 years long conflict.  However, it did not provide specific 
details that identified the various reasons for that migration.  
The U.S. Department of State (2001b) also discussed the PKK’s practices 
of killing, kidnapping, and threatening people as a strategy used to recruit new 
members and to also gain logistic support. Those practices motivated people to 
leave their homes and move to safer places to protect themselves. Because of 
this migration, regional provinces doubled, and some even tripled, in size in 
1990s, without a commensurate increase in services such as schools (U.S. 
Department of State, 2001b). According to Cabbar Leygara, the former mayor of 
Baglar district in Diyarbakir, the move to urban centers in the region during the 
early and mid 1990s was not a typical migration process. It was the result of an 
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escape from terrorism.  This was supported by the fact that the migration was not 
organized in same way as the typical rural to urban moves had been (Human 
Rights Watch, 2002). Because of the unanticipated nature of conflict, people 
tended to leave many of their possessions behind. This resulted in not only social 
and psychological problems, but also economic ones too.   
 
Village Guards 
Temporary village guards were among the government policy against the 
PKK. In April 1985, a new law (no.3175) amended the Village Law of 442, and 
allowed the temporary village guards (Gecici Koy Korucusu – GKK) from the 
region to help fight the terrorism problem (Global IDP Database, 2005). 
According to Global IDP Database (2005), in 2000, there were over 80,000 
GKKs, with about 400,000 family members. In order to protect their villages 
against PKK raids and to cancel logistical support for the terrorists near their 
villages, the GKKs were equipped with arms and paid by the government 
(Kiliccioglu, 2002; U.S. Department of State, 2001a).  
Villagers were free to apply for the new paramilitary militia, but many of 
them hesitated because of their fear of the PKK’s retributions. Also  some of the 
villagers, that had no GKKs were suspected to be PKK sympathizers in the eyes 
of the security forces and so were harassed by the  security forces, other village 
guards, as well as the terrorists if they refused to support them (Zucconi, 1999).  
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Hence, civilians, living in the region and taking no part in the disagreement, were 
really faced with a terrible dilemma. 
After the government policy of GKK, the PKK declared villagers who 
applied for the GKK system to be their enemy.  Also, PKK members often 
executed GKKs, members when they caught them (Human Rights Watch, 2002; 
Global IDP Database, 2005). The PKK terrorist’s strategy went farther when they 
decided to start massacring GKKs’ noncombatant families, including women and 
children. According to the government’s Global IDP Database (2005), after the 
village guard system was employed the PKK’s main target was the GKKs and 
their families.   
Consequently, armed conflict put the people of the region at risk (Cornell, 
2001). They were also killed deliberately for joining the GKK force as they 
attempted to protect their villages. If taken hostage during a PKK raid, many of 
the villagers were killed just because they had joined the Government’s GKK 
system (Global IDP Database, 2005). Tragically, villagers who refused to join the 
GKK system faced retaliations from the security forces. Those villagers were also 
accused by neighboring villagers, who had joined the GKK system of leaving 
their flanks vulnerable to PKK raids (Human Rights Watch, 2002). As a result of 
this dilemma, many villagers left for the cities.  
Apart from the protection of their villages, GKKs were occasionally used in 
operations as a force against the PKK because they knew the terrain well. 
However, they had no formal chain of command and were commonly believed to 
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be the least disciplined security force in the region (U.S. Department of State, 
2001a). In addition, they often used their powers to pressure other villagers, 
whom they thought were PKK supporters. As a result they became known for not 
only protecting their villages against terrorists, but also for killing, torturing, and 
reinforcing the local supremacy of their tribal leaders through the use of this  
“private army” (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Global IDP Database, 2005). 
 
Economy and Conflict in the Region 
According to Internally Displaced Persons’ Database (2005), regional 
inequality in Turkey is very high. For example, in terms of Gross National Product 
(GNP) per capita, the difference between the provinces (Kocaeli-Mus), which has 
the highest and lowest GNP scores, the ratio is 1 to 11. In other words, in Kocaeli 
GNP is 11 times higher than that in Mus. The poorest cities of Turkey are located 
in the East-Southeast region, Mus, Agri, Bitlis and Bingol (Global IDP Database, 
2005). This region is also rated as last in economic growth, development and in 
its share of the national disposable income (Global IDP Database, 2005). 
According to Zucconi (1999), the conflict in Southeastern Turkey is mostly 
related to the economy. The area has always been a place of structural 
underdevelopment and after the Second World War has maintained high levels 
of migration. There is also a significant gap between the rich and the poor within 
the region.  The poorest 20% of the inhabitants are 11 times more economically 
deprived than the wealthiest 20% (Human Development Report for Turkey, 
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1997). Comparing this region with the others in Turkey, the proportion of citizens 
living below poverty line can also demonstrate the poverty of the region. In 
Turkey, the proportion of citizens living below poverty line is 14.2 while it is 30 in 
the underdeveloped Eastern and Southeastern regions. While this is significant, 
data indicate that those living below the poverty level in industrialized Marmara 
and Aegean regions is only 1.4 (Zucconi, 1999). 
The regional economy had been substantially dependent on agricultural 
activities. However, 38% of villagers in the region are landless (Global IDP 
Database, 2005). Because of the common land inequality of farming lands and 
harsh climate, animal husbandry has been the main agricultural activity in the 
region.  Unfortunately, because of the governmental restrictions on agricultural 
activities in an attempt to fight against terrorism, productivity and growth of 
animal husbandry severely declined (Zucconi, 1999; Global IDP Database, 
2005).  
In order to engage in animal husbandry, people had usually preferred to 
leave in small Hamlets located in open lands far from city centers and big 
villages. Armed conflict prevented these people from engaging in husbandry, 
making things worse. Before the conflict, the region was the core of livestock for 
both Turkey and its neighbors. After those conflicts started the number of 
livestock dropped significantly from 30 to 2 million (Zucconi, 1999). 
The continuation of the terrorist problem made conditions harsher 
because, as has been mentioned, the threat of terror forced people to either 
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migrate from their home lands or be displaced by the government to a safer 
place. This caused another problem, unemployment. After their moves to central 
villages or city centers, people, who used to be engaged in husbandry and 
farming, tried to adapt to the new settings. Although some of them adapted and 
found work, many others, especially older ones, were not able to. (Global IDP 
Database, 2005).  
According to Zucconi (1999), the fear caused by the conflict of terrorism 
and the new government restrictions caused people to move from rural to urban 
settings within the same province. They also tended to move to the central urban 
cities inside the region, like Diyarbakir, Urfa, and Van (Parliamentary Report, 
1997). According to the 1997 Parliamentary report, the population in Diyarbakir 
doubled in five years. This resulted in mass unemployment of people. In the year 
of 1996, there were over 15,000 street vendors in Van, and there was a 30 
percent unemployment rate in Diyarbakir (Zucconi, 1999).  
Thus, the regional economy has been disrupted by the conflict. During the 
worst years of the conflict in the region, between the years of 1987 and 1994, 
there was a thirty percent decline in income from 14.6 to 10.2. During the same 
time, there was a very small decrease in population from 14.7 to 14.6 (Zucconi, 
1999; Global IDP Database, 2005). Interestingly, at the same time, the mean 
nationwide income was rising. Just before 1980s, prior to the conflict, per capita 
income in the region was 34.4% of that of the wealthiest regions. However, in the 
mid-1980s, just after the conflict, it fell to 29.2% (Zucconi, 1999). 
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Zucconi (1999) mentions the impact of the conflict on the Turkish state 
economy. It is in fact that the conflict not only negatively impacted the regional 
economy, but it also negatively impacted the national economy. According to 
Zucconi, the conflict in the region exhausted the resources of the nation and 
absorbed about one third of the state’s annual budget in 1999 alone. In addition, 
the conflict contributed to corruption and criminal activities as drug trafficking was 
the major source of income for the terrorist groups. Kirisci and Winrow (1997) 
also discussed the affect of the conflict on the economy. They stated that 
statewide GDP was $173 billion in 1993, but that state expenses for security and 
emergency rule for the fallowing year were above $11 billion. This figure shows 
what a negative impact the conflict was on the national economy.  
According to the “human development index” (HDI) (1997), an index 
based on life expectancy, literacy rates, school enrollment ratios, and adjusted 
income, nine of last eleven spots of Turkey are among the region. In 1990s, the 
literacy rate of the region was 58.3% and the ratio of students in schools to the 
population between ages 7 and 21, was 38.8%. However, the literacy rates of the 
Marmara and Aegean region was 84.6%, and the ratio of students to the 
population was 61.6%. Increasing the number of private schools and the 
expenditures for private education in the Marmara and Aegean regions 
contributed to this widen gap between the regions.  
In East and Southeast region(s), the fragile economic conditions, regional 
economic imbalances, and loss of income sources reflected the extended 
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security problems (Human Development Report for Turkey, 1997; Zucconi, 
1999). Government authorities also agreed that the region was faced with 
economic problems (Mutlu, 1995). In response to these imbalances, public 
investments and expenditures to the region had been higher since 1980s than in 
the other regions and three times higher than the country’s national average 
(Kirisci and Winrow, 1997). One of the major investments in the region was the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), which was a serious of dams on Firat 
(Euphrates) and Dicle (Tigris) rivers that produce electricity and irrigate the arid 
but fertile lands of the region. GAP, was also interrupted by terrorism, along with 
its aims to modify the social and economic framework of the region (Mutlu, 1995). 
However, extensive public investments did not match by far private investments. 
The following figure shows this imbalance. In 1992, even though the population 
of the region was about 15% of the overall population, they only had 5.8% of the 
national bank deposits and credits (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997).  
Further, a comparison of the number of people to health staff in 1990’s 
also shows the effects of the security problem on public expenditures in the 
region. According to Human development report for Turkey (1997), the ratio of 
citizens to medical doctors is double in the region when compared with the rest of 
the country and triple when compared with the Marmara region.  
It is important to let the reader know that Turkey’s Constitution guarantees 
“social security” to all its citizens. So during the conflict of the 1990s, the Turkish 
state attempted to be providing this service and urged its officials to work in the 
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region. The State paid extra money to officials who worked in this area under the 
name of “security compensation.” The State also tried to appoint new 
government employees to the region as they had little say in where they would 
start their work. 
To conclude, PKK forced people either to join the terrorist organization or 
to move towards other cities by using fear and violence. In fact, forcing people to 
migrate towards other cities inside the country was a Maoist strategy (Goodman 
& Franks, 1975). However, the first government responses to the regional 
terrorism were not against this strategy of PKK. Also, they were collapsed the 
weak economic activities of the region and increased the fear of the people. In 
addition, the Gulf War worsened the political conditions in Northern Iraq, and the 
living conditions and terrorist incidents in the Southeast region of Turkey. 
Increased terrorist incidents in the region degenerate the weak economic 
conditions, and also might have impacted on people’s dedications to migrate out.  
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The migration literature is very huge in size, so it is difficult for this study to 
offer a complete review of it. Therefore, the literature review in this study is going 
to use a very broad brush for the general migration studies. After giving a general 
idea about the perspectives of migration literature, this chapter will focus on the 
push and pull model of migration. This will be followed by, a focus is on conflict 
and violence related migration, specifically as it relates to the research question 
and the hypotheses of this study. Finally, literature concerning migration in 
Turkey is going to be reviewed. 
The information in this chapter is the basis for the hypotheses of this 
study. It will concentrate on the relationship between terrorist incidents and 
migration patterns. In order to show this relationship, which is going to be 
mentioned in following chapter under hypotheses, this part of the study will 
examine all conceptual variables, representing empirical facts in describing 
hypotheses. Since there is a scarcity of migration literature directly related to 
terrorism, migration literature related to conflict, chaos, and violence are given 
special importance. 
To make the conceptual variables easier to understand, this study will 
divide variables into groups (table 4): terrorism, conflict and violence related – 
casualties, likelihood of an individual to be a victim, insecurity or violence, and 
the number of terrorist incidents or guerrilla attacks; economy related – income, 
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industrial workforce, and unemployment; and other variables – geographic 
distance and density of population.  
Table 4: selected literature related with migration and refugee movement  
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The Table 4 above and the Figure 1 below can help the reader to 
understand where the conceptual variables of this study come from and how the 
hypotheses of this study were developed.  
 
Figure 1: variables of migration in groups 
 
As is mentioned in hypotheses, this study hypothesizes that there is a 
positive relationship between migration and terrorist incidents. It may be a direct 
relationship as it is mentioned in hypotheses 2 and 3 or an indirect one as is 
mentioned in hypotheses 4 and 5. The hypothetical relationship is shown in 
figure 1. Since the focal point of the study is the impact of terrorist incidents on 
migration patterns (hypotheses 2 and 3) the literature review is mostly focused 
on the literature related to conflict-violence related migration and forced 
migration.  
While reviewing the literature, it was observed that the economic model 
that focus on voluntary migration are dominant in migration studies as too are  
the economic variables (Sahota, 1968; Atalik and Ciraci, 1993; Pazarlıoglu, 2001; 
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Pendleton, 2001; Moore and Shellman, 2002; Carlos, 2002; Moore and 
Shellman, 2004b). Also, the literature reiterates that poor economic conditions 
are among the main causes of terrorism, thus indirectly causing migration 
(hypotheses 4 and 5) (Kennedy 1986; Kegley, 1990; Charshaw 1990). Therefore, 
literature that is related to economic models of migration is also going to be 
covered. It is going to be beneficial for this study as it tries to control economic 
impacts on migration patterns. 
 
Migration in Broad Perspective 
Studies related with migration mostly focused on voluntary migration, with 
very little emphasis on the event of necessary or involuntary population 
movements. Some scholars added in involuntary migration along with overall 
migration. For example, both Kunz (1973) and Richmond (1993) criticized 
migration theories for not including the involuntary migration or refugee 
movements. Even so, the central focus of broad-spectrum migration theories are 
on voluntary population movements (Ravenstein 1889; Lewis, 1954; Harris and 
Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976; Lee 1966). As a voluntarily profit seeking 
movement, economists are interested in migration. They mostly relate the causes 
of migration with the mobility of labor force for better employment and income 
opportunities (Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 1976). 
However, migration cannot be explained only by a desire for economic 
profits (Kunz, 1973; Richmond, 1993; Voutira, 1997). Avoiding conflict, violence 
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or disaster is also a basic need for human-beings (Maslow, 1943). After the cold 
war era in late 20th century, many causes forced people to migrate out of their 
homes as refugees. Some authors began to support the dominance of the 
refugee practices as a model of displacement (Voutira, 1997). Both refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) represent a populace who involuntarily 
migrate out or are forced to flee their home towns as a result of a violence, 
conflict, or harassment. Unlike the voluntary migrants, they must accept the loose 
of houses, tools, lands, and rights (Boano, Rottlaender, Sanchez-Bayo, and 
Viliani, 2003). 
Moreover, as will be mentioned in hypothesis 4, an armed conflict may be 
a cause of economic collapse through the destruction of the economic structures 
(Boano et. all, 2003). It may also result in a decline of the public services and 
infrastructures which may also impact negatively on the functions of economic 
consistency. According to Boano (et al, 2003), the investment and expenditure 
rates also decrease, as a result of lack of resources and opportunities. 
Ultimately, unmet essential needs forced people to migrate in an attempt to get 
them met (Maslow, 1943). This conflict generated migration also impacts the 
economy causing new conflicts (Boano et. all, 2003).    
During the times of conflict, an environment of violence is the main cause 
for people to flee their homes (hypotheses 2 and 3). According to Boano (et. all, 
2003), violence threatens the individual’s sense of security, which is a basic need 
for people. They point out that the level of violence is related to the level of 
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apparent threat. Thus, individuals assess the level of violence to decide their 
future moves. The level of violence is an important variable in determining the 
causes of migration. In order to indicate the level of violence this study uses a 
number of terrorist incidents as will be mentioned in the hypotheses.  
Still, the number of studies examining the level of violence as an indicator 
for out-migration is limited. However, a few authors have made a distinction 
concerning the types of violence (Davenport, Moore, Poe, 2003; Russell, 1995). 
According to them the types of violence have different results on migration flows. 
Whereas the types of violence are different, the theories used by the violence 
related migration studies are almost all the same. They all utilize the “push and 
pull” model as a theory to understand migration patterns. 
 
Push and Pull Model in Literature 
The push-pull model primarily developed for migration studies relies 
mainly on the motives of the migrant. It was first used by economists as an 
economic theory that explained move from places of labor surplus (low income 
and employment) to places of labor scarcity (high income and employment). 
They mostly used the model to explain migration as a consequence of a series of 
rational and calculated economic choices by people (Todaro, 1976; Marshall, 
1978; Piore, 1979; Clark, 1989; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989 and Weiner, 
1996). According to neoclassical approach, economic opportunities (i.e. income) 
are the main reason for migration. Many migration studies emphasize the 
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importance of income as a factor in the migration decision both from the 
neoclassical approach and “new economics of migration.”  
As concerns voluntary migration, economy is accepted as the core 
determinant for migration. According to micro-economic approaches, the 
opportunity of getting a job is a known factor (Harris-Todaro, 1970). For the 
involuntary migration, it may also have an effect on the migrants’ decision. 
Therefore, many forced, violence, or conflict related migration studies also 
include economic variables in their models (Goodman, et. al, 1975; May and 
Morrison, 1994; Schmeidl, 1997; Davenport, Moore, and Poe, 2003). In terms of 
involuntary migration studies, some scholars have taken for granted a 
relationship between poverty and leaving the place of origin (Weiner and Munz, 
1997), and some others found that economic opportunity was indeed a significant 
factor of migration patterns (May and Morrison, 1994). However, some others 
scholars have been unable to find a relationship between poor economic 
conditions and the creation of a refugee population (Stanley, 1987; Schmeidl, 
1997).  
As explained above, a wide-range of literature has attempted to clarify 
migration patterns based solely on economic motives or variables that push or 
pull migrants between places. However, using the push and pull model as related 
to economic factors and migration has some critics. The major critique of using 
the “push and pull model based only on economic boundaries” is that it entirely 
ignores other influences in the decision to migrate. There is a significant amount 
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of migration literature that refutes the idea that migrants are “pulled” by purely 
economic incentives (Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Curry-Rodríguez, 1988; 
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994).  
Islas (2005) states that the attempt to explain migration based solely on 
economic models is not sufficient and is also problematic. In her study, she 
conducted in-depth interviews with four previous migrants to understand their 
experiences concerning migration. She found that people migrate even if 
economic incentives do not exist. Russell (1995) stresses out that the conditions, 
structures, and objectives act as “push and pull” forces for migration. According 
to Boano (et. all, 2003) any kind of migration that happens is caused by a 
combination of “push and pull” forces. According to the “new economics of 
migration,” even the households, as decision makers, are accepted as a push-
pull force (Rotte & Vogler, 1998).   
All migrants decide after considering these factors (Davenport, et al., 
2003). Depending on degrees of “push and pull” forces, the act and motivation of 
migration can be changed. The difference between migrants, refugees, and 
internally displaced persons is based on their motivation to leave. It is all related 
to the coercion present and the choice of the migrant (Van Hear, 1998; 
Pedersen, 2003).  
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Conflict, Violence & Migration 
In Angola, almost 2 million people in 1992-1994 and almost 3 million in 
1998 left their homes as a result of armed conflict (Celik, 2002). Muggah (2003) 
mentions about that the leading “push factors” leading to internal migration are 
natural and human-made disasters, ethnic or religious persecution, and the 
development and conflicts. He states that internal migration is induced by 
coercion where people are facing more risks than opportunities.  An example is 
Sri Lanka where the civilians were brutally displaced by the conflict. Except for 
the natural disasters, all Muggah’s causes of internal migration are related to 
some kind of terror and/or violence. These causes are addressed in hypotheses 
2 and 3 of this study.  
Indeed, numerous studies explore the subject of migration in response to 
violence; however, most of them are related to forced (involuntary) migration and 
have a special focus on exodus (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003). Although 
violence clearly plays a role in the decision to migrate, it may not be assumed 
that migration results purely from political rather than economic factors. Hamilton 
and Chinchilla (1991) stated that a grouping of the effects of political crisis, 
economic crisis, and war might transform a normal migration into a movement. 
William Stanley (1987) examined the impact of both political violence and a poor 
economy on international migration from El Salvador. He used a time series 
analysis and found that political violence explained more than half of the variance 
of motivation of Salvadorian people who migrated to the USA. However, he could 
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not find a significant relationship between migration from the country and 
economic variables. 
Literature on involuntary migration is inclined to examine the society or 
country at the macro level as the unit of explanation. Since the push-pull model 
sees migration as a result of human motivation, exposure to violence can be a 
good motive for people searching for security. According to Davenport (et al., 
2003), terror campaigns and violent protests by dissidents cause public fear and 
can push the population toward the need for security. They mentioned some 
specific dissident movements, such as violent separatist or revolutionary 
movements creating aggressive and insecure settings. In such an environment 
people feel their security to be in danger as situations gets worse. Davenport (et 
al., 2003) also concluded that government violence together with the dissident 
violence increases the individuals’ perceptions of threat and insecurity. 
Other than Davenport (et al., 2003), some literature also investigates 
government sponsored violence. Violence such as human rights violations, 
repression, genocide, and state victimization of minorities are indicators of 
violence related migration (Hakovirta, 1986; Gibney, Apodaca, and McCann, 
1996; Apodaca, 1998; Jonassohn, 1993; Rummel, 1994; Jonassohn and 
Bjornson, 1998; Zolberg, et. al., 1989; Schmeidl, 1997; Newland, 1993; 
Kaufmann, 1998). Davenport (et al., 2003) looked at global migrant flows 
between 1964 and 1989.  Schmeidl (1997) on the other hand looked at third 
world refugee between 1971 and 1990. They both shared a number of similarities 
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in their empirical analyses. Schmeidl (1997) focused on actions of actors in 
political rivalry. Similarly, Davenport (et al., 2003) focused on conflict between the 
government and dissidents. They both distinguished the sources of threats into 
three categories: state violence, dissident violence, and the composition of state–
dissident violence. They both stated that internally displaced people and 
refugees try to escape from the same occurrences. 
Among the violence related literature, only very little number of studies 
used the power of statistical inference (Hakovirta, 1986; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997; 
Gibney, et al. 1996; Apodaca, 1998; and Davenport, et al., 2003). Some of the 
studies stated that the correlation between violence and migration was not as 
complex as the one between economic conditions and voluntary migration 
(Massey et al., 1994). On the other hand some others believe that the correlation 
between violent conflicts and migration is as significant as voluntary migration 
(Davenport, et al., 2003). Moreover, they believe that violent conflicts were the 
main reason of forced migration. 
Among violence related migration studies Schmeidl’s (1995, 1997) laid 
down the standards (Davenport, et al., 2003). She performed a multivariate 
analysis that considers both push and pull forces of migration. She found that 
institutional human rights violations have weaker explanatory power than that of 
generalized violence, and civil wars with foreign military influences are more 
significant in generating large number of refugees than are those without outside 
intervention. 
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The studies of Hakovirta (1986) and Apodaca (1998) contain selection 
biases as they only study countries that produce refugees. At the global level, 
Gibney (et al., 1996) does not mention in detail the factors that distinguish states 
producing migration from those that don’t. Similar to Hakovirta (1986) and 
Apodaca (1998), Gibney (et al., 1996) also ignores internally displaced people in 
his analyses. Within the classic economy related migration literature only (e.g. 
Todaro, 1976), Hakovirta (1986) and Apodaca (1998) focus on variables that 
apply to out-migration generating countries. Gibney (et al., 1996), on the other 
hand, looks at the variables within the in-migration countries. Lastly, all of their 
consideration is incomplete because of the “push” and “pull” factors affecting the 
exodus could also be influenced by both the internal conditions within migrant 
countries and also the external conditions found in other countries (Davenport, et 
al., 2003).  
 
Selected Studies on Migration 
In their study, May and Morrison (1994) focused on the impact of political 
and economic factors on internal migration within Guatemala from 1976 to 1981. 
They explore the constant violence in Guatemalan politics and examined the 
impact of that violence on migration from two perspectives: the first cycle (1960-
1973) and the second cycle (1972-1985). They investigated whether or not 
political violence had had any impact on internal migration in Guatemala. Similar 
to the second and third hypotheses of this study, they hypothesized that violence 
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shaped migration flows. Their dependent variable was the probability of migration 
from one state to another. This was defined as the number of migrants from one 
state to another, divided by the rest of the population within the state. This 
technique was also used previously by Schultz (1982).  
The authors concluded that people are willing to “pay” for safety in order to 
stay away from violence. They stated that safety is definitely a personal need, but 
that its level of value does vary from person to person. Therefore, the amount of 
safety needed would vary depending on the person. According to their study, an 
increase in the level of political violence in a particular location does raise the 
need for safety in that region. That increased need for safety impacts significantly 
on people’s choices. Either they would decrease their expectations of safety and 
remain in the area, or they would leave their home in order to find safety. In 
choosing among those alternatives, people first check the cost of their safety 
(May and Morrison, 1994). Therefore, an individual’s choice to migrate might be 
affected by the cost of migration, an expletory factor (variable) for migration.  
In order to measure the impact of violence on migration, May and 
Morrison (1994) used political killings and “corpses found,” or bodies of people 
killed for political reasons by paramilitary organizations, the security personal, 
and guerrillas. The “paramilitary” variable was used to measure the level of state-
sponsored terror. They also utilized distance from the incident as an indicator of 
the economic and psychic cost of migration. Moreover, they used unemployment, 
expected wage, and literacy rate in both origin and target places as variables 
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involved in the migration decision making process. Tax receipts were used as 
indicators of expected wages. To test their hypothesis, they classified the levels 
of violence as either high or low.  
Their statistical results supported their hypothesis. For instance, if violent 
incidences per capita doubled in high violence areas, there would be a 7% 
increase in out-migration. However, if the same increase in violence occurred in 
states with a previously low level of violence, there was no increase in out-
migration. Moreover, when noted a doubling in the level of violence within a 
destination areas, they found a 2 to 9 percent decrease in in-migration.  
As far as the economic variables were concerned, they found that if the 
expected wages in destination area were doubled, there would be a 75 to 85 
percent increase in in-migration to those places. Conversely, if the 
unemployment in the destination area was doubled, there would be a 15 to 28 
percent decrease in in-migration to those places. Interestingly, they also found 
that people were less likely to migrate to places with high literacy rates and more 
likely to migrate a closer state.  
In order to differentiate refugee from internally displaced person, Moore 
and Shellman (2002) focused on three groups of variables across two settings: 
violence; socio-econo-political opportunities and transaction costs. They tried to 
measure the impacts of those variables within all countries that they could 
provide data for those variables between the years 1970 and 1995. They 
attempted to measure flow of refugees or IDPs by using data on refugee and IDP 
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stocks. In other words, they worked with the stock data to produce a flow 
measure. The findings showed that the size of the economy and democratic 
institutions raised the probability of producing more refugees than IDPs, and that 
violence reduced that probability.  
They point out that violence was an important factor that impacts migration 
patterns. They found that people were afraid of losing life and liberty and that the 
stress level of violence was positively related with relocation and being either a 
refugee or an IDP. They related violence to politically violent behavior, and to 
international war, concluding that civil wars, in neighboring countries, or an 
international war might significantly impact on migratory behavior. They 
hypothesized that a civil war in the country of origin and a civil war in a 
neighboring country would have a positive impact on IDP flows while civil wars in 
neighboring countries had a negative effect on refugee flows. 
According to their study, bigger countries with bigger populations and 
superior economies had more socio-economic opportunities than smaller 
countries with smaller populations and smaller economies. As much of the 
migration research focuses on income, they concluded that income was an 
important motivator to migrate, but that it was not the only motivator. As  final 
points, they further concluded that transaction costs, function of distance and 
difficulty of topography were also factors that impacted on people’s decisions to 
migrate or not. 
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For their global sample of countries, they got data from different sources. 
In order to measure refugees they used data provided by the Statistics Division 
of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. They used IDP data from 
Schmeidl’s and Jenkins’ online Global Refugee Migration Project. They tried to 
answer if migrant producing countries produced more IDPs or more refugees. 
The dependent variable was coded as a nominal variable with three values. “0” 
indicated neither IDPs nor refugees; “1” indicated more IDPs than refugees; and 
“2” indicated more refugees than IDPs. For independent variables, they used 
genocide and the violation of the rights and the integrity of the person as proxy 
for violence.  
In order to measure genocide they used Harff’s data, and coded “0” for no 
genocide and “1” for genocide. To measure human rights violations by the 
government, they used the Political Terror Scale (PTS). This is 5 point scale 
where smaller values are associated with lesser levels of violation. In order to 
measure dissident violence, they calculated the sum of riots and guerrilla attacks 
from Banks’ online Cross-National Time-Series Data.  They did not include non-
violent components, such as general strikes and anti-government protests.  
According to the authors, if both the government and the dissidents 
engaged in military clashes, people were more likely to have a sense of 
insecurity. So they also used the intrastate and extra systemic war lists. For an 
intrastate war, they assigned a “1” if there were more than 1,000 deaths in that 
country per year, and for a war that took place in the territory, they again scored 
  
71
 
“1”. For socio-economic variables, they used gross national product (GNP), 
gathered from both the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data and 
Banks’ online Cross-National Time-Series Data. In order to measure freedom, 
they used the Polity IV data. This is a measure of institutional democracy that 
ranges from (–10 to 10). Finally, for transactional costs, they used 1, if there were 
mountains on the border.  
For statistical analysis, they used the multinomial logit model because the 
dependent variable was nominal. Also, they performed Wald tests to determine if 
independent variables had different outcomes and to determine if there was a 
sufficient difference between IDPs and refugees” and if there were more 
refugees than IDPs. The results indicate that several of the variables had a 
statistically significant impact on both the likelihood that a country produces more 
IDPs than refugees.  
Findings suggest that genocidal events increased the probability of 
producing more refugees than IDPs, but would not produce more IDPs than 
refugees. The countries that experienced a genocidal event were (1.96 and 2.43 
times) more likely to produce refugees than the countries without a genocidal 
event. The countries that experienced only human rights violations produced 
more IDPs than refugees. 
The coefficients for the measures of dissident violence were significant, 
and Wald tests showed that they were not significantly different for both the 
“IDPs greater than refugees” and the “refugees greater than IDPs”. Also, the civil 
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war variable produced similar results in both models. A country that experienced 
a civil war was (11.5 and 25.9 times) more likely to produce more IDPs than 
refugees then countries without civil wars.  
An international war increased the likelihood (between 3.7 and 4.35 times) 
that a country would produce more IDPs than refugees. Interestingly, the 
international war did not produce a statistically meaningful estimation for the 
“refugees greater than IDPs” equation. On the other hand, a country whose 
neighbors had civil wars was (5.33 and 21.6 times) more likely to produce more 
IDPs than refugees. 
According to the results, the size of the economy increased the probability 
of producing more refugees than IDPs. Likewise, if the proportion of neighbors 
with more democratic political structures increased, the likelihood of producing 
more refugees than IDPs increased as well. A country with a lower democracy 
score was (3.15 and 3.61 times) more likely to produce more refugees than IDPs. 
Finally, for the transaction cost the results were not statistically significant. 
In their study, Davenport (et al., 2003) explored reasons for being 
“internally displaced persons (IDP) or a refugee”. They claimed that the main 
reason for fleeing from their home was the threat of personal integrity. In order to 
explore all the reasons for fleeing from home, they performed a least square 
analysis on a pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCTS) data from 129 countries 
for 1964–1989 and measured the following: state threats towards individual 
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integrity, dissident threats towards individual integrity, and (state and dissident) 
joint threats towards individual.  
They tried to measure the characteristics that caused a state generate 
forced migration. Contrary to most literature in the area, they also emphasized 
the “pull” factors of migration. They also did not limit themselves by time or 
space, so they minimized the selection bias. Because the study did not 
distinguish refugee and IDPs, both of them were included.   
As a dependent variable, they used net-migration data, the difference of 
emigration and immigration, reported by the United States Committee on 
Refugees. Their definition of net migration rate required the use not only of the 
push forces, but also the pull forces. Genocide/politicide and wars were used as 
independent variables. For the structure of the polity, Polity III, Polity 98, and 
Banks’ Cross-Polity Time Series data were used. Democracy scale runs between 
(-10 and 10), autocracy and democracy. The authors also mentioned that the 
uncertain nature of the polity’s future could impact on people’s threat perceptions 
causing people to be more liable to leave their home of origin. So, they decided 
to use another variable to show the large moves towards autocracy or 
democracy, (–16 to 16).  
Additionally, dissident behaviors, as a threat to personal integrity, were 
used as independent variables. Dissident behaviors were divided into four 
variables. The first one included the number of guerrilla combats, riots, protest 
demonstrations, antigovernment demonstrations, general strikes, and 
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revolutions. The second one included the number of dissident conflicts. The third 
one included deviance from the usual violence. This variable had a value of “1,” if 
it exceeded the mean. Finally, the civil war variable was used. Besides 
independent variables, there were also several control variables. For example, 
per capita GNP was used as a proxy variable for economic threat. 
During OLS regression, there were some problems because statistical 
software, Stata, routinely eliminated any country with a value of “0” for each 
case. Hence, for refugee regression 69 countries out of 1,464 cases were 
removed, and for IDP regression 92 countries out of 2,052 cases were removed. 
The authors preferred to use least squares with dummy variables. 
For IDP or refugee figures, 73% of the country-years could not turn out a 
nonzero score. The F-tests signified that the measurement was greater than the 
null model. Therefore, the null-hypothesis was rejected for all models, except for 
one. The findings for each of the three types of threats were statistically 
significant, which meant that a threat towards personal integrity was really the 
leading reason explaining why people leave their homes. In addition, moves 
towards democracy also generated large number of forced migrants.   
Specifically, previous net forced migration, genocide and politicide 
campaigns by the state, dissident conflict behavior, mixture of different types of 
protest events related to dissidents, and civil war had positive impacts on net-
migration. Also, the structures of the polity, economic opportunity, and population 
had impacts on net migration. 
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To conclude, the authors pointed out that rising dissident behavior would 
generate a threatening environment. In other words, the more a distinct type of 
conflict occurred, the more likely individuals were to view them as threats to their 
safety and leave their home. Other findings indicated that shifts toward 
democracy increased conflict due to changes in policies (Larrabee, 1992; 
Newland, 1993; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Ward and Gleditsch, 1998; Krain 
and Myers, 1997; Schmeidl, 1997)  
According to these findings, once other factors were controlled for the 
following would occur: a ten year long civil war would lead to about 744,000 
people fleeing their homes;  a ten year long genocide or politicide would result in 
574,000 refugees; a one-unit change on the way to democracy for a year for ten 
years would be associated with about only 27,000 refugees; and finally, a 16 unit 
increase in polity would be associated with about 71,000 people choosing to flee 
their homes in the first year. Statistical analysis did not produce a statistically 
significant estimate either for GNP per capita or population variables. 
In their article, Moore and Shellman (2004a) declared that the main 
reason people abandoned their homes for an uncertain life elsewhere was “fear 
of persecution” in other words, violence. Their study was unclear about IDPs and 
did not mention the people who relocated inside the state because of violence. 
The majority of relocated people they studied did not cross the borders, but their 
study still provided a good understanding of the impact of fear of persecution (or 
violence) on migration.  
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By focusing on push forces that make people flee their homes, Moore and 
Shellman (2004a) explored the indicators of forced migration. They identified 
dissident threat (the number of times dissidents used violence), the interaction of 
government and dissident forces, and government threat as potential sources of 
intimidation for people to leave their homes. Rather than examining “push and 
pull” forces together, they limited their analysis to forced migrants created by a 
state. They also tried to control impacts of economic variables on migration, and 
used wage and GNP per capita variables in their (the zero-inflated negative 
binomial) model. 
Primarily, they tried to find out what the characteristics were of countries 
that might generate forced migrants. Besides the external forces of violence, 
such as foreign troops, they mentioned the hostile behavior of the dissidents and 
the government as the sources of people’s fear. They hypothesized that the 
larger the threat created by those sources, the greater the number of forced 
migrants a state would generate. In order to test their hypotheses, they brought 
into play a global sample of countries from over a forty year period. They found 
support for their hypothesis. Violence did have a significantly greater impact on 
forced migration than other variables such as the average size of the economy or 
the type of political institution. 
According to their results, the impact of the dissident violence on forced 
migration, as the strongest determinant, was clear. The violent behavior of both 
dissidents and governments were key indicators of forced migration flows. In 
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addition to fear of persecution (or violence), institutional democracy and income 
both have an impact on the size of forced migration flows; however, their affect 
was comparatively small. Therefore, rather than the pull factors, the push force of 
violence, drove the process. 
In another study, Moore and Shellman (2004b) focused on refugees’ 
movements and investigated the motives that directed the populace to seek 
refuge. Also, they checked if the refugees were pushed by violent behavior or 
pulled by economic expectations. In order to get answer to those questions, the 
authors used the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
time-series data set on refugees for both the top ten refugee destinations and the 
top ten directed-pairs refugee flows between 1955 and 1995.  
While they examined the data, they recognized that the top ten countries, 
producing the most refugees in the world, had at least one border with countries 
that had significant armed conflict after the World War II. Because of the lack of 
data for refugee flows, annual stock data for refugees was used as the 
dependent variable. As a result of the regular violent conflict in those countries, 
they used “fear of persecution” as a primary theory. They focused on restrictions 
of life, property, and the physical integrity of individual liberty. This caused them 
to focus on killings, seizure of property, arbitrary arrest, and torture. They used 
three activates that influence the likelihood of a given individual to expect to be a 
victim of persecution: the state, dissidents, and foreign troops. They 
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hypothesized that “fear of persecution” would have the largest force on refugee 
flows.  
In addition to the primary theory, “fear of persecution” as a function of the 
violent behavior of three actors, they also used the following determinants of 
refugee flows: wages, values on family, friends, culture, access to an information 
network to reduce the cost of relocation (e.g., Hatton & Williamson 1998: 14, 38), 
and the cost of relocation (distance, and travel expenses changed by 
technology). 
The violent behavior of the state as a coercive force was represented 
through mass killings, genocide, and politicide. To measure state sponsored 
terror, the Political Terror Scale was used (Gibney & Dalton 1996). They used the 
total number of guerrilla attacks and riots as an indicator of rebel violence. They 
also use civil wars and interstate wars, in a dummy variable, to operationalize the 
interaction of the state and dissidents.   
In order to measure freedom, they used the Polity IV data. They also 
made use of GNP, and direct and indirect indicators of property rights, such as 
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index and Economic Freedom of the 
World Index. Finally, for relocation costs, they used existence of a border. They 
assigned a value of one for land borders and water border of less than 200 miles.  
Their findings showed that local violent behavior, relative wages, diaspora 
populations, and borders impact on refugee flows. The fear of persecution 
(violence) measurements had significant impact in the country of origin, but they 
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were not significant in the country of asylum. Relative wages were also 
significant, but not as much as violence. These findings confirmed previous 
finding stated above that violence did have a serious impact on people leaving 
their homes. In short, within the country of origin, the violent behavior of states, 
dissident groups and foreign soldiers pushed the populace to relocate. Violent 
dissent was not statistically significant because they were expecting a positive 
relationship between the proportion of violent dissent in the origin countries and 
the asylum countries, so they could not find support for their hypothesis. 
According to their findings (-0.002), a 1% raise in the quantity of armed riots 
creates an estimated decrease of 0.2% in refugee flow.  
Genocide, civil war, and war were positively signed and statistically 
significant. In the origin country, civil war raised the anticipated refugee flow by 
2.4% to 2.7%, and genocide increased it by 1.6% to 2.1%. A change to 
democracy generated a negative signed statistically significant coefficient. Also, 
the ratio of GNP, border, and time, a proxy to travel technology, produced a 
statistically significant coefficient. Transaction costs had large substantive effects 
as well, so it was expected that people tended to choose the closest place to stay 
away from the violence and go where others have gone before. Further, the 
violent activity of states, dissidents, and foreign soldiers did not have any impact 
on refugees’ decisions about where to go; however, wages, culture, and costs 
were effective in destination choices. 
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McMillen (1994) discusses the impact this violence had on migration. He 
analyzed the Kentuckians’ deep anger and violent revenge that was focused on 
the newly freed slaves that he got from such documents as letters and affidavit of 
raped African-American women.  He found that the thousands of rapes and 
killings by the gang of “nigger killers,” were a push forces for African-American 
freed-slave migration out of Kentucky in the late 19th century. He stated that 
violence and abuse was as significant a factor as the desire to leave the areas 
where they had been slaves.   
In his study, Gian Sahota (1968) tried to answer the question, “Why do 
people leave their homes?” In order to find the reasons, he looked at the 
rationality of typical migration decision, and sought the incentives of those 
decisions. His study looked at the interstate migration within Brazil. Because 
there were many differences among the states of Brazil in terms of living 
conditions, economic opportunities and structures, and growth rates, he looked at 
the issue from an economic angle. However, he also tried to find out if there were 
non-economic factors, like belonging to a particular group. 
In essence, his explanations were based on the “push” and “pull” factors. 
Sahota (1968) stated that inhabitants were pushed from rural areas because of 
poverty and low income levels, and pulled to urban centers because of 
opportunities of employment and education. His hypothesis was simply rooted in 
economic factors, but he also hypothesized that education and lure of the “bright 
lights” of the cities were also factors in migration patterns. He concluded that a 
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migration decision was not necessarily provoked solely by economic costs and 
returns.   
He used census data of 1950 for nineteen states of Brazil. His dependent 
variable was limited to the number of male adult migrants, who were born in one 
region and ended up residing in another. This was divided into age groups. 
Regional wage rates, income dispersion, growth rate, education, density of 
population, urbanization, and geographic distance were among independent 
variables. The independent variables for both origin and destination of migration 
came from either census data or Annual Brazilian Statistics. No standard 
measures, like the Lorenz curve or Gini coefficient, were used. The author 
assumed that push factors might have greater impacts on areas with higher 
income dispersions than those with lower income dispersions.  
He used single-equation least-squares method and found high collinierity 
between wage rate and education. According to his findings, density as a pull 
force for destination had a gravitation effect on migrants, with an elasticity of 0.93 
for the middle-aged migrants and 1.35 for the young migrants. Distance was 
highly significant with a negative sign meaning it was deterrent to migration. 
Education was also significant both in the origin region and the destination 
region. Moreover, industrialization was significant, but only for the middle aged 
group. Urbanization was not significant for the destination region; however, it was 
significant for the origin region for both of the age groups. 
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Related with the income, growth of income in the destination was very 
significant for both age groups. Per capita income was also significant both in the 
origin and the destination regions. Low income was not significant for both 
regions. In sum, according to Sahota (1968), internal migration in Brazil was 
highly related with earning discrepancies. 
Van Wey (2005) examined the effect of land ownership on out-migration in 
Mexico and Thailand. He stated that land impacted migration because it was a 
source of wealth, employment, investment opportunity, and inequality in 
ownership. Previous work contained the opposite results. For example, some 
research found that there was a negative relationship between land ownership 
and migration (Taylor & Yunez-Naude, 2000; Van Wey, 2003). Still other 
research has found a positive relationship between land ownership and migration 
(Massey & Espinosa, 1997; Rozelle, Taylor & deBrauw, 1999).  
Van Wey (2005) used a discrete time event history analysis method and 
found that the effect of land ownership is negative for the vast majority of men. 
The impact of land ownership on out-migration was negative for (majority of) 
households with land up to ten hectares, but it was positive at twenty hectares 
and up. According to his findings, internal migration is less likely from areas with 
less equally distributed land. Also, the size of landholdings has a negative effect 
on out-migration. He also concluded that individuals from large households were 
more likely to migrate.  
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Carlos (2002) explored the function of macroeconomic variables such as 
employment, average earnings, and population on international migration from 
the Philippines to twenty-six non-Middle Eastern countries between 1981 and 
1995. He tested the validity of Harris-Todaro (1970) expected wage hypothesis 
and Schultz (1982) symmetry hypothesis on migration. He assumed that 
migration would occur until employment probability and wage rates in the origin 
country equaled those in the destination country. Therefore, he hypnotized that 
higher wages in the destination or lower wages in the origin country would al 
increase migration, and that higher unemployment in the origin country and lower 
unemployment in the destination country would also increase migration.  
In order to determine the impact of the economic variables, he used fixed 
effects panel data regression method. The natural logarithm of the odds ratio 
between migration and non-migration was used as dependent variable, and 
average earnings, gross national product, and employment rate were used as 
independent variables. In regression analysis, he used employment rate, 
earnings, and population of both the origin and destination areas of the migration. 
With his findings, he could not confirm the validity of the Harris-Todaro (1970) 
expected earnings hypothesis or Schultz (1982) symmetry hypothesis for his 
model. 
He found that the higher the populace in the Philippines, the higher the 
demand for domestic labor was. He also discovered that the motivation to 
migrate decreased as domestic income per laborer increased. He concluded that 
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the growth of population in the Philippines resulted in an increased need for job 
and therefore increased the probability to migrate. According to his finding, the 
population and wage increase in destination places had converse impact on 
migration from the Philippines. Finally, he found that higher wages causes influx 
of job-seekers and, therefore, higher unemployment in rural-urban migration. 
Frayne and Pendleton (2001) stated that migration dynamics changed in 
Namibia after the new political privilege in 1990. They discussed macro and 
micro conceptual framework of migration in an attempt to better understanding 
the nature of migration in the African environment. The Namibian Migration 
Project was designed according to this framework. 
After reviewing literature on migration, they conducted interviews with 
senior government officials within different ministries and municipalities. Then, 
they performed a standardized survey across Namibia using both migrants and 
non-migrants. Also, they collected case studies of individual migrants. They 
checked the impact of the war of liberation against South Africa, and the impact 
of poverty, and the epidemics (HIV/AIDS) on migration. Their data included 900 
households and 2,700 people and their unit of analysis was the individuals.  
For rural-rural migration, for the first move, the family was the key cause 
for migration (55%) and education was the second important reason for 
migration. For the second and third moves, economic reasons were the main 
factors for migration. For the forth move, living conditions were the most 
important force for migration (27%). And for the last two moves, environmental 
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issues and health caused for the migration. Rural-urban migration made up 15% 
of lifetime migration and 24% of first moves. While economic reasons were the 
key cause for migration (40%). Besides economic reasons, family reasons (35%) 
and education (29%) were also important for rural to urban migration.  
Urban-urban migration, made up 20% of lifetime migration, economic 
reasons also are the key cause being (36% for the first move and 60% for the 
third and fourth moves). As far as urban – urban migration is concerned, family 
reasons and education were not as important. The impact of the living conditions 
on migration was increased by (7%). The least important cause for migration was 
health care. Finally urban-rural migration, made up 8% for first moves and 24% 
for fourth moves, and interestingly health care was the major reason for 
migration.  
Although internal wars commonly take place, only a very few research 
studies have assessed the significance of internal warfare on migration and 
urban growth. Goodman (et. al, 1975) tried to measure the impact of the internal 
war in South Vietnam on migration and urbanization. He pointed out that the 
principle effects of the Vietnamese internal war had been felt in the countryside 
rather than the cities. His article was primarily based on the relationship between 
the type and intensity of internal war and migration towards urban areas. He 
found that increasing levels of insecurity resulted in people leaving home to move 
to a relatively safe area. 
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He hypothesized that internal war and conflict such as a guerilla war or a 
revolutionary war, would be related to internal migration. According to his results, 
rural insecurity is as important as economic factors in causing someone to move 
towards the cities. People move towards urban areas in order to flee from both 
rural insecurity and poverty. Therefore, the probability of coming into contact with 
warfare is related to the decision to migrate. He interviewed some witnesses of 
armed conflict who implied that migrants escape from internal warfare because 
they did not want to be oppressed by both communist insurgents and 
government officials. Also, during this time of conflict, the rebels encouraged 
people to migrate towards small cities as this was a Maoist strategy to expand its 
support for a general revolutionist struggle (Goodman, et. al, 1975).  
In order to find out the bases of migration, Goodman conducted a survey 
on 297 migrants in Saigon. He divided the causes of migration into categories 
such as: war-related, job-related, and family-related. The sample was stratified 
into groups, 1964-1966, 1967-1968, and 1969-1971. The findings showed the 
reasons for migration as follows: war related reasons 55%, 63%, and 36%; job-
related reasons 27%, 24%, and 31%; and family related reasons, 13%, 11%, and 
12% respectively. 
Of the people surveyed, almost two-thirds of them stated internal-warfare-
related factors, such as insecurity, threats, nearby military action, harassment 
and additional taxes, were the reason for their migration. Also, 56.6% mirrored a 
pessimistic opinion of the rural life, and 27.8% reflected a positive attraction to 
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the cities. Moreover, there were some non-war related factors, such as 
dissatisfaction with their previous job or a wish for a better job (22.9%), better 
housing (14.4%), more farming lands and produces (2.5%), and better and more 
schools (1.3%).  
In a different study, Ritterband (1978) examined the Arab-Israeli conflict as 
a “push” force, impacting on personal decisions to migrate from Israel. However, 
he found that out-migration rates in Israel were parallel to that of economic 
conditions. Similar to him, Lamdany (1982) analyzed the impacts of economic 
and conflict related conditions on annual out-migration rates in Israel. He found 
that economic conditions were the best predictors to explain out-migration from 
Israel. In contrast to economic condition, his findings about the effects of Arab-
Israeli conflict on out-migration were unclear. Both Ritterband (1978) and 
Lamdany (1982) reported a significant relationship between war and out-
migration in 1974 (just after the 1973 war), but there were no significant 
relationship between those variables for the 1956 and 1967 wars.   
Moreover, Cohen (1988) examined and analyzed the effects of the Arab-
Israeli conflict on out-migration from Israel. He examined out-migration measures 
as indicators of social disintegration, and tested the impact of two features of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict on out-migration rates during 1951-1984. The first feature 
was annual military reserve duty and the second was the salience of the conflict 
as reflected in a newspaper. These two features were hypothesized to affect 
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emigration rates. His findings were similar to that of Ritterband (1978) and 
Lamdany (1982).  
Sociological literature, such as Durkheim (1951), Simmel (1955) and 
Cosar (1956), agree that wars have a tendency to enforce the social cohesion 
because they raise patriotism and national faith. Similar to this sociological 
literature, Cohen (1988) stated that conflict with an outside enemy would raise 
social cohesion and integration. He also concluded that out-migration was a 
disgraceful behavior within Israel. His results support arguments for reverse 
effect of the two features of conflict on out-migration rates. 
Out-migration as dependent variable was defined as emigration per 1,000 
within the population. This data was gathered from the Israeli Central Bureau of 
Statistics based on the authorized forms that Israeli citizens had to complete prior 
to departure and upon return to the country. However, since out-migration was 
viewed as a negatively valued behavior, there was the possibility that the 
emigrants might not have stated their real migration plans upon departure. The 
variable, military reserve was classified information, so the ratio of working men 
temporarily absent from their work was used as a proxy for this variable. For the 
salience of the conflict, news related to the conflict published on the front page of 
the daily Ha’aretz between 1971 and 1984 was used. This variable was scored 
between 0 (no conflict related news) to 5 (a conflict related news on the entire 
front page).  
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In order to control the impact of economic conditions, economic indicators 
were also included. Those variables were the average unemployment for the 
present and the preceding year, real per capita private consumption to indicate 
standard of living and income, and the annual change of real per capita private 
conception. Data showed that there was a quick rise in out-migration during1974 
after the 1973 war, and after significant reserve duty increases. However, the 
relationship between the salience of conflict and out-migration rates were 
negative (-.55 for 1951-1973 and -.13 for 1974-1983). This means that salience 
of conflict actually attenuated out-migration during the 1951-1973 periods.  
Cohen (1988) explained the increased out-migration after 1973 by 
concluding that the positive consensus among Israelis had decreased after the 
1973 war. Hew further concluded that the increased out-migration was the shock 
of 1973 war which put an end of the stigma of out-migration from Israel that had 
existed among the population. The association between the private consumption 
and out-migration were also found to be negative. However, the correlation 
between unemployment and out-migration was positive. 
For Agadjanian and Prata (2002), war pressures and demographic 
activities both were directly responsible for forced migration. Specifically civilian 
casualties, psychological stress, and a decline of socioeconomic conditions and 
social disorder support hypothesis that the general effects of war and of the 
related negative socio-economic crises are related. They analyzed the reflected 
reproduction in Angola during the war. They used a multiple indicator cluster 
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survey (MICS), conducted in Angola in 1996. The MICS used a countrywide 
representative sample of 4,890 women aged 14 to 49. They found that women, 
living in war-affected areas, were more likely to give up bearing children during 
the war, and would make up for their lost opportunity to reproduce after the war. 
In his article, Bariagaber (1997) deals with the Ethiopian refugees who 
suddenly fled from their home state to avoid the conflict of warfare and other 
types of political violence. Ethiopia had a war in Eritrea, a conflict in the Ogaden, 
and an armed opposition revolutionary movement in 1974. There were also other 
armed conflicts in Ethiopia, such the one in Nacfa in 1982 against the Eritrean 
Liberation Front. There was also political violence in an attempt to effectively 
control land, where opposing groups had opted for a rural based armed 
challenge.  
The author used warfare, conflict, and violence related variables to explain 
refugee (or out-migration) from Ethiopia. He also used drought as a control 
variable because it was among the push forces of migration in Ethiopia. His study 
covers a period of 22 years (1967-1988). The dependent variable was the 
number of refugees who fled Ethiopia (REFFROM). This data was obtained from 
the U.S. Committee for refugees, the World Refugee Survey: Annual Reports. 
There were 12 independent variables used to assess domestic, regional, and 
extra-regional violence (executions, political assassinations, guerilla attacks, 
riots, arrests, and wars). Independent variables were obtained from Africa 
Research Bulletin (Africa Research, 1967-1988). Some of them are as follows: 
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the number of attempted or successful coups (COUP), domestic military attacks 
(DATTACK), domestic casualties (dead, wounded, and captured armed 
combatants) (DCAUSAL), number of state emergency (EMERG), domestic 
violence (INTERVEN), threats, accusations, and warnings by government 
(DTHREAT), and assassinations and executions (ASSAS). The collection of the 
internal and foreign violence measures are in agreement with Rummel’s (1963) 
pioneering Dimensionality of Nations project.  
Time series data was used. In order to get at the causes of refugee 
movements from Ethiopia, a stepwise regression was performed. According to 
the results, the presence of extra-regional forces inside the country explained the 
biggest proportion of the dependent variable. Threats and executions were also 
important independent variables, but “assassination and execution” variables 
were not significant at the .05 level. Independent variables explained a high 
variation of the dependent variable (R2 =.085, and adjusted R2 =.083; for 
INTERVEN: β = .89, t = 8.97, p = .000; for DTHREAT: β = .45, t = - 4.26, p = 
.001; and for ASSAS: β = .89, t = - 2.96, p = .008). 
The correlation coefficient between domestic military attacks and threats-
warnings was .75, which means that domestic military attacks were highly 
correlated with threat-warnings and assassinations/executions. The new model 
also explained a high variation of the variance of refugee movements, but the 
number of casualties was not significant at the .05 level (R2 =.082, and adjusted 
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R2 =.079; for INTERVEN: β = .96, t = 8.34, p = .000; for DTHREAT: β = -.70, t = - 
5.66, p = .000; and for ASSAS: β = .33, t = 2.92, p = .091).  
In their study, Kernot and Gurung (2003) stressed that conflict between 
the Maoist insurgents and government forces was the main cause of recently 
generated large numbers of internally displaced people and refugee movements 
in Nepal. According to their study, as Maoist conflict spread throughout the 
country, victims of the conflict were displaced from their homes or forced to flee 
because of the fear of terror, insecurity, human rights violations, economic 
blockades, destruction of educational, health facilities, and deprivation of 
resources due to state imposed restrictions on the delivery of food, medicine, and 
other essential items. Villagers actually had to get permission to secure their 
rations.  
The authors stated that thousands of people living in conflict affected 
areas left their homes to escape from violence. The armed clashes between 
insurgents and government forces left the overall community in a terrorized state. 
People within the conflict zone were both afraid of the insurgents and of the 
government forces. On the one hand, insurgents attacked the state owned 
electric plants, communication facilities, governmental offices, banks, schools 
and health centers. On the other hand, government forces killed people they 
assumed to be linked to the Maoists. For example, in 2002, 1,062 government 
forces and citizens were killed by insurgents but 4,151 people were killed by the 
government forces. People responded to this threat by moving toward urban 
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centers, district headquarters or sought refugee in other countries. The number 
of displaced people was estimated to be around 150,000–200,000 in 2002. 
Bariagaber (1997),  in an attempt to differentiate refugee from migrant, 
defined refugee as one who  unexpectedly moves out of his place of origin 
against his own will, while the migrant freely moves to a known  area of 
destination. However, the migrants, subject to Kernot and Gurung’s study (2003), 
were not the ones who simply calculated the cost and benefits of their migration.  
They were very similar to the refugees in Bariagaber’s study. Their decision to 
migrate was usually made suddenly and they moved towards new and unknown 
environments reluctantly. 
 
Migration in Turkey 
Internal migration in Turkey has had an intense negative affect on the 
formation of society over the past few decades. As a result there have been 
numerous and diverse studies about differing impacts of the push and pull forces 
on the internal migration within Turkey. However, most of the studies did not 
utilize a reliable and valid database to produce scientific evidence, which could 
accurately reveal all the dynamics, causes and effects of the internal migration 
movements (Icduygu & Unalan, 1998). Still, there are some credible academic 
researches who tried to investigate the basis of those movements. 
Atalik and Ciraci (1993) looked at the impact of regional differentiations in 
Turkey on internal migration. They used net migration rate, as a dependent 
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variable, between 1980 and 1985, and they attempted to measure the impact of 
per capita GNP, population, density of population, the population growth rate, 
industrial workforce, distance, and literacy rate on net migration. Their regression 
analysis showed that the most important indicator of net migration was per capita 
GNP. Relying on their results, internal migration in Turkey was the result of the 
push effects, grounded in regional differences.  
Yamak and Yamak (2005) also examined internal migration patterns in 
Turkey by using data from all (67) provinces and found a statistical relationship 
between internal migration and income in Turkey between 1980 and 1990. 
According to their results, income inequalities between provinces were the major 
actor of internal migration. They found that the pull forces of migration were more 
effective than push forces. According to their results, almost 25% of the migrants 
from the out-migrating provinces left their home of origin as a consequence of 
economic reasons and just about 70% of migrants to in-migrating provinces left 
their home due to economic reasons. In conclusion, rather than the low wages in 
out-migrating provinces being the reason for migration , high wages in in-
migrating provinces were the main reason for internal migration. 
Pazarlıoglu (2001) created a domestic migration model for Turkey. He 
used time-series data from 1980, 1985, and 1990. According to his study, 
migration is based on population, economics, environment, political problems, 
and wars. He hypothesized that the following were among the major reasons for 
internal migration: increasing population, developing farming technologies, 
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decreasing farming lands, as in Bolu in West Black Sea region, industrial and 
transportation developments, unemployment, and conflict in the Southeast 
region.  
His dependent variable was the net migration rate or the difference 
between in-migration and out-migration in 1980, 1985, and 1990. For 
independent variables, he used the following: Gross National Product per capita 
(KBGSYIH) as a proxy variable to demonstrate the level of income of the 
provinces; electric usage per person (KBELEK) as a proxy for wealth to show 
economic status of the provinces; years of education spend in schools (EGTOR); 
number of doctors per capita (SAGOR); unemployment rate (ISOR); and the 
proportion of farmers to the population of the province (TAROR). A TREND 
variable was also used to show the time effect. Finally, he concluded that (9) of 
the provinces, under emergency rule, were directly affected by terrorism 
problems. This resulted in using a discrete variable to differentiate those 
provinces from each others. Those provinces were Agri, Bingol, Bitlis, Hakkari, 
Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Tunceli and Van. Dispite his efforts, his study did not find a 
relationship between terrorism and migration patterns due to data limitations.  
He puts his variables into seven models, and used chi-square, LM test, 
and Hausman test to find out their impact on net-migration.  
Model 1: GO = f (KBELEK, ISOR, SAGOR) 
Model 2: GO = f (KBELEK, TAROR, SAGOR) 
Model 3: GO = f (KBGSYIH, ISOR, SAGOR), 
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Model 4: GO = f (KBGSYIH, TAROR, SAGOR), 
Model 5: GO = f (KBELEK, EGTOR), 
Model 6: GO = f (KBELEK, TREND), 
Model 7: GO = f (KBGSYIH, TREND) 
Of these seven models, model 3, 4, and 7 did not generate significant 
results. Although model 2, which uses TAROR (proportion of farmers to the 
population) to show underemployment, was very similar to model 1 and had a 
very high explanatory power (0.8925), one of the variables was not significant 
(TAROR=1.5). Therefore, model 1 was preferred. Three models were found 
significant: electricity consumption, unemployment and health for the model 1; 
electricity consumption and education index for the model 5; electricity 
consumption and trend for the model 6.  
For model 1, net-migration was explained by KBELEK, ISOR and SAGOR 
variables. Chow test showed that there was no group effect, but independent 
variables had significant results, so the null-hypothesis was rejected (F [66,131] 
=9.528[0.000]). Explanatory power of the model was very high (0.8954; 
significance levels KBELEK=1; ISOR=0.5; and SAGOR=0.01). LM [1] 
=51.97[0.000] showed there was no coincidental impact. Hausman test (H [3] 
=64.40[0.000]) confirmed the impact of coefficients.  
For model 5, net-migration was explained by a human capital variable 
(EGTOR) and an economic variable (KBELEK). According to Chow test 
independent variables had significant results, so the null-hypothesis was also 
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rejected (F [66,132] =10.35[0.000]; significance levels KBELEK=0.01; 
EGTOR=1). LM [1] = 48.52[0.000] showed there was no coincidental impact. 
Hausman test (H [3] =64.40[0.000]) confirmed the impact of coefficients. For 
model 6, net-migration was explained by a TREND variable, besides KBELEK 
variable. Chow test confirmed the effect of the model (F [66,132] =9.812[0.000]; 
significance level for both variable is 0.01). LM [1] =100.38[0.000] showed there 
was coincidental impacts. Hausman test (H [3] =64.40[0.000]) confirmed the 
impact of coefficients.  
In order to test his models and produce policies to slow down internal 
migration, the author had different scenarios. For scenario 1, he increased the 
real values of KBELEK (electric usage), SAGOR (health index) 10% and 
decreased the real value of ISOR (unemployment) 10% for 1990. By these 10% 
improvements in model 1, there was a decrease in out-migration rates of the 
origin provinces of migrated people, and there was a decrease in in-migration 
rates of the target provinces, except for Eskisehir and Izmir. The results of model 
5 and model 6 were not expected ones.  
For scenario 2, only KBELEK variable was increased 10%, and the other 
variables held constant. The results were consistent with scenario 1. Similarly, 
model 5 and 6 produced unexpected results. Below, the table for selected 
provinces demonstrates the results of both scenarios for model 1 (p.7). 
 
 
  
98
 
 
Provinces 1990 Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Ağrı -100.18 -82.55 -83.89 
Artvin -103.73 -77.36 -76.89 
Bingöl -91.74 -67.49 -68.31 
Çankırı -62.88 -59.79 -62.33 
Giresun -76.77 -60.99 -62.04 
Mardin -63.77 -59.79 -62.33 
Muş -105.78 -78.47 -79.14 
Ankara 19.33 10.70 15.70 
Antalya 85.81 41.93 43.14 
İstanbul 102.07 78.23 81.84 
Manisa 20.43 7.87 8.87 
 
The table shows the impact of good economy to decrease migration, so 
policies that increase income would slow down the internal migration. The author 
also mentioned that 70% of terror related migrated people were willing to return 
their home towns if the economic conditions of the home would improve and the 
security of people would be guaranteed. He stressed that the primary condition 
was the economy and not terror related. Therefore, economic improvement 
would have an impact on decreasing terrorism. In conclusion, macro level 
policies were needed to develop equilibrium between the push and pull forces 
that result in migration.  
In their paper, Gezici and Keskin (2005) compared internal migration 
within provinces in Turkey to their level of development. The study dealt with 
regional structures and imbalances within Turkey. It hypothesized that internal 
migration was related to regional inequalities, so they utilized socio-economic 
indicators to evaluate the impact of regional inequalities on internal migration. 
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Because their study was based on regional differences, they examined the 
differences between in-migration and out-migration regions in an attempt to 
explain the factors most responsible for causing internal migration. Specifically, 
they grouped the characteristics of migration into two forces: pull and push. 
According to their study, if the characteristics of in-migration to provinces were 
more prevalent on migration, then pull forces would be dominant; and if the 
characteristics of out-migrating provinces had more impact on migration, then 
push forces would be dominant.  
Besides interregional differentiation of wages and factor prices, they also 
accepted that there might be many other factors that affect migration. However, 
they chose to examine the issues from the perspective of the neoclassical growth 
theory. It states that capital moves to where profits are the highest, and the labor 
to where the wages are highest. Their perspective saw migration as part of the 
labor market: unemployment on the one hand and job opportunities on the other 
(Harris and Todaro, 1970; Muth, 1971; Todaro, 1976; Vanderkamp, 1989; 
McCormick, 1990). 
They used a nationwide data from (73) provinces for demographic and 
socio-economic variables to test the interregional inequalities and interactions of 
internal migration movements in Turkey. Because the 2000 data was not 
available during the study, they assumed that the migration movements of 1985-
90 were valid for the year 2000. In order to determine a relationship between 
socio-economic variables and internal migration, a stepwise multiple regression 
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analysis was used. They used net migration rate as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables were chosen from among variables that were assumed to 
have pull and push effect on migration.  
The variables that they used are as follows:  average increase in 
population between 1990 and 2000, birthrate, the number of doctors per 10,000 
people, the increase in the number of high schools, per capita public 
investments, per capita GNP, the number of industrial workers, the number of 
agricultural workers, agricultural product value, geographic location, and per 
capita industrial electricity consumption. Except for the geographic location 
variable, all variables had numerical values. 
They found that there were no significant relationship between the 
migration and the total population, birthrate, number of agricultural workers, rate 
of literate people, number of high schools, number of doctors per 10,000 people, 
agricultural product value, industrial electricity consumption, or public 
investments. However, there was a significant statistical relationship between the 
migration and GNP. This turned out to be the most effective variable in 
determining the net migration rate, industrial workforce rate, geographic location 
(east-west), and annual estimated population growth. 
The results showed an east-west dichotomy in migration movements with 
a high level Pearson correlation (r=666). For the level of socioeconomic 
development and migration speed, the test also gave a high-level directional 
relationship (r=567). For the relationship between the migration rates between 
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1985 and 1990 in the 73 provinces there was a significant difference between 
coastal provinces and inland provinces (r=432). For the relationship between the 
migration rate realized between 1985 and 1990 in Turkey, other than three 
metropolitan provinces (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir), and five provinces (Bursa, 
Mersin, Adana, Antalya, and Mugla) gave the value r=393. This result showed 
that those provinces had an impact on the migration speed in Turkey because of 
their economic activities and job opportunities.  
Further, results indicated that terrorism was a repellent factor with a low 
but significant resulting variable. For relationship between the net migration rate 
realized between 1985 and 1990 in the 73 provinces of Turkey territories under 
strict control (provinces in emergency rule because of the terrorism problem), 
there was a weak, but adverse directional relationship (r=268). The findings also 
showed that terrorism had an impact on out-migrating movements in Turkey 
between 1985 and 1990.  
Finally, Ayse Celik (2002), in her dissertation, looked at the home-town 
associations from the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey and the 
recently formed Kurdish ethnic associations in Istanbul. Although she mentioned 
the effect of conflict in Southeastern Turkey and conflict related migration from 
the region on function and ideologies of the ethnic associations in Istanbul, 
founded by migrants from East and Southeastern Turkey, she was not mentioned 
how effective the conflict and conflict related violence on migration was. She 
used in-depth interviews and surveys utilizing the snowball technique among the 
  
102
 
members of ethnic Kurdish associations. She also checked newsletters of those 
associations. She found that the members of those ethnic associations were 
highly affected by the conflict. 
In sum, this chapter looks at the perspectives of migration literature first. 
Later, it focuses on the push and pull model of migration, as it relates to the 
research question and the hypotheses of this study. Then, literature concerning 
migration is reviewed. The focal point of the research is to check if there was a 
relationship between terrorism incidents and the net-migration rate. Because of 
the limitation of migration literature openly related to terrorism, migration 
literature related to conflict, chaos, and violence are reviewed instead. While 
checking the relationship between terrorism and net-migration, this study also 
aims to control impacts of all important factors on net-migration, so it chooses to 
use push and pull model. The models of May and Morrison (1994), Moore and 
Shellman (2002, 2004a), and Davenport (et al., 2003) fit the best for this study. 
Those studies include both violence and conflict related variables and other 
important forces such as economic related variables and distance. Therefore, as 
stated in push and pull model and related literature, this study also uses terrorism 
related variables, economy related variables, and other variables such as 
distance.  
 
 
 
103 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This part of the study will explain the methods that answer the research 
questions. First, it is going to describe the methodology, the unit of analysis, the 
sampling, and the statistical tests. That will be followed by a discussion 
concerning the research design, variables, data collection, and the hypotheses of 
the study. Finally, it will provide details about the study’s limitations.  
This quantitative study conducted a secondary data analysis. It is a quasi 
experimental research study that engages more than one sample over a time. 
Although quasi experimental designs are weaker in internal validity than 
experimental designs, they are superior to cross-sectional designs because they 
study more than one sample over a period of time (Nachmias-Frankfurt & 
Nachmias, 2000). Panel data for this study covers the time between 1992 and 
2001. According to Nachmias (et. all, 2000), panels examine the same sample at 
two or more time intervals. This solves the time dilemma of correlational and 
cross-sectional designs. 
Using panel data allowed this study to examine changes in the dependent 
variable over time. The unit of analysis was the provinces in Turkey, especially 
the ones in the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. The decision 
concerning the units of analysis influenced subsequent research design and the 
data analysis decisions and was in coordination with the research question. So, 
provinces as units of analysis were chosen purposefully for not having ecological 
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or individualistic fallacies (Nachmias, et. al, 2000). 
As mentioned above, the time frame for the analysis was 1992-2001. To 
show the differences in regions, this study used migration data from all 
provinces. This will avoid there not being a representative sample. In order to 
relate terrorist incidents’ impact on citizens’ inclination to leave their homes, a 
multiple regression was performed. Results of the multiple regressions will show 
if there are any relationships between terrorist incidents and migration. The figure 
(2) below, not representing the actual data, symbolizes the aim of this study; 
finding the relationship between number of terrorist incidents (I) and number of 
net-migrants (M) during the time.  
 
Figure 2: visual representation of relationship 
 
The region and the time frame are chosen purposefully because of the 
high terror incident rates during that time. As mentioned above, the number of 
terrorist incidents in the [East and Southeast] region was [2-3 times] higher than 
that of the national average. Also, starting in1992, there was continual terrorist 
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incident in that region of Turkey. Those terrorist incidents peaked during 1992-
1995. In 1996, terrorist incidents slowed down. Then after the leader of the 
terrorist organization, Ocalan was captured in 1999 terrorism almost stopped. To 
cover the different periods of terrorist incidents, panel data was examined in 
three parts. The first part of the data covered migration between 1992 and 1995 
(the period of highest level of terrorist incidents), the second section of the data 
covered migration between 1996 and 1999 (a period of moderate level of terrorist 
incidents), and the third section of the data covered migration between 2000 and 
2001 (the period of the lowest level of terrorist incidents) -- see the table below. 
 
Table 5: data periods  
DATA Region A 
(high terrorist incident provinces) 
Region B 
(low terrorist incident provinces) 
Period I East/S.East 1992-1995 (1) Other 1992-1995 (2) 
Period II East/S.East 1996-1999 (3) Other 1996-1999 (4) 
Period III East/S.East 2000-2001 (5) Other 2000-2001 (6) 
 
Variables 
Variables are measurable [abstract] concepts that represent empirical 
facts and help the researcher describe relationships (AcaStat Research Methods 
Handbook, 2004). This study used a dependent variable (DV) and a few 
independent and control variables. All the variables used in this study were 
quantitative. For Patton (2002), using quantitative variables and indicators have 
some advantages such as parsimony, precision, and ease of analysis. This 
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results in the key elements being quantified through validity, reliability, and 
retains the credibility needed to meet the necessary statistical assumptions.   
 
Dependent variable 
This study tries to explain migration patterns. Therefore, in order to find 
out motives that impact on inclination to leave their home towns, “net migration 
rate” were used as a dependent variable (Atalik and Ciraci, 1993; Pazarlıoglu, 
2001; Davenport, et al., 2003). Net migration is defined as the differentiation of 
in-migrants and out-migrants of a place during a certain period of time (Atalik and 
Ciraci, 1993; Pazarlıoglu, 2001). Unlike the out-migration, in-migration can be in 
a negative, positive, or zero value (Davenport, et al., 2003).  
According to Nachmias (et. al, 2000), a variable is continuous if it does not 
have a minimal size unit. In this study, the dependent variable, net migration rate, 
is a continuous variable, which allows the study to perform multiple regression. 
For “net migration rate,” this study used “net migration” per 1,000 residents. For 
example, in 1995, province X had a population of 200,000 residents. In a year, 
10,000 out-migrants left the province, and 1,000 in-migrants come to X. During 
that time, 5,000 babies were born, and 4,000 people died. As a result, net 
migration of X in 1995 has a negative value (-9,000), so does the net migration 
rate (-45). This means that the number of people leaving the province is more 
than the number moving to the province, and the result of this meant that the 
population of X in 1996 was 192,000.  
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These results can be easily calculated with the fallowing formulations:  
Net migration = in-migrants – out-migrants 
Net migration rate = Net migration / (Population / 1000) 
Subsequent population = Population + (Births – Deaths) + (In-migrants – Out-
migrants).  
Since (In-migrants – Out-migrants) = Net migration, 
Subsequent population = Population + (Births – Deaths) + (Net migration). 
Thus, Net migration = Subsequent population – [Population + (Births – Deaths)]. 
As can be seen in the final equation, “net migration” can be easily 
calculated without knowing exact numbers of either “in-migration” or “out-
migration.” Simply, the number of population, births, and deaths are enough to 
determine net migration.   
In order to obtain net migration, the number of births and deaths in the 
provinces between 1993 and 2002 were gathered from “State Registry of 
Population and Citizenship” (Nufus ve Vatandaslik Isleri Genel Mudurlugu – NVI). 
The data for the population of the provinces was gathered from “Department of 
State Statistics” (Turkiye Istatistik Kurumu – TUIK). For the population data, TUIK 
was able to give the exact number of the population for all provinces during 1990 
through 2000 because they have collected the census data for those years. 
However, the population between those years and 2001 were calculated by using 
provincial annual population growth rate. This is the TUIK estimation for 
provinces for specific years.  
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For example, in order to find out population of province X for 1991, the 
1990 base population of province X is multiplied by 1991 population growth rate 
of province X. The result is then added to the 1990 population of province X. 
Finally, in order to find out the net migration rate of province X, the formula above 
was used. The difference between births and deaths of the subsequent year is 
added to the population. Then, the difference between the subsequent population 
and the population is taken into account. Finally, the result is divided by per 
10,000 residents in that province.  
The final value of net migration shows the type of migration. If the value of 
net migration is positive (more in-migration), it means that more people are 
moving into the area than leaving it. If the value of net migration is negative 
(more out-migration), it means that more people are leaving the province than 
entering it. As mentioned above, in-migration cases have a distribution from zero 
to positive figure, and out-migration cases have a distribution from zero to 
negative figure.  However, net-migration displays a normal distribution, from 
negative integer to zero to positive integer (Davenport, et al., 2003). 
 
Independent Variables 
These variables are expected to explain change in the dependent 
variable, net migration (Nachmias, et. al, 2000). Two kinds of explanatory 
variables are going to be used in this study. The first group of variables is 
terrorism related variables. They are going to be used as independent (predictor) 
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variables. The second group of variables, that are economic related variables, 
was used as control variables; they were added to this study after reviewing the 
migration literature, which has mostly attempted to explain migration as the sole 
result of economic conditions. To test for the strength of the results, various 
combinations of the independent and control variables were used.  
The independent variables (IVs), used are the rate of terrorist incidents, 
and terrorism related casualties. The rate is [the number of terrorist incidents, 
and terrorism related casualties] per 10,000 residents. The number of terrorist 
incidents included the annual total number of terrorism related killings, murders, 
assaults, bombings, waylays, and kidnappings between 1992 and 2001. The rate 
of terrorism related casualties is going to be examined into two variables, the rate 
of total number of killed people and security forces (civilians, GKKs, soldiers, and 
police officers) and the number of killed terrorists. All the IVs of this study have 
continuous (interval level) figures. Data for the terrorist incidents for the provinces 
in Turkey was gathered from Turkish National Police database, which collects 
data from all over the country that depends on police reports.  
 
Control Variables 
In addition to the terrorism related variables, which negatively affected 
retention within their places of origin, according to the literature, economic forces 
might also motivate people to leave their hometowns. In order to control the 
impact of economic variables, this study used economical indicators of the 
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provinces for the same period. Unemployment rates and GDP per person were 
used as proxies to measure the impact of economic forces on migration (Sahota, 
1968; Atalik and Ciraci, 1993; May and Morrison, 1994; Pazarlıoglu, 2001; 
Carlos, 2002; Moore and Shellman, 2002; Moore and Shellman, 2004b). As in 
dependent variable, unemployment rate is going to be per 10,000 residents. 
Besides economic variables, geographic distance and the density of 
population (per square km) variables were used because they are among the 
mostly widely used variables in literature (Sahota, 1968; May and Morrison, 
1994; Moore and Shellman, 2002; Moore and Shellman, 2004b). Population 
density was used to control the gravity effect of the city and destination was used 
to control the economic cost of relocation. For destination variable, average 
destination to Istanbul, the most migrated province, and to Mersin, mostly 
preferred by migrants from the [East and Southeast] region, is going to be used. 
Control variables tested the likelihood if that any other causal link might be 
explained by variables other than those stated in the hypotheses (Nachmias, et. 
al, 2000). They were used to ensure the relationship between the variables 
stated in the hypothesis. According to Nachmias (et. al, 2000), using control 
variables reduces the risk of wrongly attributing explanatory power to the IVs. 
Interval level data for control variables was gathered from TUIK and Turkish 
Workforce Institution (ISKUR).  
As seen above, all variables are coming from either census data or 
archival records, resulting in this study being depending on secondary data. 
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According to Nachmias (et. al, 2000), a research design that relies on secondary 
data analysis, utilizes secondary data for at least three reasons.  
1. Conceptual substantive: secondary data may be the only source of 
available data to use for research on certain problems.  
2. Methodological factors: secondary analysis design has methodological 
advantages because it has increased observations, improved measurement, 
sample size, representativeness, and easy replication.  
3. Economic factors: compared to original data collection methods, it is a 
very cost-efficient way of gathering data.  
For this research study the first reason was the primary reason for 
choosing secondary data analysis, but the other two reasons were still important 
to this process  
 
Hypotheses 
In order to develop tentative answers to research problems and to expose 
the expected relationships between independent and dependent variables, some 
hypotheses were derived from theories and the literature. In this research, a 
relation means two or more variables are related; when this happens, changes in 
one variable are systematically related to changes in another. According to 
Nachmias (et. al, 2000), direction or magnitude refers to the relationship between 
variables being either positive or negative.  There is a positive relation, if the 
values of one variable increase, along with the values of another.  There is a 
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negative relation, if the values of one variable increase, while the values of the 
another decrease. The lowest magnitude possible in these relationships is the 
zero relation. Below are the hypotheses that we can be certain of only after they 
are empirically tested.  
 
H01: there is no difference in net-migration between the areas with high 
terrorist incidents and low terrorist incidents. 
H1: net-migration is higher in the areas with high terrorist incidents than 
those with low terrorist incidents. 
The aim of this hypothesis was to check if there was a significant 
difference in net-migration between areas with high terrorist incidents and low 
terrorist incidents. The number of terrorist incidents in the east and southeast 
regions was much higher than the national average. As was mentioned in both 
the theories section and the literature review, this condition may effect motivation 
to leave the areas (Maslow, 1943; May and Morrison, 1994; Moore and 
Shellman, 2002).  
To check this hypothesis, this study is going to look at the migration 
difference between high terrorist incident (region A) provinces and low terrorist 
incident (region B) provinces in table 5 above. Since the provinces of East and 
Southeast region of Turkey is 25-30% of all provinces, it is thought that choosing 
the top 25% of the high terrorist incident provinces (out of 81 provinces) can also 
reflect Eastern and Southeastern provinces. In order to select “region A” (high 
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terrorist incident) provinces, first, all provinces are arranged in descending order 
by their rate of total terrorism related killed people and their rate of terrorist 
incidents.  
After that, the top 20 provinces with the highest terrorist incident rate were 
chosen. However, it is seen that the separation between 20th and 21st high 
terrorist incident provinces is almost the same while there was a gap in terrorist 
incident rate between 21st and 22nd high terrorist incident provinces. Therefore, 
the first 21 high terrorism incident provinces are chosen as high terrorist incident 
provinces. Finally, the first 21 chosen provinces are called “region A” and others 
are called “region B” provinces. Among these 21 high terrorist provinces only 
Sivas is not in either the Eastern or the Southeastern regions, but it does border 
with the provinces in the Eastern and Southeastern regions.  
Two different examination were performed, one for all periods, and one for 
each period. To test the significant differences in general, first a discrete variable 
is used to differentiate the cases into regional groups (A and B). Then, a “T-test” 
is going to be performed by using the newly created grouping variables. A 
significant mean difference in “net-migration rate” between those regions will 
support this hypothesis. To perform a T-test for each period, cases belonging to 
periods were first selected. For example, for “period I,” the cases between 1992 
and 1995 were selected. Since cases were generated with the year, such as 
Ankara_1992 or Ankara_1993, this selection is not going to be complicated. 
Again, a significant difference in “net-migration rate” for each period between 
  
114
 
regional groups (between 1 and 2 in period I, 3 and 4 in period II, and 5 and 6 in 
period III) will support the hypothesis. 
 
H02: there is no relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents.  
H2: the higher the terrorist incident rate, the higher the net-migration. 
This hypothesis was also derived from the literature (Goodman, 1975; 
May and Morrison, 1994; Bariagaber, 1997; Moore and Shellman, 2002, 2004a, 
and 2004b; Kernot and Gurung, 2003). Discussing the significant relationship 
between net migration and terrorist incidents for all provinces and high terrorist 
incident provinces for all and each period may help to extend this hypothesis. 
To find out if there is a relationship between net migration rate and 
terrorist incidents, a multiple regression is going to be performed. In order to 
manage other impacts on net-migration control variables from the literature are 
going to be included into the multiple regression analysis. As stated above, these 
variables are going to be GDP per person, unemployment (or employment), 
distance to major cities, and density of the population.  
First, the analysis was performed for all provinces. Then, it was executed 
only for “region A” (high terrorist incident) provinces for all the periods and then 
for each period separately. Over again, the control variables mentioned above 
were used. After performing a multiple regression, a significant relationship 
between net-migration rate and terrorist incidents will support this hypothesis.  
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H03: there is no relationship between the number of deaths caused by 
terrorism and net-migration. 
H3: the higher the number of deaths caused by terrorism, the higher the 
net-migration. 
This hypothesis is also originated from the literature. Both May and 
Morrison (1994) and Moore and Shellman (2002) found a relationship between 
conflict related deaths and migration. Although Bariagaber (1997) could not find a 
significant relationship at 5% significance level, he did find a relationship at 10%. 
Concerning this hypothesis, checking the significant relationship between net 
migration and number of deaths for both all provinces and high terrorist incident 
provinces for all and each period may also help to broaden this hypothesis. 
Here, the number of deaths is going to represent the number of people 
killed and the number of security forces killed (GKKs, soldiers, and police 
officers) per 10,000 residents. It does not include the number of terrorists killed. 
However, the, the number of terrorists killed per 10,000 residents is also going to 
be included in the regression analysis. 
To find out if there is a relationship between net migration rates and the 
number of deaths, again a multiple regression analysis is going to be used. 
Again, the control variables mentioned above is going to be used. After 
performing multiple regression analysis for all provinces for all and each period, 
again a multiple regression is going to be used for only high terrorist incident 
provinces for all and each period separately. Previously selected high terrorist 
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incident provinces are going to be used for this hypothesis as well. A significant 
relationship between net-migration rate and number of deaths will support this 
hypothesis. 
 
H04: there is no relationship between GDP per person and net-migration in 
provinces with high terrorist incidents. 
H4: in high terrorist incident provinces, the less the province’s average 
GDP per person, the higher the net-migration. 
 This hypothesis tries to determine the relationship between economic 
deprivation and migration. As mentioned in the literature, there might be a 
relationship between net-migration and economic deprivation (Sahota, 1968; 
Todaro, 1976; Weiner, 1996; Pazarlioglu, 2001; Pendleton, 2001). To find out if 
there is a relationship between net migration rate and GDP per person in high 
terrorist incident provinces, “region A” provinces are going to be chosen. This 
selection is made to differentiate the high terrorist incident provinces from the 
rest. A multiple regression analysis is going to be performed on the selected 
provinces for the overall period and then again for each period separately. Once 
again, the control variables mentioned above are going to be used. A significant 
relationship between net-migration rate and GDP per person would support this 
hypothesis.  
Also, as was mentioned in the background information, high levels of 
terrorism did appear to impact the economy of the region. Therefore, if that 
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relationship is higher during the term of high terrorist incidents (period I) than 
during the term of low terrorist incidents (period III), it might show that the 
economy is related to out-migration as well as with terrorism. 
 
H05a: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the 
amount of GDP per person in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.  
H5a: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the less the GDP per 
person, the more the terrorist incident rate.   
H05b: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the 
unemployment rate in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.  
H5b: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the higher the 
unemployment rate, the more the terrorist incident rate.  
Both hypothesis 5a and 5b are exceptional hypotheses that are trying to 
show if there is a relationship between high terrorist incidents and poor economic 
conditions. According to some scholarly literature, socio-economic conditions are 
the main cause of terrorism (Kennedy 1986; Kegley, 1990; Charshaw, 1990). 
However, according to other scholars, the main causes of terrorism are 
completely different and do not include socio-economic conditions. For that group 
of scholars, the main cause of terrorism is geostatic (Luttwak 1983), 
psychological deviation (Feldmann and Perala, 2004), and ideological belief 
(Segaller, 1987). The reasons for terrorism in Eastern and Southeastern regions 
of Turkey may differ; it may be one of the reasons above or a combination of all. 
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However, it is certain that terrorism in the region had impacts on [both the 
regional and the national] economy, which may in turn impact the prevalence of 
terrorism (Human Development Report for Turkey, 1997; Kirisci and Winrow, 
1997; Zucconi, 1999).  
The relationships explored in this hypothesis are especially important. It is 
important to know if migrations within areas with high terrorist incidents in 
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey are not only the result of fear but 
also with the economic deprivation of provinces, as mentioned in “background 
information”. Since terrorism is related with the economical deprivation of a 
region, it might also have an impact on net-migration as well. It is like a vicious 
circle. A poor economy creates an environment for terrorism. Terrorism has a 
negative impact on the economy and both effect migration and each other in a 
downward cycle.  
 
 
In order to investigate this hypothesis (5), this study is going to determine 
if there is a relationship between terrorist incidents and economic variables (GDP 
in H5a and unemployment in H5b) for all and each of the periods. To find out if 
there is a relationship between terrorist incidents and economic variables, a 
TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS 
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MIGRATION 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
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multiple regression analysis is going to be performed. However, unlike the 
previous hypotheses, the number of terrorist incidents is going to be used as 
dependent variable and the net-migration rate is going to be the one of the 
independent variable. As a control variable, population density is going to be 
added in the regression models of all and each of the periods. This analysis will 
not only show the relationship between economic variables and terrorist 
incidents, but also will prove the relationship between the net-migration rate and 
terrorist incidents. A significant relationship between terrorist incidents and 
economic variables (GDP in H5a and unemployment in H5b) is going to support 
this hypothesis. 
 
Statistical technique 
Since the dependent variable is continuous, using a multiple regression 
will result in the best prediction (Tabachnick & Fidell (2001). Therefore, in order 
to find out the degree of relationship among variables this study used “Multiple 
R,” which assessed the degree to which one continuous (dependent) variable is 
related to a set of other (explanatory) variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The 
result of multiple regression cannot show causality but represents the best 
prediction of a dependent variable from several explanatory variables with the 
fallowing equation: kk xbxbxbxbbY +++++= ...' 3322110 .  
Performing the multiple regression analysis, the researcher must be 
careful to pay attention to normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of residuals, 
  
120
 
outliers, and multicollinearity. In order to test the hypothesis for significant 
relation, values from analysis of variance (ANOVA) table can be used to test the 
lack of fit assumption. If the assumptions are met, the test for a significant 
regression can be performed to examine the results (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
Since the number of cases is more than IVs, assumption of “ratio of cases 
to IVs” is met. For the multivariate outliers, the degree of freedom (df) is going to 
be the same with the number of IVs, so df value at 0.05 level from the “critical 
value of chi-square (x2)” table is going to be checked. After running a multiple 
regression, saved mahalanobis distance values of cases should not exceed the 
critical value of chi-square. 
For the normality of variables, skewness and kurtosis is going to be 
checked. When the distribution is normal, the values of skewness and kurtosis 
are zero (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Heteroscdasticity and normality of residuals 
are also going to be checked, after running linear regression plots and checking 
the histogram, normal probability plot, and partial plot. Normality of residual 
should be observed, but not the heteroscdasticity.  
Furthermore, Multicollinearity or singularity in the dataset is going to be 
checked. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more of the explanatory variables 
in a sample overlap with other variables in the sample (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001). It happens when a correlation coefficient between two IVs is high (greater 
than .90). Rarely, singularity happens when a correlation coefficient between two 
IVs is 1. It drives coefficient standard errors upward. A coefficient that might have 
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passed conventional standards of statistical significance outside the presence of 
multicollinearity could fail a hypothesis test because of inflated standard errors.  
Multicollinearity is especially important when it hinders the accuracy of 
important coefficient estimates and therefore prevents the identification of the 
causal process leading to the dependent variable. When it is present, methods of 
analysis cannot fully distinguish the explanatory factors from each other or isolate 
their independent influence, and the large size of standard error may not allow for 
any significant regression coefficient (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Therefore, the 
study would fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, a perfect or very high Squared 
Multiple Correlations (SMC) among IVs or a very low tolerances (1-SMC), or 
multicollinearity diagnostics is going to be screened (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). 
If there is a multicollinearity problem, the IV, that causes the problem, should be 
excluded. In order to decide which variable is to be excluded, the correlation 
between the variables will be checked. After checking IVs’ relationship with the 
DV, and comparing the IVs’ correlation coefficients with the DV, the IV with the 
“smaller value” will be dropped because it has a smaller correlation coefficient 
with the DV. In other words, the IV with a smaller Pearson correlation with the DV 
will be excluded. 
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Reliability and Validity 
The precision of the measurements may be affected by reliability and 
validity (Nachmias, et al., 2000). Reliability means the ability to repeatedly 
measure the same value of significance with no change occurring. This can be 
done when another researcher, measures the same subject with the same 
variables and obtains the same results (Nachmias, et al., 2000; AcaStat 
Research Methods Handbook, 2004).  
Therefore, reliability can be dependent on who performs the 
measurements, and when, where, and how data are collected. For good 
reliability, larger samples are always preferable. In order to make this research 
more reliable, the maximum number of cases was added into the equation by 
using panel data, which also helps to control for time effects on the empirical 
data (Nachmias, et. all, 2000).  
Panel data’s ability to remove fallacies of measurement, can happen by a 
cross-sectional design. According to Nachmias (et. all, 2000), the main problem 
with panels is obtaining an initial representative sample. This is not going to be a 
problem in this study because all the provinces were selected as its samples. 
Since the panel data for the measurement came from the formal sources, data 
reliability and validity is not going to be a concern either. 
Validity means that the operationalized variable precisely represents the 
abstract concept it intends to measure (AcaStat Research Methods Handbook, 
2004). Validity in quantitative research depends on careful instruments 
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construction (Patton, 2002). This study used instruments that came from the 
literature. This helped to minimize the validity problem. Having a clear conceptual 
definition of the variables, on the other hand, is also very important for construct 
validity. This is about the correspondence between the concepts and the actual 
measurements. Since all the concepts are defined, including the variables, this 
study does not have a problem with construct validity.   
A measure containing high levels of validity is an aim for this study. 
However, since it is a quasi experimental design, its internal validity is lower than 
an experimental design, but it may have a better external validity. Researchers 
often succeed in compensating for the internal validity problem by matching or 
expanding the “number” and “variety” of contrasted groups (Nachmias, et al., 
2000). Here, the study is going to use various combinations of variables to test 
for the strength of the results, so this may increase validity.  
 
Limitations 
Because of the difficulty of finding people who migrated out from the 
Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey between 1992 and 2001 and 
forming a sampling from them, this study did not use a survey; It instead 
examined migrating motivations in a very broad scale and therefore did not take 
into account all the individual feelings and factors that causes migration. In other 
words, this study is limited to secondary data concerning migration and terrorist 
incidents.  
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Also, this study is limited as to the number of extremist incidents 
implemented by terrorist groups between 1992 and 2001. Only the extremist 
incidents implemented by [non-governmental] terrorist groups were examined. 
Sometimes an incident is not recorded as a terrorist incident because the terrorist 
groups refuse to take responsibility. Also, the definition of terrorism varies 
depending on the perceptions of individuals.  
Furthermore, sometimes, a large, very violent terrorist incident will affect 
more people more than several small terrorist incidents. This study examines 
effects of terrorism on migration by comparing it to the number of the terrorist 
incident an individual is exposed to. The study will not be able to evaluate the 
level of effect each single incident has on every person in the study.  
Moreover, this study is going to compare the changes of out-migration in a 
period with the changes in extremist incidents, unemployment, and GDP per 
person in the same period. Subjects related with political issues, such as 
freedom, political rights, and civil liberties, are not going to be used in that 
comparison because freedom, political rights, and civil liberties are abstract 
subjects, and can have varying scores depending on who measures them. 
Finally, since this study measures the net migration (out-migration) rate 
from certain provinces, variables related with in-migration or gravity effects are 
not used.  For example, this study does not cover the effect of families or friends, 
as stated in social capital and social network theories. However, while the main 
question is not related to reasons for the migration patterns, and the study only 
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aims to find out a relationship between terrorist incidents and the number of out-
migrants, the effects of families, friends, or charm of living in a big province do 
not constitute a problem. The total number of the out-migrants is going to cover 
all the migrants, who moved out from the region for what ever reason.
126 
CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
This chapter explains the results of the study, which examines the link 
between net-migration and terrorism. First, it gives a general overview of the 
findings without discussing any metrics. Then, in hypotheses testing section, it 
examines each hypothesis using different models. Hypotheses’ testing is going to 
be done under three subtitles. The first will be the differences in net-migration 
between provinces, as mentioned in hypothesis 1. Then, the relationships 
between net-migration and terrorist incidents, as mentioned in hypothesis 2; 
terrorism related deaths, as mentioned in hypothesis 3; and GDP per person in 
high terrorism incident provinces, as mentioned in hypothesis 4, will be 
examined. Following that, the relationship between terrorism incidents and 
economic variables, as mentioned in hypothesis 5, are going to be evaluated. 
Finally, the findings of the study will be discussed in relation to the literature.  
 
Overview of Findings 
The aim of this study is to show whether there is a relationship between 
net-migration and terrorism. In order to develop responses to the research 
questions, several models were used. Models for all the provinces and for 
provinces with high terrorism incident rates (Region A) were developed. Also, 
there were models for the following time periods: all periods (1992-2001), Period 
I (1992-1995), Period II (1996-1999), and Period III (2000-2001).  
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The research findings show that there is a statistical significance 
difference in net-migration between provinces with high terrorism incident rates 
and those with low terrorism incident rates. Findings also show that this 
difference is the highest during time Period I, when the terrorism incident rate 
was at its highest for all periods; and this difference in net-migration is the lowest 
during time Period III, when the terrorism incident rate was at its lowest for all 
periods. Thus, these findings may be a supporting evidence for the relationship 
between net-migration and the terrorism incident rate. 
Secondly, the findings show that there was a positive relationship between 
net-migration and terrorist incidents. Accordingly, net-migration is going to 
increase, if the incident rate increases. This relationship is clear in the models 
that reflect high terrorism incident provinces. Also, terrorism events are more 
evident during 1992-1995. In addition to the number of terrorist incidents, results 
confirm that net-migration is also related to the number of deaths caused by 
terrorism. This relationship is also positive, meaning that net-migration is going to 
increase as the number of deaths rises. Again, this relationship is more evident in 
the models with “Region A” provinces in Period I. 
Research findings related to the economic variables demonstrates that 
both GDP per person and unemployment impacted net-migration. However, their 
impacts vary in different models. Results show that while GDP has the most 
significant impact on models with all the provinces, it has no significant impact on 
models with the high terrorism provinces. Therefore the direction of this 
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relationship is negative, which means that if the GDP per person drops off, net-
migration increases. Again, this relationship is not valid for the models with high 
terrorism incident provinces.  
Interestingly, results related with unemployment are in contrast with the 
result related to GDP. Unlike GDP, unemployment has no significant relationship 
in the models with all the provinces, except for 2000-2001, when the terrorism 
incident rate is the lowest for all periods. However, there is a positive relationship 
with net migration in the models with high terrorism provinces, especially models 
for Period I. This finding indicates that in the high terrorism incident provinces 
and also in all provinces during 2000-2001, net-migration was increased due to 
unemployment.  
By this result, it might be thought that unemployment rate in high terrorism 
incident provinces was also related to terrorism incident rate. However, findings 
indicate that there was no relationship between terrorist incident rates and 
unemployment in any period in the high terrorism incident provinces, even if 
there was a relationship between GDP rate and terrorism incident rate in high 
terrorism incident provinces only between 1992 and 1995.  
Density, as an important pull factor, was one of the major agents that 
impacted on net-migration in all the models. Distance, which was measured by 
two variables, had two different results. While distance to Istanbul had in 
negative relationship with net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces, 
distance to Mersin had in positive relationship with net-migration in high terrorism 
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incident provinces. In short, the further the distance to Istanbul from the high 
terrorism incident provinces, the less the net-migration is; and the further the 
distance to Mersin in high terrorism incident provinces, the more the net-
migration is.  
 
Hypotheses Testing 
In order to determine the statistical significance of the hypotheses, a T-
test, for the first hypothesis was used and a Standard Linear Multiple Regression 
was used for all the other hypotheses. All statistical analysis was done with 
SPSS software. Before starting the analysis, the frequencies of the variables 
were checked to see if there was any missing data (appendix A). It was 
determined that there was not a missing data problem. Since net-migration 
between 1992 and 2001 was examined during in three periods, hypotheses were 
developed for four periods; three periods plus one for all the periods. Descriptive 
Statistics tables for all and the high terrorism incident (Region A) provinces in 
each period are shown below (table 6 and 7). 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics table for all provinces in each period. 
All Provinces (1992-2001) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 740 93.6490 171.91949
Gross Domestic Product 740 2223.2947 1104.12940
Net Migration Rate 740 -162.9946 212.43756
Unemployment Rate 740 158.0262 122.56763
Distance to Istanbul 740 824.08 432.196
Distance to Mersin 740 673.99 263.263
Incident Rate 740 .9465 2.74460
Rate of Killed People/Security 740 .3826 1.39167
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 740 .8100 3.43307
 
All Provinces (1992-1995) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 296 88.7530 155.66735
Gross Domestic Product 296 2095.0959 1084.80750
Net Migration Rate 296 -170.7412 211.70553
Unemployment Rate 296 163.3587 121.99280
Distance to Istanbul 296 824.08 432.635
Distance to Mersin 296 673.99 263.531
Incident Rate 296 1.4548 3.50720
Rate of Killed People/Security 296 .6770 1.93179
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 296 1.2113 4.67581
All Provinces (1996-1999) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 296 95.2754 176.76775
Gross Domestic Product 296 2433.2735 1119.56731
Net Migration 296 -167.49336 213.482598
Unemployment Rate 296 133.5479 114.23124
Distance to Istanbul 296 824.08 432.635
Distance to Mersin 296 673.99 263.531
Incident Rate 296 .8011 2.43630
Rate of Killed People/Security 296 .2688 .97555
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 296 .7602 2.67402
All Provinces (2000-2001) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 148 100.1882 192.75225
Gross Domestic Product 148 2059.7347 1050.17297
Net Migration 148 -138.50376 211.442920
Unemployment Rate 148 196.3177 129.34783
Distance to Istanbul 148 824.08 433.370
Distance to Mersin 148 673.99 263.979
Incident Rate 148 .2206 .42402
Rate of Killed People/Security 148 .0214 .07480
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 148 .1069 .44573
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics table for Region A provinces in each period. 
 Region A Provinces (1992-2001) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 210 50.4747 20.42346
Gross Domestic Product 210 1312.3525 451.47628
Net Migration Rate 210 -260.9421 192.41147
Unemployment Rate 210 140.3220 99.84644
Distance to Istanbul 210 1340.52 222.293
Distance to Mersin 210 697.33 216.272
Incident Rate 210 2.8935 4.60374
Rate of Killed People/Security 210 1.2992 2.35383
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 210 2.8329 5.99420
   
 Region A Provinces (1992-1995) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 84 47.8247 18.39245
Gross Domestic Product 84 1254.0650 440.96529
Net Migration Rate 84 -282.3629 178.95817
Unemployment Rate 84 153.2026 119.04156
Distance to Istanbul 84 1340.52 223.095
Distance to Mersin 84 697.33 217.052
Incident Rate 84 4.5802 5.45395
Rate of Killed People/Security 84 2.3506 3.04995
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 84 4.2455 8.04332
Region A Provinces (1996-1999) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 84 51.2776 20.83391
Gross Domestic Product 84 1418.9480 463.34690
Net Migration Rate 84 -265.8655 193.57075
Unemployment Rate 84 105.0810 71.75672
Distance to Istanbul 84 1340.52 223.095
Distance to Mersin 84 697.33 217.052
Incident Rate 84 2.4334 4.15193
Rate of Killed People/Security 84 .8633 1.60095
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 84 2.6539 4.51041
 Region A Provinces (2000-2001) N Mean Std. Deviation 
Population Density Per KM2 42 54.1688 23.08873
Gross Domestic Product 42 1215.7366 413.49386
Net Migration Rate 42 -208.2540 210.24501
Unemployment Rate 42 185.0429 82.31058
Distance to Istanbul 42 1340.52 224.451
Distance to Mersin 42 697.33 218.372
Incident Rate 42 .4401 .70523
Rate of Killed People/Security 42 .0682 .12929
Rate of Total Killed Terrorist 42 .3657 .78493
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Differences in Net-Migration between Provinces 
H01: there is no difference in net-migration between the provinces with 
high terrorist incidents and low terrorist incidents. 
  As was mentioned above, a T-test was used to find out if there was a 
difference between the provinces. First, a dummy variable was created to 
differentiate the provinces. The dataset contained 81 provinces during a 10 year 
time span. However, 7 out of the 81 provinces had been townships of a nearby 
province during 1990s and have joint datasets for some variables during 1990s, 
i.e. unemployment rate. For that reason, datasets of those seven provinces were 
merged with the provinces in which they had previously been townships. The 
following details at merge of data: the dataset for Osmaniye was merged into 
Adana; Duzce was merged into Bolu; Kilis merged into Gaziantep; Yalova 
merged into Istanbul; Ardahan and Igdir were merged into Kars; and Karabuk 
was merged into Zonguldak. None of the merged provinces was among the 21 
high terrorist incident provinces. While datasets of the two provinces were 
merged, incident numbers and populations of the provinces were collected under 
one province and then the incident rate variable for the merged provinces was 
produced. Finally, the dataset contains 74 provinces over 10 years, which results 
in 740 cases. The dummy variable helped to make the comparison between net-
migration rates of the 21 previously selected high terrorist incident provinces and 
net-migration rates of the other 53 provinces. 
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For all periods (92-01):  
After running an “independent samples T-test,” the group statistics table 
(appendix B) was checked and it was concluded that the right variables had been 
selected. According to this table, for Region A, sample size (N) was 210, mean 
was (-260.9421), standard deviation was (192.4114), and standard error was 
(13.27765); for Region B, sample size (N) was 530, mean was (-124.1852), 
standard deviation was (207.6071), and standard error was (9.0178). Levene's 
Test for the Equality of Variances in Independent Samples Test Table (appendix 
C) shows that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not violated (the 
"Sig." value was not significant, p = .513). Therefore, it is assumed that the 
variances are approximately equal (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989). Here, "Sig. 
(2-tailed)" confirms that the observed difference in the means (136.75) is 
significant (p = .000). 
084.0
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T-Test result shows that the difference in the means is significant 
(t = 8.245, p = .000, df = 738, 2η = .084), so the null hypothesis does not fall 
within 95% interval. H01 is rejected in favor of H1 for all periods.  
 
For Period I (92-95): 
According to the group statistics table (appendix D), for Region A, sample 
size (N) as 84, mean was (-282.3629), standard deviation was (178.9581), and 
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standard error was (19.5259); for Region B, sample size (N) was 212, mean was 
(-126.5137), standard deviation was (207.6982), and standard error was 
(14.2647). Independent Samples Test Table (appendix D) shows that 
homogeneity of variance assumption was not violated (p = .233). Here, the 
observed difference in the means (155.84) is significant (p = .000). The SPSS 
output indicates that the difference in the means is significant (t = 6.044, 
p = .000, df = 294, 2η = .11), so for Period I, the null hypothesis (H01) is rejected 
in favor of H1 at 5% significance level.  
 
For Period II (96-99): 
The group statistics table shows that the right variables were selected 
(appendix F). According to this table, for Region A, sample size (N) was 84, 
mean was (-265.8655), standard deviation was (193.5707), and standard error 
was (21.12030); for Region B, sample size (N) was 212, mean was (-128.5157), 
standard deviation was (208.8065), and standard error was (14.3408). Levene's 
Test for the Equality of Variances (appendix G) shows that homogeneity of 
variance assumption was not violated (p = .692). Here, "Sig. (2-tailed)" confirms 
that the observed difference in the means (137.34) is significant (t = 5.206, 
p = .000, df = 294, 2η = .084), so the null hypothesis does not fall within 95% 
interval. For Period II, H01 is rejected in favor of H1. 
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For Period III (00-01): 
Group statistics table (appendix H) was checked and it was concluded that 
the right variables had been selected. For Region A, sample size (N) was 42, 
mean was (-208.2540), standard deviation was (210.2450), and standard error 
was (32.4415); for Region B, sample size (N) was 106, mean was (-110.8669), 
standard deviation was (206.4316), and standard error was (20.0504). 
Independent Samples Test Table (appendix I) shows that homogeneity of 
variance assumption was not violated (p = .968). It also confirms that the 
observed difference in the means (97.38) is significant (p = .011). The output 
shows that the difference in the means is significant (t = 2.574, p = .000, df = 
146, 2η =.043); therefore, the null hypothesis (H01) is rejected in favor of H1 for 
Period III.  
 
Net-Migration by Terrorist Incidents, Deaths, and GDP 
 H02: there is no relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents.  
H03: there is no relationship between the number of deaths caused by 
terrorism and net-migration.  
H04: there is no relationship between GDP per person and net-migration in 
provinces with high terrorist incidents. 
In order to test the relationship between net-migration and terrorist 
incidents stated in H02, the number of terrorism related deaths stated in H03, and 
GDP per person stated in H04, a standard linear multiple regression for all cases 
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(provinces) and another standard linear multiple regression for high terrorism 
incident provinces (region A) were run for each of  the periods. In this part, H02, 
H03, and H04 are examined together because they are all tested with same 
statistical test by using the same DV and IVs.  For all three hypotheses, net-
migration rate is going to be the dependent variable. Independent and control 
variables are going to be as fallows: terrorism incident rate, rate of people and 
security forces killed, rate of total killed terrorist, population density per KM2, 
gross domestic product, unemployment rate, distance to Istanbul, and distance to 
Mersin. 
Because migration decisions may not happen immediately, a one year lag 
effect for the terrorist incidents and deaths was also used to determine if a time 
lag would have a different impact on net-migration than the previous models. 
Before running the regression analysis, the data was checked to assure that it 
met the assumptions of multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).   
The first assumption was that the DV is going to be an interval scale. The 
measurement level of DV (net-migration) was going to be a ratio, so the first 
assumption was met. The second assumption is the “ratio of cases to IVs,” which 
means that the regression models would have to have more cases than IVs. 
Since the dataset had 740 cases, with a minimum of 42 cases for the last model 
(in Period III-Region A cases), this assumption was also met (appendix A, J). 
Third assumption was the absence of outliers among the variables 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Both univariate and multivariate situations were 
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checked. Univariate outliers were cases with extreme values on one variable and 
multivariate outliers were cases where an unusual combination of scores on two 
or more variables exist (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For univariate outliers, cases 
with standardized scores in excess of +/- 3.29 (p<.001) were potential outliers. 
With a very large N, some standardized scores in excess of +/- 3.29 were normal 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
SPSS DESCRIPTIVES were run and standardized values were saved as 
variables (appendix K). Then, those values were checked to see if their 
standardized scores were in excess of +/- 3.29. Here, the data had some outlier 
cases in excess of +3.29. The following cases were the outliers, have Z scores of 
higher than + 3.29: the “density” variable for all the years (cases) of Istanbul 
province;  the “GDP” variable for all the years of Kocaeli province; the 
“unemployment” variable for some of the cases in Eskisehir and Zonguldak 
provinces;  and the “incidents rate,” the  “rate of people and security forces 
killed,” and the  “rate of killed terrorists” variables for most cases of Hakkari, 
Sirnak, Tunceli, and some cases of Siirt, Bingol, and Mardin provinces.  
When these outliers were identified, there were several ways to reduce 
their impact, such as the elimination of the variable responsible for most of the 
outliers, variable transformation, changing the score on the variable, or the 
elimination of the case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The problem with deleting 
outliers is that the generalizability can be raised for those left, but reduced for the 
whole population. In this particular example, no variables or cases with univariate 
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outliers were eliminated because the cases with univariate outliers were the key 
cases to determining the relationship mentioned in the research question.  
Once the potential outliers were located, the search for multivariate 
outliers began (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Multivariate outliers are combined 
results. The chi-square value determined the highest value. Here, the degree of 
freedom was 8, which is the number of IVs. The first, df was 8 at the 0.05 level. 
This is checked against the “critical value of chi-square (x2)” table. The value was 
found to be 15.5073. So it was concluded that the mahalanobis distance of the 
cases cannot exceed 15.5073. However, there were some cases that exceeded 
the mahalanobis distance. Those cases were very similar to the cases with 
univariate outliers as they were mostly high terrorism incident cases from Region 
A provinces. As was mentioned above, those cases were the key cases for this 
research so, if the other assumptions were met, they would not be eliminated.   
However, it is known that outliers may lead both Type I and Type II errors 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). So to control their impact, the variables with outliers 
were also transformed and another linear multiple regression run with the 
transformed variables for all models in each period. For transformation, SQRT 
was used first, but almost nothing changed. Then, LG10 and LN transformations 
were used. They both eliminated all the univariate outliers, except for the outliers 
belongs to GDP per persons of all Istanbul cases. After checking the 
mahalonobis distance, it was seen that a few outliers still existed but despite this 
the LN transformation was the preferred method.  
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Still, both assumption of normality and linearity were going to be tried with 
previous (original) data, which included non-transformed variables. If they met, 
the data before transformation would be the basis for analysis and the 
transformed data would be used to ensure that neither Type I nor Type II errors 
existed. The reason for this choice was related to the research question which 
asked about the impact of terrorism - outlier cases - on net-migration.  
Another assumption is the normality of variables that have two 
components: skewness and kurtosis. Skewness has to do with the symmetry of 
the distribution and kurtosis has to do with the peakedness of a distribution 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). With large samples, the significance level of 
skewness is not as important as its actual size and the visual appearance of the 
distribution. When a distribution is normal, values of skewness and kurtosis is 
going to be zero.  
 1764.00900.0*96.1
0900.0
096.10
0900.0
740
66
==
−==−=
===
S
S
S
Sz
N
S
s
s
  3529.01800.0*96.1
1800.0
096.1
01800
0
1800.0
740
2424
==
−==−=
===
K
KKz
N
Sk
 
For sample size of 740, critical value of skewness is +/- 0 .1764. 
For sample size of 740, critical value of kurtosis is +/– 0 .3529.  
 
In order to check skewness and kurtosis, a SPSS DESCRIPTIVES was 
run (appendix L). While Net Migration Rate and Distance to Mersin were 
negatively skewed, all others are positively skewed. Distance to Mersin and 
distance to Istanbul had negative kurtosis, but all others had positive kurtosis. 
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Another multiple regression assumption was linearity, which was a 
straight-line relationship between two variables. It was important in a practical 
sense because Pearson’s r only captures linear relationships among variables. 
Linearity between two variables was assessed by inspecting bivariate 
scatterplots (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  Here, if both variables were normally 
distributed and linearly related, the scatterplot was oval-shaped. If one of the 
variables was non-normal, the scatterplot between this variable and the other 
were not oval. Here, no clear outliers, which might cause heteroscdasticity, were 
observed (appendix M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, and T). Heteroscdasticity may occur 
when some variables are skewed and others are not. To check the 
heteroscdasticity and the normality of residuals, a linear regression plots, with 
Y:*ZPRED and X:*ZRESID, was run (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The residuals 
were saved, and the histogram, normal probability plot, and partial plot were 
checked. Here, heteroscdasticity was not observed (appendix U, V, W).  
Screening data prior to the analysis showed that all assumptions were 
met, except for some outliers, which were acceptable with a large N. This result 
allowed the use of the original data. Therefore, in terms of hypothesis testing, the 
regression results without transformed variables are going to be the base. 
However, if the transformed variables produce very different results, they are 
going to be reported as well.  
Multicollinearity or singularity, another assumption of multiple regression, 
was checked for all the models. This happens when the explanatory variables in 
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a sample overlap and forces the coefficient standard errors up (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). When this occurs, analysis may not completely differentiate each 
IVs independent impact, which may result in no significant regression coefficient 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In order to check multicollinearity, a linear 
regression with collinierity statistics was run, and low tolerances (1-SMC) were 
checked (appendix X). It was thought that there could be multicollinearity 
between “incidents rate” (tolerance = .126) and “rate of people and security 
forces killed” (tolerance = .095).  
These low tolerance values indicated that there was a collinearity problem 
but they did not show which IV caused the problem at this level (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001).  In order to decide which variable to exclude, correlation between 
the variables was checked. To analyze the correlation, SPSS Bivariate 
Correlation Analysis was used, and high (> .90) correlation coefficients between 
IVs were checked (appendix Y). It is determined that there was a multicollinearity 
between the “incidents rate” and the “rate of people and security forces killed” 
(.931). Thus, the IV with a smaller absolute Pearson correlation then the DV was 
excluded. After checking their relationship with the DV, the “rate of people and 
security forces killed” (.-227) was excluded and the “incidents rate” (-.250) was 
kept. 
After checking the data for the assumptions of multiple regression and 
excluding the “rate of people and security forces killed”, a standard multiple 
regression for all cases was run. It was seen that the most important IV (incident 
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rate) had a significant relationship with the DV (p = .000); however, the Beta 
value of it was negative (-.233), which made interpretation difficult because the 
DV had also both negative and positive values. As was mentioned earlier, the 
value of the DV (net-migration) has a meaning. If it was negative, it meant that 
the province sent more out-migration in that year; similarly, if it was positive, it 
meant that the province received more in-migration that year.  
To make the results more understandable with an easily explained Beta 
value, transformation of DV seemed to be a good idea. With the aim of keeping 
the meaning of DV, different transformation methods were used, but they 
generated univariate outliers. Finally, it was decided that transformation with the 
following formula (-1) kept the meaning of the DV and did not generate any 
univariate outlier. After the (-1) transformation of the DV, values under zero (0) 
meant more in migration and values over zero (0) meant more out migration. 
Therefore, an increasing DV means more out-migration, and a decreasing DV 
means more in-migration. In short, the bigger the value of net-migration, the 
bigger the number of out-migrants is. Now, the data was ready for SPSS 
analysis. 
 
For all periods (92-01):  
Since the research looked at the impact of extreme cases on net-
migration, data (models) with outliers were preferred. After omitting the “rate of 
people and security forces killed” variable, a standard linear multiple regression 
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for all cases and another multiple regression for high terrorism incident provinces 
(region A) were run.  
 
Table 8: significance of variables for 1992-2001. 
 
ALL 
1992-2001 Incident 
Rate 
Killed 
People 
Killed 
Terrorist 
Density GDP Unem-
ploymnt 
Dist. 
Istanbul 
Dist. 
Mersin 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2 =
 .3
98
  
 N
=7
40
 p=.000,  
β =.201 
R2=.389 + 
p=.003 
β =.156 
p=.027 
β=-.097 
p=.000 
β =-.261 
p=.000 
β =-.478 
    X   
p=.096 
     X  p=.000 
β =.183 
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .3
97
   
N
=2
10
 p=.000 
β =.381 
R2=.355 + 
p=.004  
β =.282 
   X p=.001 
β =-.276 
    X p=.005 
β =163 
p=.000 
β =-.416 
p=.002 
β =.303 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
  A
ll 
R
2  =
 .3
83
   
N
=6
66
 
p=.000 
β =.201 
R2=.374 + 
p=.006  
β =.151 
    X     
p=.051 
p=.000  
β =-.264 
p=.000 
 
β =-.464 
   
      X 
   
    X 
p=.000 
β =.178 
   
   
   
   
   
 N
on
-T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
(o
rig
in
al
 IV
 v
al
ue
s w
ith
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .4
01
   
N
=1
89
 
p=.000 
β =.395 
R2=.358 + 
p=.003 
β =.305 
   
    X 
p=.002 
β =-.290 
   X 
p=.009 
β =.160 
p=.000 
β =-.422 
p=.006 
β =.288 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2 =
 .5
73
   
N
=7
40
    X     X     X 
p=.000 
β =-.661 
 
 p=.015 
 
 β =-.194 
     X 
p=.007 
β =-.220 
    X  
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .4
28
   
N
=2
10
 
p=.009 
β =.296 
    X    X 
p=.007 
β =-.227 
   X 
p=.020 
β =.144 
p=.000 
β =-.547 
p=.001 
β =.344 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
ll 
R
2  =
 .5
66
   
N
=6
66
    X     X    X 
p=.000 
β =-.672 
p=.036 
β =-.171 
   
    X 
p=.007 
β =-.236    X 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
   
   
   
(w
ith
 L
N
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .4
35
   
N
=1
89
 
p=.039 
β =.244 
    X     X 
p=.007 
β =-.239 
   X 
p=.025 
β =.141 
p=.000 
β =-.578 
p=.002 
β =.319 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
X : no statistical significance at 5%. 
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After the LN transformation of variables, multicollinearity was checked 
again. Unlike the non-transformed models, no Multicollinearity was observered in 
(1st and 3rd) models with all cases. However, similar to the non-transformed 
models, Multicollinearity between “incident rate” and “rate of people and security 
forces killed” was observed in (2nd and 4th) models with “Region A” cases. 
Therefore, in models with transformed variables “rate of people and security 
forces killed” was only omitted in models with “Region A” cases.  
 
Table 9: SPSS results of 1st model for 1992-2001. 
1992-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
   
 A
ll 
C
as
es
/P
ro
vi
nc
es
 
   
   
   
   
  (
1s
t  M
od
el
)  
   
   
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
              (R2= .398   N=740) 
Incident Rate = .201**** 
Killed Terrorists = -.097** 
Population Density = -.261**** 
GDP per person = -.478**** 
Distance to Mersin = .183**** 
Unemployment = .050*   
Killed P/S: R2=.389, p=.003, Beta=.156+ 
               (R2= .573   N=740) 
Population Density =-.661**** 
GDP per person = -.194** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.220*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
The explanatory power of the 1st model was (R2 = .398, N = 740) 
(appendix Z). The adjusted R2, which shows the penalty factor, was very close to 
the R2. ANOVA table shows that the F-test, overall strength of the model, was 
significant (appendix 1A). Coefficients table (appendix 1B) indicates that incident 
rate (t = 4.517, p = .000, Beta = .201), rate of killed terrorists (t = -2.216, p = .027, 
Beta = -.097), population density (t = -8.417, p = .000, Beta = -.261), GDP (t = -
12.176, p = .000, Beta = -.478), and distance to Mersin (t = 6.276, p = .000, Beta 
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= .183) variables all had statistically significant relationships with the dependent 
variable with net migration at 95% confidence level. On the other hand, distance 
to Istanbul (p = .268) and unemployment rate (p = .096) were not statistically 
significant at 95% confidence levels.  
Here, B shows the contribution, changed by one unit. Absolute value of 
Beta shows the standardized (net) contribution of individual variables. According 
to the coefficients table the incident rate had the biggest positive impact on DV 
towards out-migration. It showed that the higher the incident rate, the higher the 
net-migration was. GDP, with a negative Beta value, had the largest negative 
impact on DV towards in-migration. A negative Beta value meant that a negative 
relationship between DV and IV existed. Here, an increasing GDP meant a 
decreasing DV, so the higher the GDP was, the lower the net-migration. 
Before running another standard linear regression for only Region A cases 
(N = 210), correlations between IVs were checked. Because of multicollinearity 
between “rate of people and security forces killed” and “incident rate” (.929), the 
“rate of people and security forces killed” variable was omitted from the model.  
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Table 10: SPSS results of 2nd model for 1992-2001. 
1992-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
   
   
R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
   
   
  (
2n
d  M
od
el
)  
   
   
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
                 (R
2 = .397   N=210) 
Incident Rate = .381**** 
Population Density = -.276*** 
Distance to Mersin = .303*** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.416**** 
Unemployment = .163*** 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.355, p=.004, Beta=.282+   
                       (R2 = .428   N=210) 
Incident Rate = .296*** 
Population Density = -.227*** 
Distance to Mersin = .344*** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.547**** 
Unemployment = .144** 
 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
The explanatory power of this 2nd model was (R2 = .397) (appendix 1C). 
The second model was also significant (appendix 1D). Similar to the first model, 
the incident rate was (t=4.772, p=.000, Beta=.381), population density (t=-3.317, 
p=.001, Beta=-.276), distance to Istanbul (t=-4.231, p=.000, Beta=-.416), and 
distance to Mersin (t=3.089, p=.002. Beta=.303) was a statistically significant 
relationship with the dependent variable at 95% confidence level. Different than 
the first model, the rate of killed terrorists (p = .218) and GDP per person (p = 
.386) was not significant (p = .576) (appendix 1E). 
As was mentioned above, the effect of an incident might negatively impact 
on net-migration after a year. So as to show this impact, lagged variables for 
terrorism related variables (incident rate, rate of people and security forces killed, 
and rate of killed terrorist) were also used in the regression models for all 
provinces (3rd model) and for Region A provinces (4th model).There was no 
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terrorism incident data for 1991, so there was no lagged incident data for 1992 
on net-migration. Therefore, there was a slight change in the number of cases in 
Period I. The lagged variables were includes only for 1993, 1994, and 1995 and 
(not 1992). For that reason, the number of total cases went down to 666 after the 
lagged variables (appendix 1F). Again, multicollinearity was checked for 3rd and 
4th models (appendix 1G, 1H). It was seen that there was still multicollinearity 
between “incidents rate” and “rate of people and security forces killed” (.932 for 
all cases; and .928 for Region A cases), so the “rate of people and security 
forces killed” was excluded from the 3rd and 4th models.  
 
Table 11: SPSS results of 3rd model for 1992-2001. 
1992-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
 L
ag
ge
d 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
   
   
 (3
rd
 M
od
el
)  
   
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
                        (R2 = .383   N=666) 
Incident Rate = .201**** 
Population Density = -.264**** 
GDP per person = -.464**** 
Distance to Mersin = .178**** 
Killed Terrorist = -.091*    
Killed P/S: R2=.374, p=.006, Beta=.151+ 
                    (R2 = .566   N=666) 
Population Density = -.672**** 
GDP per person = -.171** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.236*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
Again, a standard linear multiple regression for all cases and another 
multiple regression for high terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run. 
According to the 3rd model, which was run for all provinces with lagged variables, 
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(appendix 1I), the explanatory power was (R2 = .383, N = 666). The model was 
significant overall (appendix 1J). Still, net-migration is significantly related to 
incident rate (t = 4.232, p = .000, Beta = .201) at 95% confidence level (appendix 
1K). For this model, population density (t = -7.993, p = .000, Beta = -.264), GDP 
(t = -11.050, p = .000, Beta = -.464) and distance to Mersin (t = 5.691, p = .000, 
Beta = .178) was statistically significant at 5%, but the rate of killed terrorists (p = 
.051), unemployment rate (p = .131), and distance to Istanbul (p = .256) were not 
significant. 
 
Table 12: SPSS results of 4th model for 1992-2001. 
1992-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
 L
ag
ge
d 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
   
  (
4t
h  M
od
el
)  
   
  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
  
            (R2 = .401   N=189) 
Incident Rate = .395**** 
Population Density = -.290*** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.422**** 
Distance to Mersin = .288*** 
Unemployment = .160*** 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.358, p=.003, Beta=.305+ 
                    (R2 = .566   N=666) 
Population Density = -.672**** 
GDP per person = -.171** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.236*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 4th model, which was run for only high terrorist incident provinces 
with lagged variables (appendix 1L), the explanatory power (R2 = .401, N = 189) 
was higher than the third one. This model was also significant (appendix 1M). 
Once more, net-migration was significantly related to the incident rate (t = 4.751, 
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p = .000, Beta = .395) (appendix 1N). For this model, population density (t = -
3.198, p = .002, Beta = -.290), distance to Mersin (t = 2.756, p = .006, Beta = 
.288), distance to Istanbul (t = -3.386, p = .000, Beta = -.422), and unemployment 
rate (t = 2.66, p = .009, Beta = .160) were statistically significant at 5%, but GDP 
(p = .058) and rate of killed terrorists (p = .703) were not significant at 5%. 
Based on these coefficient tables, when all other variable values were 
held constant, the second null hypothesis (H02), which states that there was no 
relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents, was rejected in favor of 
H2 during the 1992-2001 period for all four models. In other words, the higher the 
incident rate, the more the net-migration was for the 1992-2001 period both for all 
provinces and for the “Region A” provinces.  
Regression results with transformed variables supported this finding only 
for Region A cases. With transformed variables, net-migration was positively 
related to terrorist incidents in high terrorism incident cases (2nd and 4th models). 
However, there was no such relation in (1st and 3rd) models with all cases. 
Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, the second null 
hypothesis (H02) was only rejected in the Region A models with the transformed 
variables.  
In order to test H03, the rate of killed people and the security was entered 
into the model instead of the overlapping variables. Then, the multiple regression 
models were run again. As can be seen in table 9, 10, 11, and 12 above, there 
was a significant positive relationship between rate of people and security forces 
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killed and net-migration for all the cases and for the Region A provinces between 
1992 and 2001. This was true even after the addition of the one year lag of 
terrorism related variables. However, with the transformed variables, there was 
no significant relationship found between “rate of people and security forces 
killed” and net migration (p = .970 for the 1st model; p = .763 for the 2nd model; p 
= .774 for the 3rd model; and p = .768 for the 4th model). 
Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, the third null 
hypothesis (H03) was also rejected for all cases and the Region A cases between 
1992 and 2001. According to the regression models with non-transformed 
variables (or outliers), the more the number of people and security forces killed, 
the more the net migration was. However, H03 failed to reject in all models with 
the transformed variables. 
When all other variable values were held constant, the fourth null 
hypothesis (H04), related with the link between GDP and net-migration only in 
high terrorist incident provinces, was failed to reject because regression 
coefficients show no statistical significant GDP for Region A cases between 1992 
and 1992 both in non-transformed and transformed models, even after the 
lagged variables. However, there was a significant negative relationship between 
GDP and net-migration in all the models with all the provinces (1st and 3rd). 
Regression models with the transformed variables also supported these findings. 
In terms of H2, H3, and H4 for all periods, the result indicates that there was no 
big difference between 1st and 2nd models and 3rd and 4th (lagged) models.  
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For Period I (92-95): 
Table 13:  significance of variables for 1992-1995. 
 
I 
1992-1995 Incident 
Rate 
Killed 
People 
Killed 
Terrorist 
Density GDP Unem-
ployment 
Dist. 
Istanbul 
Dist. 
Mersin 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .5
27
   
N
=2
96
 p=.000,  
β =.317 
R2=.522 + 
p=.000 
β =.370 
p=.000 
β=-.244 
p=.000 
β =-.259 
p=.000 
β =-.574 
 
     X   
 
     X  
p=.000 
β =.209 
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .5
98
   
N
=8
4 
p=.000 
β =.708 
R2=.568 + 
p=.000  
β =.874 
p=.002 
β=-.373 
     X     X p=.026 
β =.182 
p=.000 
β =-.590 
p=.001 
β =.477 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
  A
ll 
R
2  =
 .4
99
   
N
=2
22
 
p=.001 
β =.262 
R2=.491 + 
p=.008 
β =.276 
p=.004 
β=-.217 
p=.000  
β =-.263 
p=.000 
 
β =-.551 
   
      X 
   
    X 
p=.000 
β =.200 
   
   
   
   
   
 N
on
-T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
(o
rig
in
al
 IV
 v
al
ue
s w
ith
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .5
91
   
N
=6
3 
p=.000 
β =.668 
R2=.358 + 
p=.003 
β =.305 
p=.005 
β=-.441 
p=.016 
β =-.333 
   X 
p=.023 
β =.223 
p=.003 
β =-.507 
p=.009 
β =.422 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .6
71
   
N
=2
96
    X     X 
p=.063 + 
    X 
p=.000 
β =-.567 
 
 p=.002 
 
 β =-.320 
p=.005 
β =.177      X      X  
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .5
63
   
N
=8
4 
p=.000 
β =.613 
R2=.534 + 
p=.004 
β =.510 
   X     X    X 
p=.050 
β =.181 
p=.000 
β =-.765 
p=.001 
β =.503 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
ll 
R
2  =
 .6
76
   
N
=2
22
 
    
   X     X    X 
p=.000 
β =-.505 
p=.003 
β =-.335 
p=.001 
β =.212 
     X      X 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
   
   
   
(w
ith
 L
N
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .5
91
   
N
=6
3 
p=.004 
β =.529 
    X 
p=.074 + 
    X     X 
p=.088  
   X p=.004 
β =.305 
p=.000 
β =-.649 
p=.003 
β =.459 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
X : no statistical significance at 5%. 
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Again multicollinearity was checked first. In Period I, there was a 
multicollinearity between "incident rate" and "rate of people and security forces 
killed" (.948 for all cases; and .927 for Region A cases), so "rate of people and 
security forces killed” variable was eliminated from the 1st and the 2nd models of 
Period I (appendix 1O, 1P). After the lagged variables, there was still 
multicollinearity between those variables for all cases and Region A cases 
(appendix 1Q, 1R), so "rate of people and security forces killed" was omitted 
from the 3rd and 4th models of Period I too. In that case, a standard multiple 
regression for all cases and another multiple regression for high terrorism 
incident provinces (region A) were run for Period I.  
 
Table 14: SPSS results of 1st model for 1992-1995. 
1992-1995 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
  A
ll 
C
as
es
/P
ro
vi
nc
es
 
   
   
   
(1
st
 M
od
el
)  
   
  S
ig
ni
fic
an
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
  
       (R2 = .527   N=296) 
Incident Rate = .317**** 
Killed Terrorist = -.244**** 
Population Density = -.259**** 
GDP per Person = -.574**** 
Distance to Mersin = .209**** 
Killed People/Security+ 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.522, p=.000, Beta=.370+ 
       (R2 = .671   N=296) 
Population Density = -.567**** 
GDP per person = -.320*** 
Unemployment = .177*** 
 Killed People/Security+ 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.683, p=.063, Beta=.247+ 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
According to 1st model (appendix 1S), the explanatory power (R2) was 
(.577), and N = 296. The model was significant overall (appendix 1T). According 
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to the coefficient table (appendix 1U), net-migration was significantly related to 
incident rate (t=4.739, p=.000, Beta=.317), rate of killed terrorists (t = -3.867, p = 
.000, Beta = -.244), population density (t = -5.878, p = .000, Beta = -.259), GDP (t 
= -10.376, p = .000, Beta = -.574), and distance to Mersin (t = 5.044, p = .000, 
Beta = .209) at 95% confidence level. However, distance to Istanbul (p = .305) 
and unemployment rate (p = .239) was not significant.  
 
Table 15: SPSS results of 2nd model for 1992-1995. 
1992-1995 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
   
   
 R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
   
   
  (
2n
d  M
od
el
)  
   
   
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
        (R2 = .598   N=84) 
Incident Rate = .708**** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.590**** 
Distance to Mersin = .477*** 
Unemployment = .182** 
Killed Terrorist = -.373***   
Killed People/Security+ 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.568, p=.000, Beta=.874+ 
          (R2 = .563   N=84) 
Incident Rate = .613**** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.765**** 
Distance to Mersin = .503**** 
Unemployment = .181** 
 Killed People/Security+ 
 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.534, p=.004, Beta=.510+ 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 2nd model (N = 84), which was run for only Region A cases in 
Period I (appendix 1V), the explanatory power (R2) was (.598). This model was 
also overall significant (appendix 1W). Coefficients table shows that (appendix 
1X), net-migration was significantly related to incident rate (t = 3.525, p = .000, 
Beta = .708), rate of killed terrorist (t = -3.136, p = .002, Beta = .373), distance to 
Istanbul (t = -4369, p = .000, Beta = -.590), distance to Mersin (t = 3.608, p = 
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.001, Beta = .477), and unemployment rate (t = 2.270, p = .026, Beta = .182) at 
95% confidence level. However, population density (p = .111) and GDP (p = 
.105) had no significant relationship with the DV at 5% significance level.  
 
Table 16: SPSS results of 3rd model for 1992-1995. 
1992-1995 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
   
L
ag
ge
d 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
   
   
   
  (
3r
d  M
od
el
)  
   
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
                (R2 = .499   N=222) 
Incident Rate = .262*** 
Killed Terrorist = -.217*** 
Population Density = -263**** 
GDP per Person = -.551**** 
Distance to Mersin = .200**** 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.491, p=.008, Beta=.276+ 
       (R2 = .676   N=222) 
Population Density = -.505**** 
GDP per person = -.335*** 
Unemployment = .212*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
After using a one year lag for terrorism related variables, a standard linear 
multiple regression for all cases and another multiple regression for only high 
terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run for Period I. According to 3rd 
model (table 16), which used lagged variables for all cases in Period I (appendix 
1Y), the explanatory power was (R2 = .499, N = 222). The model was significant 
overall (appendix 1Z). According to the coefficient table (appendix 2A), net-
migration was significantly related to lagged incident rate (t = 3.264, p = .001, 
Beta = .262), rate of killed terrorist (t = -2.919, p = .004, Beta = -.217), population 
density (t = -5.001, p = .000, Beta = -.263), GDP (t = -8.352, p = .000, Beta = -
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.551), and distance to Mersin (t = 4.037, p = .000, Beta = .200) at 95% 
confidence level. However, distance to Istanbul (p = .548) and unemployment 
rate (p = .407) were not significant.  
 
Table 17: SPSS results of 4th model for 1992-1995. 
1992-1995 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
L
ag
ge
d 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
   
   
  (
4t
h  M
od
el
)  
   
   
   
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
        (R2 = .591   N=63) 
Incident Rate = .668**** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.507*** 
Unemployment = .223** 
Distance to Mersin = .422***  
Population Density = -.333** 
Killed Terrorist = -.411*** 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.564, p=.000, Beta=.853+ 
    (R2 = .591   N=63) 
Incident Rate = .529*** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.649**** 
Unemployment = .305 *** 
Distance to Mersin = .459*** 
Population Density = -.207*  
  
Killed P/S: R2=.551, p=.074, Beta=.357+ 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 4th model (N = 63), which was run for only Region A cases with 
lagged variables in Period I (appendix 2B), the explanatory power (R2) was 
(.591). This model was also overall significant (appendix 2C). Here, lagged 
incident rate (t=5.249, p=.000, Beta=.668), rate of total killed terrorist (t=-2.915, 
p=.005, Beta=-.411), population density (t=-2.495, p=.016, Beta=-.333), distance 
to Istanbul (t=-3.116, p=.003, Beta=-.507), distance to Mersin (t=2.695, p=.009, 
Beta=.422), and unemployment rate (t=2.344, p=.023, Beta=.223) had 
statistically significant relationships with the DV at 5% significance level. For this 
model, GDP (p = .646) had no statistical significant relationship with net-
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migration at 95% confidence interval.  
The result indicated that there was a statistically significant relationship 
between net-migration and terrorist incidents in all four models of Period I. Beta 
values showed that incident rates had the biggest positive impact in all the 
models, which means that between 1992 and 1995 terrorism incident rate had 
the biggest impact on net-migration, towards out-migration, in all the provinces 
and also the high terrorist incident provinces. Therefore, when all other variable 
values were held constant, the second null hypothesis (H02) was rejected in favor 
of H2 for all models of Period I. 
As in the models of all periods above, regression results with transformed 
variables supported this finding only for the Region A cases. With transformed 
variables, net-migration was positively related to terrorist incidents in high 
terrorism incident provinces (2nd and 4th models); however, there was no such 
relation in (1st and 3rd) models with all cases. Therefore, when all other variable 
values were held constant, the second null hypothesis (H02) was only rejected in 
“Region A” models with transformed variables.  
Again, in order to test H03, the rate of people and security forces killed 
was entered into the models instead of the overlapping variables, and multiple 
regression models were run. As it was seen in table 14, 15, 16, and 17, there 
was a significant positive relationship between rate of people and security forces 
killed and net migration for both models with all provinces and models with 
Region A provinces, even after the lag effect of terrorism related variables were 
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added. According to these findings, the more the rate of people and security 
forces killed, the more the net migration was. Consequently, when all other 
variable values were held constant, the third null hypothesis (H03) was also 
rejected for Period I.  
However, with the transformed variables, this relation is significant only for 
the 2nd model at 5%; it is not significant for all other models (p = .063 for the 1st 
model; p = .157 for the 3rd model; and p = .74 for the 4th model). Therefore, when 
all other variable values were held constant, H03 was only rejected for the 2nd 
model with the transformed variables. 
Regression coefficients of models with “Region A” provinces showed that 
the GDP was not statistically significant in any of the models for Period I. 
Therefore, the fourth null hypothesis (H04) failed to reject when all other variable 
values were held constant. Even though GDP per person did not have a 
significant relationship with net-migration, unemployment did have a significant 
relationship with net-migration for models with “Region A” cases in Period I. 
These findings indicate that the results for the 1st and 2nd models of Period I were 
more significant than the 3rd and 4th models, at least in models with transformed 
variables to test H03.  
 
For Period II (96-99): 
Again multicollinearity was checked for Period II. In Period II, there was a 
multicollinearity between "incident rate" and "rate of people and security forces 
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killed" (.917 for all cases; and .959 for “Region A” cases), so the "rate of people 
and security forces killed" was omitted from the 1st and 2nd models of Period II 
(appendix 2E, 2F).  
 
Table 18: significance of variables for 1996-1996. 
 
II 
1996-1999 Incident 
Rate 
Killed 
People 
Killed 
Terrorist 
Density GDP Unem-
ployment 
Dist. 
Istanbul 
Dist. 
Mersin 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .3
94
   
N
=2
96
 
    X     X 
 
     X   
p=.000 
β =-.252 
p=.000 
β =-.508 
 
     X   
 
     X  
p=.001 
β =.162 
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .3
61
   
N
=8
4      X     X 
p=.029 
β=.305 
p=.001  
β =-.276 
    X p=.005 
β =.163 
p=.004 
β =-.587 
p=.030 
β =.390 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
  A
ll 
R
2  =
 .3
95
   
N
=2
96
 p=.026 
β =.153 
    X 
 
     X   
p=.000  
β =-.256 
p=.000 
 
β =-.551 
   
      X 
   
    X 
p=.001 
β =.165 
   
   
   
   
   
 N
on
-T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
(o
rig
in
al
 IV
 v
al
ue
s w
ith
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .3
54
   
N
=8
4  
p=.034 
β =.300 
    X 
 
     X      X    X 
 
     X   
p=.006 
β =-.562 
p=.045 
β =.361 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .5
28
   
N
=2
96
 
   X     X 
 
     X 
p=.000 
β =-.680 
 
 p=.002 
 
 β =-.291 
 
     X   
p=.007 
β =-.299 
    X  
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .3
74
   
N
=8
4      X 
R2=.489 + 
p=.001 
β =-.652 
p=.000 
β =.421 
    X    X 
 
     X   
p=.000 
β =-.547 
    X 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
ll 
R
2  =
 .5
53
   
N
=2
96
 
    
   X 
p=.083 
    X 
p=.096 
   X 
p=.000 
β =-.704 
p=.031 
β =-.305 
 
     X   
p=.007 
β =-.346 
    X 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
   
   
   
(w
ith
 L
N
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .4
05
   
N
=8
4  
p=.039 
β =.244 
    X 
p=.077  
    X     X 
p=.096   
   X p=.025 
β =.141 
p=.002 
β =-.758 
p=.002 
β =.319 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
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X : no statistical significance at 5%. 
 
After the lagged variables, there was also a multicollinearity between 
lagged incident rate and lagged rate of people and security forces killed (.922 for 
all cases; and .938 for region A cases) so "lagged rate of people and security 
forces killed" also omitted from the 3rd and 4th models (appendix 2G, 2H). 
Following the elimination of the variable causing multicollinearity, a standard 
multiple regression for all cases and another multiple regression for high 
terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run for Period II.  
 
Table 19: SPSS results of 1st model for 1996-1999. 
1996-1999 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
A
ll 
C
as
es
/P
ro
vi
nc
es
 
   
   
 (1
st
 M
od
el
)  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
              (R2 = .394   N=296) 
Population Density = -.252**** 
GDP per Person = -.508**** 
Distance to Mersin = .162*** 
              (R2 = .528   N=296) 
Population Density = -.680**** 
GDP per person = -.291** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.299** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
According to 1st model (table 19), for all cases of Period II (appendix 2I), 
the explanatory power was (R2 = .394, N = 296). The model was significant 
overall (appendix 2J). According to the coefficient table (appendix 2K), population 
density (t = -5.097, p = .000, Beta = -.252), GDP (t = -7.732, p = .000, Beta = -
.508), and distance to Mersin (t = 3.453, p = .001, Beta = .162) were significant 
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variables at 5%. However, incident rate (p = .502), rate of killed terrorist (p = 
.154), distance to Istanbul (p = .439), and unemployment rate (p = .484) were not 
significantly related to net migration.  
 
Table 20: SPSS results of 2nd model for 1996-1999. 
1996-1999 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
  R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
(2
nd
 M
od
el
)  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
                (R2 = .361   N=84) 
Killed Terrorist = .305** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.587*** 
Distance to Mersin = .390** 
         (R2 = .374   N=84) 
Killed Terrorist = .421** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.610** 
 Killed People/Security+ 
  
 Killed P/S: R2=.489, p=001, Beta=-.652+ 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 2nd model (table 20), which was run for only Region A cases in 
Period II (appendix 2L), the explanatory power was (R2 = .361, N = 84). This 
model was also overall significant (appendix 2M). Coefficient table shows that 
(appendix 2N), net-migration was still significantly related to rate of killed 
terrorists (t = 2.231, p = .029, Beta = .305), distance to Istanbul (t = -2.963, p = 
.004, Beta = -.587), and distance to Mersin (t = 2.207, p = .030, Beta = .390) at 
95% confidence level. For this model, incident rate (p = .383), population density 
(p = .453), GDP (p = .353), and unemployment rate (p = .454) had no significant 
relationship with the DV at 5% significance level.  
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Table 21: SPSS results of 3rd model for 1996-1999. 
1996-1999 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
 L
ag
ge
d 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
   
   
 (3
rd
 M
od
el
)  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
                (R
2 = .395   N=296) 
Incident Rate = .153** 
Population Density = -.256**** 
GDP per Person = -.511**** 
Distance to Mersin = .165 *** 
             (R2 = .553   N=296) 
Incident Rate =.308* 
Population Density = -.704**** 
GDP per person = -.305** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.346** 
Killed People/Security =-.349* 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
After using a one year lag for incident rate and rate of total killed, again, a 
standard multiple regression for all cases and another multiple regression for 
only high terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run for Period II. According 
to 3rd model (table 21), which uses lagged variables for all cases in Period II 
(appendix 2O), the explanatory power was (R2 = .395, N = 296). The model was 
significant overall (appendix 2P). According to the coefficient table (appendix 
2Q), net-migration is significantly related to lagged incident rate (t = 2.234, p = 
.026, Beta = .153), population density (t = -5.186, p = .000, Beta = -.256), GDP (t 
= -7.779, p = .000, Beta = -.511), and distance to Mersin (t = 3.505, p = .001, 
Beta = .165) at 95% confidence level. However, rate of killed terrorists (p = .723), 
distance to Istanbul (p = .171) and unemployment rate (p = .487) were not 
significant.  
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Table 22: SPSS results of 4th model for 1996-1999. 
1996-1999 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
L
ag
ge
d 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
   
(4
th
 M
od
el
)  
   
   
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
         (R2 = .354   N=84) 
Incident Rate = .300** 
Distance to Istanbul = -.562*** 
Distance to Mersin = .361** 
 
 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.319, p=466, Beta=.122+ 
         (R2 = .405   N=84) 
Distance to Istanbul = -.758*** 
Distance to Mersinl =.329* 
  
Killed P/S: R2=.450, p=077,, Beta=-.374+ 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 4th model (appendix 2R), which was run for only Region A cases 
with lagged variables in Period II (N = 84), the explanatory power (R2) was 
(.450). This model was also overall significant (appendix 2S). For the coefficient 
table (appendix 2T), lagged incident rate (t = 3.473, p = .001, Beta = .444), 
distance to Istanbul (t = -2.653, p = .010, Beta = -.491), distance to Mersin (t = 
2.223, p = .029, Beta = .363) had a significant relationship with net migration at 
5%. However, rate of terrorists killed (p = .186), population density (p = .713), 
GDP (p = .407), and unemployment rate (p = .740) had no significant relationship 
with the DV at 5% significance level.  
In period II, findings showed that there was no statistically significant 
relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents any of the provinces or 
the high terrorism provinces (1st and 2nd models). However, after the lagged 
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effect of terrorism related variables (3rd and 4th models), it was seen that there 
was a statistical significant positive relationship between net-migration and 
terrorism incidents.   
The results showed that the impact of incident rate in 1st and 2nd models of 
Period II were different than in (3rd and 4th) models with the lagged variables. 
Since the number of terrorist incidents in previous years (i.e.: Period I) was more 
than the subsequent years, models with the lagged variables might show the 
relationship between net-migration and incident rate better. As a result, when all 
other variable values were held constant, H02 was rejected in 3rd and 4th models, 
but failed to reject in 1st and 2nd models. 
Regression results with transformed variables were almost parallel to 
these findings: 1st and 2nd models were not significant, but 4th model was 
significant at 5%. The 3rd model was not significant at 5% significance level but 
was significant at 10% (p=.083). Therefore, when all other variable values were 
held constant, H02 was rejected only in 4th model, but failed to reject in 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd models of transformed variables. 
Once again, in order to test H03, the rate of people and security forces 
killed was entered into the models instead of the overlapping variable, and the 
multiple regression models were run. As it was seen in table 19, 20, 21, and 22, 
the third null hypothesis (H03) failed to reject for all models of Period II. Then, 
when all other variable values were held constant, (H03) failed to reject for all 
models of Period II. Regression models with transformed variables support these 
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findings for all models, except the 2nd one. When all other variable values were 
held constant, (H03) failed to reject for 1st, 3rd and 4th models with transformed 
variables of Period II.  
According to the 2nd model of Period II, there was a significant negative 
relationship between net-migration and rate of people and security forces killed, 
so H03 was rejected for the 2nd (Region A) model of Period II. However, a strong 
response to H3 was not found, because of the negative Beta value. The 2nd 
model of Period II opposed to the H3. The more the people and security forces 
killed during Period II, the less the net-migration was. This finding with 
transformed variable was confusing because it was in conflict with the previous 
findings with non-transformed variables. 
In Period II, again it was observed that there was a relationship between 
GDP and net-migration for all models with all cases. However, similar to other 
periods, this relation does not remain the same for “Region A” cases. Therefore, 
when all other variable values were held constant, (H04) failed to reject for Period 
II as well. 
 
For Period III (00-01): 
For Period III, multicollinearity was also checked for all cases as well as 
”Region A” cases. In Period III, there was a multicollinearity between the rate of 
killed terrorists and “rate of people and security forces killed” (.905 for the 1st 
model; .895 for the 2nd model) for all cases and for region A cases (appendix 2U, 
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2V), so the rate of killed terrorists was omitted from the model. However, when 
lagged variables were used, there was multicollinearity between the lagged 
variables. 
Table 23: significance of variables for 2000-2001. 
 
III 
2000-2001 Incident 
Rate 
Killed 
People 
Killed 
Terrorist 
Density GDP Unem-
ployment 
Dist. 
Istanbul 
Dist. 
Mersin 
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .3
57
   
N
=1
48
 p=.000 
β =.398 
    X 
 
     X   
p=.000 
β =-.292 
p=.000 
β =-.388 
p=.038 
β =.155 
 
     X  
p=.005 
β =.196 
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .5
38
   
N
=4
2  
p=.007 
β =.510 
    X 
p=.059 
 
     X   
 
     X   
p=.052 
     X 
p=.011 
β =.373 
     X       X  
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
  A
ll 
R
2  =
 .3
05
   
N
=1
48
 
p=.019 
β =.180 
R2=.303 + 
p=.024 
β =.172 
 
     X   
p=.002  
β =-.247 
p=.000 
 
β =-.406 
p=.043 
β =.156 
   
    X 
p=.011 
β =.183 
     
   
   
   
   
   
 N
on
-T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
(o
rig
in
al
 IV
 v
al
ue
s w
ith
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .4
01
   
N
=1
89
 
    X      X 
 
     X   
p=.035  
β =-.446 
     X 
 
     X   
p=.052 
     X       X  
1 
st
 M
od
el
 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
R
2  =
 .6
59
   
N
=1
48
 
   X     X 
 
     X 
p=.009 
β =-.971 
 
     X   
 
     X        X      X  
2n
d  M
od
el
 
R
eg
io
n 
A
 
R
2  =
 .5
45
  
N
=4
2      X     X 
 
     X   
p=.046 
β =-.675 
    X 
 
     X        X  
 
    X 
3r
d  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
ll 
R
2  =
 .5
41
   
N
=1
48
     X     X 
 
     X   
p=.001 
β =-.738 
 
     X   
 
     X        X  
 
    X 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
ra
ns
fo
rm
ed
 
   
   
   
   
   
(w
ith
 L
N
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 o
ut
lie
rs
) 
4t
h  M
od
el
 
La
gg
ed
 A
 
R
2  =
 .4
35
   
N
=1
89
 
    X 
R2=.683 + 
p=.009 
β =-.918 
 
     X 
p=.079    
p=.007 
β =-.239 
     X      X       X       X  
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
X : no statistical significance at 5%. 
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For all cases, there were collinearities between “incident rate” and “lagged 
rate of killed terrorists” (.961); “lagged rate of killed terrorists” and “lagged rate of 
people and security forces killed” (.944); and the “incident rate” and “lagged rate 
of people and security forces killed” (.972). Also for Region A cases, there were 
collinearities between “incident rate” and “lagged rate of killed terrorists” (.966); 
“lagged rate of killed terrorists” and “lagged rate of people and security forces 
killed” (.936); and “incident rate” and “lagged rate of people and security forces 
killed” (.979). Therefore, both “lagged killed terrorists” and “lagged people and 
security forces killed” variables were eliminated from the 3rd and 4th models of 
Period III. 
 
Table 24: SPSS results of 1st model for 2000-2001. 
2000-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
A
ll 
C
as
es
/P
ro
vi
nc
es
 
(1
st
 M
od
el
)  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
           (R
2 = .357   N=148) 
Incident Rate = .398**** 
Population Density = -292**** 
GDP per Person = -.388**** 
Unemployment = .155** 
Distance to Mersin = .196*** 
            (R2 = .659   N=148) 
Population Density = -.971*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
First, a standard multiple regression for all cases and another multiple 
regression for high terrorism incident provinces (region A) were run for Period III. 
According to 1st model (table 24), the explanatory power was (R2 = .357, N = 
148) (appendix 2Y). The model was significant overall (appendix 2Z). According 
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to the coefficient table (appendix 3A), net-migration was significantly related to 
incident rate (t = 4.129, p = .000, Beta = .398), population density (t = -3.872, p = 
.000, Beta = -292), GDP (t = -4.110, p = .000, Beta = -.388), unemployment (t = 
2.092, p = .038, Beta = .155), and distance to Mersin (t = 2.835, p = .005, Beta = 
.196). However, distance to Istanbul (p = .727) was not statistically significant at 
95% confidence level. 
 
Table 25: SPSS results of 2nd model for 2000-2001. 
2000-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
R
eg
io
n 
A
 C
as
es
 
   
   
(2
nd
 M
od
el
)  
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
                (R
2 = .538   N=42) 
Incident Rate =.510*** 
Unemployment = .373** 
Population Density =-.373*  
Killed People and Security = -348* 
             (R2 = .545  N=42) 
Population Density =-.675** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
  
For the 2nd model (appendix 3B), which was run for only Region A cases 
in Period III (table 25), the explanatory power (R2) was (.538, N = 42). This 
model was also overall significant (appendix 3C). Coefficient table shows that 
(appendix 3D), net-migration was significantly related to incident rate (t = 2.869, p 
= .007, Beta = .510) and unemployment (t = 2.681, p = .011, Beta = .373) at 95% 
confidence level; however, the rate of total killed terrorists (p = .059), the rate of 
people and security forces killed (p=.059), and population density (p = .052) is 
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not significant at 5% significance level. For this model, GDP (p = .227), distance 
to Istanbul (p = .318), and distance to Mersin (p = .913) have no significant 
relationship with net-migration, even at 10% significance level.  
 
Table 26: SPSS results of 3rd model for 2000-2001. 
2000-2001 
 
             Non-Transformed 
      β  values of IVs with outliers 
                    Transformed 
β  values of IVs with transformed outliers 
   
   
L
ag
ge
d 
A
ll 
C
as
es
 
   
   
   
 (3
rd
 M
od
el
)  
   
 S
ig
ni
fic
an
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
        (R2 = .305   N=148 ) 
Incident Rate = .180** 
Population Density = -.247***   
GDP per Person = -.406**** 
Unemployment = .156** 
Distance to Mersin = .183** 
 
Killed P/S: R2=.303, p=024, Beta=.172+ 
(R2 = .541   N=148 ) 
Population Density = -.783*** 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
After using one year lag for incident rates, a standard multiple regression 
for all cases and another multiple regression for only the high terrorism incident 
provinces (region A) were run for Period III. According to the 3rd model (appendix 
3E), which uses lagged variables for all cases in Period III (table 26), the 
explanatory power was (R2 = .305, N = 148). The model was significant overall 
(appendix 3F). According to the coefficient table (appendix 3G), net-migration 
was significantly related to lagged incident rate (t = 2.380, p = 019, Beta = .180), 
population density (t = -3.214, p = .002, Beta = -.247), GDP (t = -4.147, p = .000, 
Beta = -.406), unemployment (t = 2.040, p = .043, Beta = .156), and distance to 
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Mersin (t = 2.574, p = .011, Beta = .183) at 95% confidence level. However, 
distance to Istanbul (p = .406) was not significantly related to net-migration rate 
at 95% confidence level. 
 
Table 27: SPSS results of 4th model for 2000-2001. 
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            (R2 = .437   N=42) 
Population Density = -.426** 
Unemployement = .311* 
        (R2 = .683   N=42) 
Population Density =-.566** 
Killed People/Sec = -.918*** 
Killed Terrorist = .642* 
 
 
 
 
+ : for H3, model run with Killed People/Security (Incident Rate removed due to multicollinearity). 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001 
 
For the 4th model (appendix 3H), which was run for only Region A cases 
with lagged variables in Period III (table 27), the explanatory power was (R2 = 
.437, N = 42). This model was also overall significant (appendix 3I). According to 
correlation table (appendix 3J), only population density (t = -2.195, p = .035, Beta 
= -.426) had a significant relationship with net-migration at 5%. Unemployment 
rate (p = .052, Beta = .311), incidnet rate (p = .364), GDP (p = .378), distance to 
Istanbul (p = .246), and distance to Mersin (p = .926) were not significant at 5%. 
Results in Period III indicate that there was a significant positive 
relationship between net-migration and terrorist incidents in all models, except for 
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the 4th one. Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, (H02) 
was rejected in 1st, 2nd, and 3rd models, but it failed to reject in (4th) model with 
lagged Region A cases. 
Models with the transformed variables could not catch any relationship 
between net-migration and incident rate. Therefore, H02 failed to reject for all 
models with transformed variables in Period III. Less terrorism incidents in this 
period might be a reason for transformed models not having any significant 
incident rate variable.   
Again, the rate of people and security forces killed variable was entered 
into the models instead of the overlapping variables to test H03. After running 
multiple regression models, it was determined that there was no statistical 
significant relationship between net-migration rate and rate of people and 
security forces killed for both all and “Region A” provinces (1st and 2nd models). 
However, after the lagged variables, it was found that there was a statistically 
positive relationships between net-migration rate and rate of people and security 
forces killed in (3rd) model with all provinces: the more the number of people and 
security forces killed, the more the net-migration was. This significant relationship 
was not seen in models with “Region A” provinces.  Therefore, when all other 
variable values are held constant, H03 failed to reject in 1st, 2nd, and 4th models, 
but it is rejected in 3rd model.  
With the transformed variables, results were same for the 1st and 2nd 
models. After using lagged variables, 3rd model did not yield a significant result, 
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but 4th one had a negative significant relationship with the DV. Consequently, 
when all other variable values were held constant, H03 failed to reject in 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd models, but it was rejected in 4th model. Again, the significant relationship 
in 4th model had a negative Beta value, which meant that the greater the rate of 
people and security forces killed, the less the net-migration was. This finding was 
also controversial.  
Similar to the previous periods, in Period III, there was no significant 
relationship between net-migration and GDP per person in high terrorism incident 
provinces in all the models, including the models with transformed variables. 
Therefore, the fourth null hypothesis (H04) also failed to reject in Period III. As in 
previous periods, GDP had still a negative relationship in models with all 
provinces. However, this similarity does not remain the same for the models with 
transformed models, which yielded no significant GDP variable. 
 
Terrorist Incidents and Economic Variables 
H05a: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the 
amount of GDP per person in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.  
H05b: there is no relationship between the terrorist incidents and the 
unemployment rate in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey.  
As was mentioned above, testing the fifth hypothesis done by standard 
linear multiple regression too. However, this time the incident rate was going to 
be used as the DV. As mentioned in methodology GDP per person and the 
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unemployment rate was going to be used as IVs. Net-migration rate and 
population density were going to be control variables this time. In order to make 
interpretation easier, again net migration was computed with (-1). Now, as in H02, 
an increasing net-migration means more out-migration. This hypothesis was only 
going to be tested for high terrorist incident provinces for all and each periods.  
Again, assumptions were checked before running a standard linear 
multiple regression. As the measurement level of DV (incident rate) was the ratio 
and the number of IVs (4) was less than the number of cases (210, with a 
minimum 42 in Period III), the first two assumptions were met. Then the 
Univariate outliers were checked by using z-scores (appendix 3K), and 
multivariate outliers were checked by using the Mahalanobis distance 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). It was seen that a few standardized scores are in 
excess of +/- 3.29 (p<.001) in the unemployment rate and the incident rate 
variables.  
After locating the univariate outliers, a standard linear multiple regression 
with mahalonobis distance was run to see if there was any multivariate outliers 
(appendix 3L). Since the degree of freedom was 4, which was the number of IVs, 
df 4 at 0.05 level from the “critical value of chi-square (x2)” table was checked. 
The value is 9.48773, so mahalanobis distance of the cases cannot exceed 
9.48773. However, there are some cases in excess of 9.48773. 
As it was mentioned above there are several ways to reduce the impact of 
outliers, such as elimination of the variable responsible for the most of the 
  
173
 
outliers, variable transformation, changing the score on the variable, and 
elimination of the case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Before trying to reduce the 
impact of outliers, normality and linearity are going to be checked. For sample 
size of 210, critical value of skewness is +/- 0 .3313, and critical value of kurtosis 
is +/– 0 .6626. 
SPSS Descriptive Statistics table (appendix 3M) shows that GDP per 
person, unemployment rate, and incident rate are positively skewed, but net-
migration rate was negatively skewed; unemployment rate and incident rate have 
positive kurtosis, but population density has negative kurtosis. In order to check 
the heteroscdasticity and normality of residuals, a linear regression plots, with 
Y:*ZPRED and X:*ZRESID, was run, the residuals are saved, and the histogram, 
normal probability plot, and partial plot are checked (appendix 3N, 3O, 3P). Here, 
homoscedasticy was not observed, so the data has heteroscedasticity problem.  
Since all cases of H05 are from high terrorism incident provinces, extreme 
cases are not as important as in previous hypothesis. In addition, the data was 
not homoscedastic. Then, the decision was to make a transformation for both 
reducing the impact of outliers and having homoscedasticity. First, SQRT was 
tried but it does not help eliminate all univariate outliers. Then, LN transformation 
was used and seen that it eliminates all univariate outliers and reduces the 
heteroscedasticity problem (appendix 3Q, 3R, 3S), but there are still some 
multivariate outliers existing. Now, the data was ready to test for both H05a and 
H05b. 
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Table 28: significance of variables for H5. 
 
INCIDENT RATE 
(Region A) 
 
GDP  
 
Unemployment 
 
Net-Migration 
 
Density 
All Periods 
(1992-2001) 
R2 = .127 
N = 210 
 
  
        X 
 
  
             X 
 
p=.001 
 
β =.268 
 
 
  
       X 
Period I  
(1992-1995) 
R2 = .185 
 N = 84 
 
 
p=.011 
 
β =-.296 
 
 
 
             X 
 
 
 
p=.000 
 
β =.448 
 
 
  
        X   
Period II  
(1996-1999) 
R2 = .145  
N = 84 
 
 
 
         X 
 
 
 
             X 
 
  
           X   
 
p=.043 
 
β =-.254 
 
Period III  
(2000-2001) 
R2 = .409  
N= 42 
 
 
This model is not overall significant at 5%. 
X : no statistical significance at 5%. 
 
For all periods (92-01):   
First, multicollinearity was checked and seen that there was no 
multicollinearity problem for all periods (appendix 3T). Then a standard linear 
multiple regression was run. According to the results of the multiple regression 
for all periods of the cases in high terrorist incident (appendix 3U), the 
explanatory power was (R2 = .127, N = 210). The model was overall significant 
(appendix 3V). The coefficient table (appendix 3W) shows that, in high terrorist 
incident provinces between 1992 and 2001, neither GDP per person (p = .269), 
nor unemployment rate (p = .134) had statistically significant relationships with 
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terrorism incident rate at the 5% significance level. For this model, the only 
significant variable was net-migration rate (t = 3.435, p = .001, Beta = .268) at 
95% confidence level.  
The result indicates that in high terrorist incident provinces for all periods 
(1992-2001), incident rate does not have a significant relationship with either 
GDP per person or unemployment rate. Therefore, when all other variable values 
are held constant, both H05a and H05b fail to reject. Explanatory power of this 
model was very low, but the model still supports a significant positive relationship 
between incident rate and net-migration rate. 
 
For Period I (92-95): 
Again, multicolliniearity was checked for Period I. Correlation table 
showed that there was no multicolliniearity problem in Period I (appendix 3X). 
According to the results of standard linear multiple regression for Period I 
(appendix 3Y), the explanatory power was (R2 = .185, N = 84). The model was 
significant overall (appendix 3Z). The coefficient table (appendix 4A) shows that, 
GDP (t = -2.589, p = .011, Beta = -.296) was in significant negative relationship 
with terrorism incident rate for high terrorist incident provinces in Period I at 5%, 
but unemployment rate (.p = 384) was in any statistically significant relationship 
with DV at 5%. SPSS Result also indicates that net-migration rate was still in 
positive significant relationship with the net-migration rate in high terrorism 
provinces between 1992 and 1995 (t = 2.353, p = .021, Beta = .296).  
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According to these findings, when all other variable values were held 
constant, H05a was rejected for Period I (1992-1995) for “Region A” cases. This 
relationship meant that the less the GDP rate was, the greater the terrorism 
incidents. The findings also indicated that H05b failed to reject for Period I in high 
terrorist incident provinces, when all the other variable values were held 
constant. The chart below represents the relationship of this finding in Period. 
 
For Period II (96-99): 
In Period II, there was no multicollinearity between variables (appendix 
4B). According to the results of the multiple regression for Period II of the cases 
in high terrorist incident (appendix 4C), the explanatory power was (R2 = .145, N 
= 84). The model was significant overall (appendix 4D). According to the 
coefficient table (appendix 4E), the only significant variable at 95% confidence 
interval for this model was population density (t = -2.055, p = .043, Beta = -.254). 
Its relationship with the DV was negative, so the less the population density, the 
more the terrorist insistent was. This statement is completely true for East and 
Southeast part of Turkey, where the “Region A” cases are chosen. 
The result showed that there was no GDP or unemployment variable that 
was significant for Period II. In other words, GDP and unemployment did not 
have any significant relationship with the terrorist incident rate for Period II. 
Therefore, when all other variable values were held constant, the null hypotheses 
H05a and H05b failed to reject for Period II. 
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For Period III (00-01): 
Again, it was seen that there was no multicollinearity problem between 
variables (appendix 4F). According to the model summary table of standard 
linear multiple regression (appendix 4G), the explanatory power was extremely 
low (R2 = .062, N= 42). ANOVA table shows that this model does not have 
significant overall (p = .659) (appendix 4H). Since the model was not significant, 
the null hypotheses H05a and H05b could not be rejected for Period III.  
After reading all the findings above and seeing that there was a 
relationship between terrorism and net-migration, one may think if there was 
some “threshold” level of terrorism, below which it did not impact people's 
decisions to migrate, and above which it prompted migratory behavior. In order to 
find out if there was some “threshold” level of terrorism, the dataset was checked 
again. First, the dataset was sorted in descending order by using net-migration 
rate. The case with zero (0) net-migration rate was found. Then, the terrorism 
incident rate was checked if it was different in below and above this case. After 
differentiating the cases by using net-migration rate, terrorism incident rate was 
still observed in both in-migrated provinces and out-migrated provinces. 
However, since terrorism incident rate was not the only variable related to the 
net-migration, this differentiation could not show the “threshold” level of terrorism.  
Secondly, the 10 most out-migrated cases were checked. All were from 
Tunceli province. Then, the first 10 most out-migrated provinces were checked. 
Respectively, Tunceli, with 12.776 average terrorism incident rate, Sinop, with 
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0.058 average terrorism incident rate, Bayburt, with 0.097 average terrorism 
incident rate, Siirt, with 4.937 average terrorism incident rate, Kars, with 0.772 
average terrorism incident rate, Kastamonu, with 0.04 average terrorism incident 
rate, Bingol, with 4.919 average terrorism incident rate, Bartin, with 0.38 average 
terrorism incident rate, Sivas, with 0.325 average terrorism incident rate, and 
Artvin, with 0.193 average terrorism incident rate were among the 10 most out-
migrated provinces. As seen, 6 out of those 10 provinces, Sinop, Bayburt, Kars, 
Kastamonu, Bartin, and Artvin, were not among the high terrorism incident 
provinces. This result was normal since terrorism was not the only force for out-
migration as mentioned in findings.  
Again, since the terrorism incident rate was not the only variable related to 
the net-migration, finding the “threshold” level of terrorism impacting on migration 
could not be possible. However, differences in terrorism incident rate between in-
migrated provinces and out-migrated provinces may help out understanding of 
the relationship between net-migration and terrorism incident rate. Finally, cases 
with in-migrated provinces, which got migrants from other provinces, and cases 
with out-migrated provinces, which sent migrants to other provinces, were 
differentiated, as in-migrated provinces and out-migrated provinces, by using a 
discrete variable.  
Then, an “independent samples T-test” was run to test if there was a 
significant mean difference in terrorism incident rate between in-migrated 
provinces and out-migrated provinces. For in-migrated provinces, the sample 
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size was (N = 129), and mean was (.3102), standard deviation was (.33793), and 
standard error was (.02971); for out-migrated provinces, the sample size was (N 
= 611), mean was (1.0808), standard deviation was (2.99972), and standard 
error was (.12136). The result of the T-test showed that there was a significant 
mean difference in terrorism incident rate between in-migrated provinces and 
out-migrated provinces (t = -6.167, p = .000, df = 673.763, 2η = .053). 
 
Figure 3: Differences in Terrorism Incident Rate 
Differences in Terrorism Incidnet Rate 
between in-migrated and out-migrated provinces
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Discussion of the Findings 
In this section, findings of this study are going to be matched up to the 
general perspectives of the migration literature. Before doing this evaluation, it 
may be helpful to remind the reader about the findings of this study in general. 
Then, a comparison with the broad perspectives of the literature will be made. 
Since terrorism related migration is the main focus of this study, findings related 
with violence/terrorism and migration are going to be the center of this match up. 
 The first finding of this study is the difference in migration patterns 
between high terrorism incident provinces and the others. Findings show that 
there is a difference in net-migration between high-terrorism incident provinces 
and the rest of the provinces during 1992 and 2001. Also, this difference 
continued through all three time periods. Eta square ( 2η ) shows that this 
difference is more significant in Period I (1992-1995), when the number of 
terrorist incidents was at its peak.  
Figure 4 below shows the means of net migration in high terrorism incident 
provinces (East/S.East) and the rest (West) in each three periods. This graph 
supports the statistical findings of H1 of this study. As it can be seen, net-
migration in EAST/S.EAST is higher than in the WEST during all three periods. 
Even though net-migration rate in WEST is almost the same in each period, net-
migration rate in EAST/S.EAST fell down in each period. 
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Figure 4: comparison of the means of net-migration rate between regions. 
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This result is parallel to the terrorism incident rate. It reminds that the 
terrorist incident might impact on migration patterns as a push force in high 
terrorism incident provinces. Also it reminds that the perceived safety in other 
provinces might impact on migration as a pull force toward that target areas. 
Davenport (et al., 2003) states that all migrants make their decision to leave after 
taking into consideration all factors, so there had to be other reasons for their 
migration decisions. 
Most migration literature in general looks at the decision to leave home 
from an economic perspective (Lewis, 1954; Lee, 1966; Harris and Todaro, 1970; 
Todaro, 1976; Borjas, 1988; Clark, 1989; McCormick, 1990; Atalik and Ciraci, 
1993). Even considering “distance” as a variable, they mentioned the economic 
cost of leaving (May and Morrison, 1994; Moore and Shellman, 2004b). 
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Moreover, May and Morrison (1994) mention the “cost of safety” as an 
expression of staying away from violence/terror. According to push-pull model, 
migration results after a combination of push and pull forces (Boano, et. all, 
2003). Therefore, while testing relationship of terrorism related variables, in H2 
and H3, with net-migration rate, this study took economic variables into 
consideration as well.  
Findings of this study show that the incident rate is positively related to 
net-migration in each of the 4 periods (6/8 models for all periods, 6/8 models for 
Period I, 3/8 models for Period II, and 3/8 models for Period III). According to the 
SPSS results, models of high terrorism incident rate provinces (Region A) with 
lagged variables are the most frequently significant models. Region A models 
with one year lag of terrorism related cases are significant in all period also, 
except for Period III (2000-2001). According to these findings, if the terrorism 
incident rates increase net-migration rate also increase. Figure 5 shows the 
means of incident rates in high terrorism incident provinces (East/S.East) and the 
(West) during each of the three time periods. 
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Figure 5: comparison of the means of incident rate between regions. 
 
 
Besides, the rate of people and security forces killed is positively related to 
net-migration in each of the 4 periods (4/8 models for all periods, 5/8 models for 
Period I, 1/8 model for Period II, and 2/8 models for Period III). For this variable, 
models with Region A cases were the most significant models. Also, it is seen 
that during Period I (1992-1995), when the number of terrorist incidents is at its 
peak, there were more significant models than during the other two periods. 
According to these findings, if the rate of people and security forces killed 
increases net-migration rates will also increase. Figure 6 shows the means of the 
rate of people and security forces killed in high terrorism incident provinces 
(East/S.East) and the (West) during each of the three periods. 
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Figure 6: comparison of the means of death rate between regions. 
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Correlated with the impacts of terrorism’s related variables on migration 
process, findings of this study are supported by literature. As is mentioned in 
literature review, avoiding violence and conflict is a basic need for human-beings 
(Maslow, 1943). Therefore, terror movements and related violence can drive 
people to look for security forcing people to migrate out (Davenport, et al., 2003). 
Threats towards life might be the single main reason for migration. 
According to Boano (et. all, 2003), the level of violence, is related to 
people’s future moves. Insecurity is as significant as economic factors in the 
migration process, so people naturally move towards relative secure areas and 
away from increasing levels of insecurity (Goodman, 1975). May and Morrison 
(1994) and Bariagaber (1997) also found positive relationship between fear of 
terror/violence and out-migration. Besides, Stanley (1987) also found that there is 
a relationship between political violence and migration motivation. In addition, 
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Moore and Shellman (2002, 2004a, 2004b) found that dissident violence and 
local violent behavior is the main reason that people desert their homes; the 
larger the threat, the greater the number of forced migrants.   
Contrary to the findings of this study, Pazarlıoglu (2001) could not find a 
relationship between terrorism and migration patterns, after differentiating some 
(9) high terrorism incident provinces and checking their relationship between 
terrorism and migration patterns. However, he used neither terrorism incident 
data nor the number of terrorism related casualties variables. Under data 
limitation, his findings might be normal because his analysis is only based on a 
differentiation of the high terrorism incident provinces. 
As relates to the economic variables, this study finds a negative 
relationship between net-migration and GDP (4/8 models for all periods, 4/8 
models for Period I, 4/8 models for Period II, and 2/8 models for Period III) and a 
positive relationship between net-migration and unemployment (4/8 models for all 
periods, 6/8 models for Period I, 2/8 models for Period II, and 3/8 models for 
Period III). The GDP variable in the models with all provinces is significant for all 
periods except for (transformed) models in Period III. This is parallel to the 
migration literature. However, the models with high terrorism incident provinces 
did not produce any significant result for GDP; they did produce significant 
results regarding unemployment. H4 tests GDP and net-migration relationship 
only in high terrorism incident provinces; thus, it was not supported. This is not 
parallel to the general migration literature. Since GDP was related to net-
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migration in the models with all provinces, this result may be interpreted as 
fallows: the impact of terrorism might have overshadowed the impact of GDP on 
net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces.   
Therefore, it is concluded that GDP is negatively related to net-migration, 
but not in high terrorism incident provinces while unemployment is positively 
related to net-migration, especially in high terrorism incident provinces. According 
to these findings, if GDP increases, net-migration rates decrease in general. 
Also, if unemployment increases net-migration rates will increase as well, 
especially in high terrorism incident provinces. The SPSS results for 
unemployment in this study are parallel to the general migration literature. 
Actually, GDP and unemployment should be connected to each other. 
Data show that GDP per person in high terrorism incident provinces is lower than 
the other provinces. However, unemployment rate in high terrorism incident 
provinces is higher than the other provinces. Because people of the region are 
mainly farmers, they might not apply for a job at ISKUR, where the 
unemployment data comes from. Figure 7 and figure 8 show the means of GDP 
and unemployment in high terrorism incident provinces (East/S.East) and the 
(West) in each of the three time periods. 
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Figure 7: comparison of the means of GDP per person between regions. 
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As mentioned above migration literature sees migration as a movement 
towards utility maximization (Todaro, 1976; Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci, 
Pellegrino, and Taylor, 1994). Therefore, migration is explained as the result of 
economic reasons (Todaro, 1976; Borjas, 1988). These findings show that 
migration is a result of a series of economic choices by people (Todaro, 1976; 
Marshall, 1978; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Piore, 1979; Clark, 1989; Zolberg, 
Suhrke, and Aguayo, 1989; Weiner, 1996). This finding is also true for this study; 
as it was seen above, GDP is an important factor for net-migration in all models 
with all cases. 
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Figure 8: comparison of the means of unemployment between regions. 
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For all provinces, the results of this study also support macro economic 
framework of migration, which sees migration as a mobility of labor force 
between regions for better employment and income opportunities (Lewis, 1954; 
Harris and Todaro, 1970; Muth, 1971; Todaro, 1976; Vanderkamp, 1989; 
McCormick, 1990). Also, findings of this study are parallel to the studies with 
previous (1980, 1985, and 1990) datasets, which show that there is a significant 
relationship between internal migration and income in Turkey (Atalik and Ciraci, 
1993; Pazarlıoglu, 2001;Yamak and Yamak, 2005; Gezici and Keskin, 2005). 
Moreover, similar to May and Morrison’s study (1994), this study finds economic 
reasons are a significant factor in the migration patterns for all the provinces.  
For high terrorism incident provinces though, SPSS results do not support 
the general tendency of migration literature for GDP. However, this finding is also 
supported by literature. According to literature, people migrate out even if 
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economic reasons do not exist (Islas, 2005). In terms of involuntary migration, 
Schmeidl (1997) could not find a relationship between economic conditions and 
migration (or being refugee). Also, Stanley (1987) found a only a relationship 
between migration and violence, but not one between migration and economic 
variables. This result reminds us of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which states 
that the need for safety comes prior to economic utility maximization.  
Terrorism literature shows that terrorism is a result of poor economic 
conditions, which may force people to leave their homes (Kennedy 1986; Kegley, 
1990; Charshaw 1990). Also, an armed conflict may be the result of poor 
economic conditions (Boano et. all, 2003). In addition, it is certain that terrorism 
in high terrorism provinces impacts negatively on the economy (Human 
Development Report for Turkey, 1997; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997; Zucconi, 1999). 
Like a vicious circle, a bad economy impacts on both terrorism and migration. 
Therefore, as Goodman (et. al, 1975) mentions, people migrate out towards safer 
areas because of both insecurity and poverty.  
In terms of relationships between incident rates and economic variables, 
as stated in H5, this study found that the incident rate is not related to 
unemployment during each the three time periods. However, it is related to GDP 
in Period I (1992-1995), when the number of terrorist incidents is at its peak. As 
is stated above, the continuation of terrorism incidents and insecurity are among 
the reasons for bad economic conditions. Also as seen above (figure 4), the net-
migration rate in high terrorism incident provinces is almost double that in the 
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others. The combination of insecurity and poor economic conditions during the 
early years of terrorism may slowly change an ordinary migration into a 
movement of mass migration (Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1991).  
Findings also show that the terror incident rates are also related to net-
migration during all the periods (1992-2001) and in Period I (1992-1995). Also, 
population density is in a negative relationship with incident rate. As a matter of 
fact, the higher the population density is, the lower the terrorism incident rate. 
This significant model shows the relationship between population density and 
incident rate implies that not only is high population density important as a 
gravitational pull that is mentioned in literature but it is also important for people 
to fell safe.  
Among the findings of this study, population density is negatively related 
to net migration in each of the 4 time periods (8/8 models for all periods, 5/8 
models for Period I, 5/8 models for Period II, and 8/8 models for Period III). 
According to these findings, the higher the population density of the province is, 
the lower the net-migration rate. This significant negative relationship may help 
the reader to understand the direction of the migration flow. These findings show 
that migration flow in Turkey is from low populated places to crowded cities 
(metropolitans) or EAST/S.EAST to WEST. Figure 9 shows the means of 
population density in high terrorism incident provinces (East/S.East) and the rest 
(West) in each three periods. 
 
  
191
 
Figure 9: comparison of the means of population density between regions. 
POPULATION DENSITY
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1992-1995 1996-1999 2000-2001
EAST/S.EAST
WEST
 
These findings support the hypothesis of Sahota (1968) about “bright light” 
of cities.  His findings also show that population density has a gravitation effect 
on migrants. Contrary to the finding of this study, Carlos (2002) found that the 
greater the population the more the migration. However, his cases are from the 
“Philippines,” which sends employees to all over the world; therefore, a higher 
population means an increased level of need for jobs.  
Distance is also used in this study to control its impact on migration as 
stated in literature (Sahota, 1968; May and Morrison, 1994; Moore and Shellman, 
2002 and 2004b). As stated before, Istanbul is chosen because it pulls the 
largest number of migrants. Mersin on the other hand is rated number fourth by 
migrants, with the highest number of migrants from high terrorism incident 
provinces. Findings of this study about distance to Istanbul show that it has a 
negative significant relationship with net-migration (6/8 models for all periods, 6/8 
models for Period I, 6/8 for Period II, and 0/8 models for Period III). Comparing to 
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the models with high terrorism provinces, its relationship with net-migration is 
more significant in models of all the provinces. Negative relationship for this 
variable means provinces close to Istanbul are sending more migrants than 
provinces far from it.  
Distance to Mersin on the other hand has a positive significant relationship 
with net-migration (6/8 models for all periods, 6/8 models for Period I, 5/8 models 
for Period II, and 2/8 models for Period III). In contrast to distance to Istanbul, 
distance to Mersin is more significant in models with high terrorism incident rate. 
Positive relationship for this variable means provinces distant to Mersin are 
sending more migrants than provinces close to it. In other words, the greater the 
distance to Mersin is, the more the net-migration.  
 The migration literature supports the findings of distance to Istanbul, but 
not of distance to Mersin. As in findings of distance to Istanbul, Sahota (1968) 
found that distance is negatively related to migration. Besides, Moore and 
Shellman (2002, 2004b) used transaction cost for distance, and have two 
different results in their two studies: not-significant results for the first study and 
negative significant results for the second one. Also, May and Morrison (1994) 
used distance as a sign for the economic cost of migration and they found that a 
significant relationship between distance and migration.  
 Average distance to Istanbul is 824 for all provinces; the average distance 
to Mersin on the other hand is 673 for all provinces. While distance to Istanbul for 
high terrorism incident provinces goes up to 1340, distance to Mersin for high 
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terrorism incident provinces (607) does not change a lot. Therefore, for high 
terrorism incident provinces, distance to Istanbul is almost double when 
compared to the distance to Mersin. Migration literature states that people 
choose the closest place to stay away from violence (Moore and Shellman, 
2004b). This might be the reason why people from high terrorist incident 
provinces choose Mersin as a Target. Also, Mersin used to have a large number 
of seasonal farm workers from the Eastern and Southeastern provinces prior to 
the conflicts. Family networks as stated in social network theory of migration 
might be another reason for people to choose Mersin as a destination (Ortiz, 
1998). 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This final chapter summarizes the results of the study and gives a short 
conclusion. Findings related with the impacts of terrorism on domestic net-
migration in a unique country for ten years are going to be a significant 
contribution to both terrorism and migration literature. Following the summary of 
the results and conclusion, a few policy implications related to the research 
findings are going to be offered. Finally, the chapter and this study, end with 
recommendations to the future research.  
 
Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
In this study, the main purpose is to find out if there is a relationship 
between net-migration and terrorism. It hypothesizes that there is a positive 
relationship between net-migration and terrorism. Staying away from violence is 
a basic need for human-beings (Maslow, 1943), so an environment of violence 
conflict is the reason for people to migrate out. Also, a violent conflict may be a 
reason for economic deprivation (Zucconi, 1999; Boano et. all, 2003). Therefore, 
a direct relationship between net-migration and terrorism is tested in hypotheses 
2 and 3 and an indirect one is tested in hypotheses 4 and 5.   
This study is different than the general migration studies because rather 
than voluntary migration, it mainly focuses on necessary population movements. 
Previous studies have presented very limited information about this relationship. 
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They mostly focused on the relationship between net-migration and economic 
deprivation, with almost a very little stress on the event of necessary population 
movements (Todaro, 1976; Marshall, 1978; Piore, 1979; Clark, 1989; Zolberg, 
Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989 and Weiner, 1996).  
Studies looking at the necessary or involuntary migration movements are 
very limited, but they affirm that the relationship between violent conflicts and 
net-migration is as significant as the relationship between economic deprivation 
and net-migration (Hakovirta, 1986; Stanley, 1987; May and Morrison, 1994; 
Schmeidl, 1995 and 1997; Gibney, et al., 1996; Bariagaber, 1997; Apodaca, 
1998; Davenport, et al., 2003; Kernot and Gurung, 2003; and Moore and 
Shellman, 2004a and 2004b). They state that migration cannot be explained only 
by economic variables; however, in order to control their impact, they mostly 
used economic variables to test their hypotheses.  
According to Stanley (1987) more than half of the variance of Salvadorian 
migration movement to the USA can be explained by political violence. Moore 
and Shellman (2004a) declared that the main reason for people to leave their 
homes was violence. May and Morrison (1994) also found that violence causes 
migration. They stated that people are willing to pay for safety, as a personal 
need. For Davenport (et al., 2003), government violence in addition to the 
dissident violence increases the individuals’ perceptions of threat and insecurity. 
Kernot and Gurung (2003) stressed that conflict between the insurgents and 
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government forces was the main cause of internally displaced people and 
refugees.  
This study is also different than the involuntary migration literature for a 
number of reasons. First, it uses statistical power to test its hypotheses. Only a 
few studies related to involuntary migration used statistical power to test their 
assumptions. Second, it looks at necessary population movements inside a 
country.  Involuntary migration literature tended to examine the country as the 
unit of explanation and mostly focused on refugee movement. Third, it includes 
both in-migrated and out-migrated places. Involuntary migration literature 
generally looked at the out-migrated places.  
This research shows that (terrorism related) violence and fear are at least 
as important as economic deprivation in people’s decisions to move. The study 
provided a comprehensive approach to evaluating the impacts of terrorism on 
net-migration. In fact, it is the first study to look at the relationship between 
domestic migration and the terrorism rates in a specific country. Examining data 
for a ten year period also strengthens this research.  
In order to show the impact of terrorism on net-migration this study used 
both “terrorism related variables” and “economic variables.” Census data is also 
used. The datasets came from all of the provinces in Turkey between 1992 and 
2001. In order to test various impacts on net-migration during different periods, 
the data is examined from three different periods: Period I (1992-1995: the period 
of high terrorism incident rates), Period II (1996-1999: the period of moderate 
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terrorism incident rates), and Period III (2000-2001: the period of low terrorism 
incident rates). In addition to these three periods, years between 1992 and 2001 
is also used as another period and called all periods. 
Based on the terrorism incident rates, this research first compared net-
migration differences between provinces with terrorism problem and those 
without. Then, the research looked at the relationship between net-migration rate 
and terrorism related variables (incident rate and related deaths). Also, it tested 
the relationship between net-migration and economic variables (unemployment 
and GDP). Finally, this study examined the relationship between terrorism 
incident rates and economic variables to see if the terrorism incident rate in high 
terrorism incident provinces was related to economic deprivation, other than the 
net-migration rate.  
The findings show that there is a difference in net-migration between high 
terrorism incident provinces and the rest. Thus, it may be concluded that 
terrorism might impact on net-migration rates. However, there might be other 
reasons for net-migration, as has been stated in literature review. Therefore, the 
relationships between net-migration and terrorism related variables, together with 
the most important variables from literature, were tested.  
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Table 29: outcomes of the hypotheses 
Hypotheses Outcomes 
H1: net-migration is higher in the areas with high terrorist 
incidents than those with low terrorist incidents. 
 
 
Supported  
H2: the higher the terrorist incident rate, the higher the net-
migration. 
 
 
Supported  
 
H3: the higher the number of deaths caused by terrorism, the 
higher the net-migration. 
 
Supported  
Not supported for  
Period II & III 
H4: in high terrorist incident provinces, the less the province’s 
average GDP per person, the higher the net-migration. 
 
 
Not Supported 
H5a: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the more the 
terrorist incident rate, the less the GDP per person.   
Supported only 
for Period I 
Not Supported  
for other periods 
H5b: in high terrorist incident provinces of Turkey, the higher the 
unemployment rate, the more the terrorist incident rate.  
 
 
Not Supported 
 
 
To test those relationships, both models from all the provinces and models 
with previously selected (21) high terrorism incident (Region A) provinces were 
used. Models that included all the provinces were used for general results and 
they also contain the Region A provinces. The data had some outliers mostly 
from terrorism related cases in high terrorism related provinces. Since this study 
looked at the impact of terrorism, it is thought that cases with terrorism related 
outliers might be important. Therefore, the first 4 models used cases with 
outliers. However, decision of having type I and type II errors also force to have 
models with transformed variables of outliers. 
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Also, models with one year lag of terrorism related variables were utilized. 
Out of each 4 models, 2 models were used with one year lag for terrorist related 
variables. Out of those 2 models, one is used with all the provinces and the other 
used with only high terrorism incident rate provinces. In sum, 8 models were 
employed in 4 periods, 1992-2001, 1992-1995, 1996-1999, and 2000-2001 (32 
models total). Then, a standard multiple regression is used for each model. 
Findings show that terrorism incident rates in Region A provinces had a 
strong relationship with net-migration for all periods, except for Period III (2000-
2001), when terrorism incident rates were the lowest in for all periods. In addition 
to terrorism incident rates, the rate of people and security forces killed in Region 
A provinces had a strong relationship with net-migration especially in Period I 
(1992-1995), when terrorism incident were the highest for all periods. Models 
with all provinces had different results: although models with non-transformed 
variables show there is a relationship between the terrorism incident rates and 
net-migration, models with transformed variables showed there is no a 
relationship between terrorism incident rate and net-migration 
In terms of economic variables, while the GDP is related to net-migration 
in the models of all provinces, it is not related to net-migration in models with high 
terrorism incident provinces. For unemployment, this relationship is different 
between regions. While unemployment is not related to net-migration in models 
with all provinces, except for models in Period I with transformed variables and 
models in Period III with non-transformed variables, it is related to net-migration 
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in models with high terrorism incident provinces. In Period III, no economic 
variables in transformed modes are significant.  
Tests for the relationship between terrorism incident rates and economic 
variables did not confirm that there is a relationship between terrorism and 
economic variables (GDP and unemployment). This is true with the exception of 
the relationship between GDP and the terrorism incident rate in Period I (1992-
1995). Therefore, there is a relationship between GDP and the rate of terrorism 
incidents in Period I, while the rate of terrorism incidents is the highest in all 
periods; yet, there is no relationship between unemployment and terrorism 
incidents at all. 
Moreover, results show that there is a negative relationship between 
population density and net-migration, which means that the direction of migration 
is towards high populated places. This shows the magnetite effect of population 
density as mentioned in the literature. This result reflects the people’s escape 
from rural insecurity. As it is shown in findings, the terrorism incident rates are 
higher in low populated areas then in high terrorism incident provinces of Turkey. 
With these results, it is easy to come up with the fallowing statements: 
• Terrorism has a strong force on migration process towards out-migration. 
• (Terrorism related) fear and violence are related to net-migration. 
• This relationship is the strongest between 1992 and 1995, when the 
terrorism incident rate is at its peak.  
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• As stated in economic models of migration, economic depression is 
related to the net-migration. 
• While economic depression is more significant in nationwide migration 
movement, rural insecurity is more significant in migration movement in 
Eastern and Southeastern (high terrorism incident) provinces.   
• The impact of terrorism might have overshadowed the impact of GDP on 
net-migration in high terrorism incident provinces.   
• While GDP is more significant in nationwide migration movements, 
unemployment is more significant in migration movements in high terrorism 
incident provinces.   
• Distance is an important factor in migration movements.  
• In high terrorism incident provinces, the bigger the “distance to Istanbul,” 
the less the out-migration from provinces.  
• In high terrorism incident provinces, the bigger the “distance to Mersin,” 
the more the out-migration from provinces. 
• Population density, as a pull factor, impacts on nationwide migration 
movements. 
• Except for the Period I, population density almost always had an impact 
on net-migration movements in the high terrorism incident provinces.  
• People migrate towards more populated places with the intention of 
escaping from both rural insecurity and economic depression.  
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Policy Recommendations of the Study Results 
Findings verify that the migration movements in the (East and Southeast) 
regions are bigger than in the rest of the country and are related to terrorism. 
Also, it is shown that terrorism, in that region, not only impacts on internal 
migration but also impacts on socio-economic conditions, which in turn also 
impact on internal migration. These findings are parallel to the literature and the 
statements in the background information in chapter II; out-migration [in East and 
Southeast provinces] is related to both economics and terrorism related conflict.  
1997 Parliamentary Report also related the economic problems of the 
regional provinces to the conflicts. This is due in part to the following event: a 
prohibition of grazing and farming in the highlands of the region due to security 
concerns. In addition to economic problems, fear of the terrorist organization, 
PKK, and fear of being stuck between PKK and the security forces help explain 
the out-migration (Parliamentary Report, 1997). Findings of this study also 
support this report: migration in high terrorism incident provinces (East and 
Southeast) is mostly related to terrorism. 
In addition, a recent (TESEV) report that focused on the social impacts of 
the net-migration showed that conflict related migration from East and Southeast 
region also have many other impacts on the socio-economic structures of other 
provinces. Because it is not planned, there is an explosion in unemployment, 
frequent infrastructure problems, and increased crime in the in-migrated 
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provinces, especially the small ones, often used as a first step in migratory 
process (Aker, Celik, Kurban, Unalan, and Yükseker, 2005).  
For not having problems connected to the sudden migratory movement 
from high terrorism incident provinces, providing safety should be the first aim. 
Providing safety may be a solution to stop terrorism related migration. It might be 
easy to give advice while sitting in front of a computer, but in practice it would not 
be easy. After experiencing a violent terror incident, making people feel safe 
again might not be easy. Thus, in addition to security forces, intelligence 
departments should struggle with the problem. Their best strategy would be to 
work hard to prevent terrorism incidents beforehand.  
They should work as an interface between the security forces and the 
people. As is mentioned in previous reports, people are afraid of being stuck 
between the insurgents and the government forces. In addition, they should work 
to prevent new recruitment to the terrorist organizations. Preventing 
participations requires understanding the underlying reasons that people decide 
to join the terrorist organizations. This may require a significant amount of further 
social research.  
Findings show that unemployment and low income are related to migrating 
out. Therefore, policies that increase income and employment would slow down 
domestic migration. As asserted in the literature, the migration movement will 
continue unless equilibrium in income differences is maintained. In East and 
Southeast provinces, unemployment has an undeniably major effect on 
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migration, so employment opportunities may help the population to stay at their 
locations. Also, the effects of more job opportunities may increase the local 
consumption and expenditures, which may in turn help the local economy.   
As a result, encouraging new employment sources in the region is 
important. Previously, central government tried to facilitate new investments to 
the region, but they mostly failed either because they were not inspected by the 
authorities or because they were exposed to conflict. Therefore, government 
supported employment projects should be checked by authorities more often and 
also protected from violence with security forces. As stated in Maslow’s theory, 
safety needs are the most desired needs under certain conditions (Maslow, 
1943).  
In addition, education may be an important factor in decreasing 
unemployment in the region. People of the region can be exposed to new 
professions, other than animal husbandry and farming. People with other 
professional skills might not be unemployed. With these new skills, they may find 
jobs either in their home towns or in new palaces. According to the TESEV report 
(2005), many in-migrants from high terrorism incident provinces tried to find job 
as non-skilled workers.  
Finally, the 2004 law # 5233, that is designed  to compensate conflict 
related losses and thus encourage people to return their hometowns in high 
terrorism incident provinces, might persuade  people to go back their homes. 
However, this law might not encourage the younger generation, who plan to live 
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in the metropolitan cities of western Turkey. Hence, they might need more 
encouragement to go back or to not move out their home towns. Therefore, other 
than job opportunities, new social and educational opportunities should be 
considered to make the regions more attractive. For example, the planning and 
development of new universities would make the region a much more attractive 
place to settle.  
 
Suggestions for the Future Research 
Results of this study show that the migration movement is from low 
populated to high populated areas. Since the unit of analysis of this study is 
provinces, it is unable to estimate the movements from villages to cities located 
in the same province. Since terrorist incidents in the region mostly happened in 
rural areas, impact of terrorism incidents on rural to urban migration inside the 
regional provinces during high terrorism incident period should be examined in 
the future.  
Both government reports and non-governmental organizations’ reports 
state that sudden migratory movements from high terrorism incident provinces 
towards cities brought many social problems together (Zucconi, 1999). A fast 
growing flow of migrants should be met by a sufficient capability to provide 
services and jobs as these fast growing marginal groups will become a social 
and economical problem for the government. Future studies may wish to check 
the effect of these social and economical problems. 
  
206
 
Literature, related to social theories of migration, refers to the importance 
of relatives in the migratory process. Migrants tend to settle with like people. This 
might be the reason that Mersin, used to have a large influx of seasonal farm 
workers from the Eastern and Southeastern provinces prior to the conflicts. 
Future research may want to research this relationship, especially before and 
after the high terrorism incident period.  
Moreover, future research may wish to depend on surveys to gain an 
individual level of analysis. Studies with large enough sample sizes may be able 
to assess all the reasons of migration. However, it may be difficult to find and 
select samples from the migrants, especially from high terrorism incident 
provinces. Studies with biased samples do not represent the whole population, 
and do not have any scholarly value. Therefore, samples should not be selected 
from one marginal group, such members of a profession, a political party, or a 
religion cult.  
Finally, the literature has identified government sponsored violence. This 
includes such things as human rights violations, suppression, and state 
victimization of minorities. These are also indicators of violence related migration 
(Hakovirta,1986; Gibney, Apodaca, and McCann, 1996; Apodaca, 1998; 
Jonassohn, 1993; Rummel, 1994; Jonassohn and Bjornson, 1998; Zolberg, et. 
al., 1989; Schmeidl, 1997; Newland, 1993; Kaufmann, 1998). In addition to 
terrorism or conflict related violence, future studies may also include human right 
abuses by government forces as a factor in out-migration.  However, this type of 
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study needs to be done with a survey which should contain a very carefully 
selected objective sample. 
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Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1F 
 
Period
222 33.3 33.3 33.3
296 44.4 44.4 77.8
148 22.2 22.2 100.0
666 100.0 100.0
Period I: High
Terrorist Incident
Period II: Moderate
Terrorist Incident
Period III: Low
Terrorist Incident
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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Appendix 1G 
Correlations
1 .338 -.234 -.015 -.284 .103 -.050 -.088 -.082
.000 .000 .700 .000 .008 .196 .023 .035
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
.338 1 -.356 .217 -.658 .064 -.249 -.247 -.231
.000 .000 .000 .000 .098 .000 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.234 -.356 1 -.033 .280 .151 .377 .325 .275
.000 .000 .399 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.015 .217 -.033 1 -.204 -.091 -.064 -.084 -.101
.700 .000 .399 .000 .019 .096 .031 .009
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.284 -.658 .280 -.204 1 -.035 .429 .413 .389
.000 .000 .000 .000 .362 .000 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
.103 .064 .151 -.091 -.035 1 .088 .103 .111
.008 .098 .000 .019 .362 .022 .008 .004
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.050 -.249 .377 -.064 .429 .088 1 .932 .746
.196 .000 .000 .096 .000 .022 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.088 -.247 .325 -.084 .413 .103 .932 1 .822
.023 .000 .000 .031 .000 .008 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
-.082 -.231 .275 -.101 .389 .111 .746 .822 1
.035 .000 .000 .009 .000 .004 .000 .000
666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666 666
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident R
Legged Killed Peo
Security
Legged R_Killed T
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbu
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
egged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
234
 
Appendix 1H 
Correlations
1 .106 -.496 .185 .033 -.477 -.315 -.351 -.360
.147 .000 .011 .653 .000 .000 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
.106 1 .150 .178 -.571 -.512 -.082 -.130 -.132
.147 .039 .014 .000 .000 .260 .075 .071
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
-.496 .150 1 .127 -.141 .152 .438 .352 .277
.000 .039 .081 .053 .037 .000 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
.185 .178 .127 1 -.224 -.259 -.056 -.104 -.162
.011 .014 .081 .002 .000 .443 .155 .026
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
.033 -.571 -.141 -.224 1 .618 .331 .358 .377
.653 .000 .053 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
-.477 -.512 .152 -.259 .618 1 .179 .207 .223
.000 .000 .037 .000 .000 .014 .004 .002
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
-.315 -.082 .438 -.056 .331 .179 1 .928 .695
.000 .260 .000 .443 .000 .014 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
-.351 -.130 .352 -.104 .358 .207 .928 1 .796
.000 .075 .000 .155 .000 .004 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
-.360 -.132 .277 -.162 .377 .223 .695 .796 1
.000 .071 .000 .026 .000 .002 .000 .000
189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Rat
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident Ra
Legged Killed Peop
Security
Legged R_Killed Te
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
Legged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
 
 
 
Appendix 1I 
Model Summary
.619a .383 .377 167.533185
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment
Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Distance to Istanbul, Legged Incident Rate
a. 
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Appendix 1J 
ANOVAb
11486078 7 1640868.351 58.462 .000a
18468328 658 28067.368
29954407 665
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Population Density Per Square
KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product, Distance to
Istanbul, Legged Incident Rate
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 1K 
Coefficientsa
291.000 37.183 7.826 .000
-.321 .040 -.264 -7.993 .000 .858 1.165
-.089 .008 -.464 -11.050 .000 .532 1.881
-.025 .022 -.050 -1.136 .256 .478 2.093
14.826 3.504 .201 4.232 .000 .415 2.410
.143 .025 .178 5.691 .000 .961 1.040
.088 .058 .048 1.513 .131 .923 1.084
-5.351 2.738 -.091 -1.954 .051 .432 2.313
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Legged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged R_Killed Terror
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 1L 
Model Summary
.633a .401 .378 152.550422
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rate,
Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
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Appendix 1M 
ANOVAb
2820259 7 402894.149 17.313 .000a
4212165 181 23271.631
7032424 188
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Gross Domestic Product,
Unemployment Rate, Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 1N 
Coefficientsa
651.603 118.902 5.480 .000
-2.707 .846 -.290 -3.198 .002 .404 2.477
-.023 .031 -.053 -.731 .466 .617 1.620
-.367 .095 -.422 -3.886 .000 .280 3.568
16.004 3.369 .395 4.751 .000 .480 2.085
.257 .093 .288 2.756 .006 .303 3.300
.356 .135 .160 2.636 .009 .898 1.114
-3.178 2.703 -.103 -1.176 .241 .434 2.306
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Distance to Istanbul
Legged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged R_Killed Terroris
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
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Appendix 1O 
Correlations
1 .359** -.258** .034 -.291** .105 -.064 -.106 -.089
.000 .000 .557 .000 .071 .273 .069 .127
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.359** 1 -.448** .230** -.642** .067 -.287** -.302** -.254**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .250 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.258** -.448** 1 .003 .337** .168** .420** .388** .238**
.000 .000 .958 .000 .004 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.034 .230** .003 1 -.156** -.089 .008 -.036 -.099
.557 .000 .958 .007 .128 .892 .536 .088
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.291** -.642** .337** -.156** 1 -.035 .513** .522** .423**
.000 .000 .000 .007 .544 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.105 .067 .168** -.089 -.035 1 .090 .119* .131*
.071 .250 .004 .128 .544 .122 .040 .024
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.064 -.287** .420** .008 .513** .090 1 .948** .756**
.273 .000 .000 .892 .000 .122 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.106 -.302** .388** -.036 .522** .119* .948** 1 .856**
.069 .000 .000 .536 .000 .040 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.089 -.254** .238** -.099 .423** .131* .756** .856** 1
.127 .000 .000 .088 .000 .024 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersin
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peo
and Security
Rate of Total Kille
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersinncident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 1P 
Correlations
1 .303** -.461** .160 -.005 -.491** -.227* -.351** -.380**
.005 .000 .146 .965 .000 .037 .001 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.303** 1 -.042 .303** -.514** -.577** -.182 -.205 -.276*
.005 .704 .005 .000 .000 .098 .061 .011
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.461** -.042 1 .283** -.127 .201 .477** .402** .190
.000 .704 .009 .248 .067 .000 .000 .084
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.160 .303** .283** 1 -.243* -.286** .059 -.021 -.164
.146 .005 .009 .026 .008 .596 .846 .135
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.005 -.514** -.127 -.243* 1 .618** .410** .477** .458**
.965 .000 .248 .026 .000 .000 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.491** -.577** .201 -.286** .618** 1 .187 .253* .272*
.000 .000 .067 .008 .000 .088 .020 .012
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.227* -.182 .477** .059 .410** .187 1 .927** .698**
.037 .098 .000 .596 .000 .088 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.351** -.205 .402** -.021 .477** .253* .927** 1 .827**
.001 .061 .000 .846 .000 .020 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.380** -.276* .190 -.164 .458** .272* .698** .827** 1
.000 .011 .084 .135 .000 .012 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Densit
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration Rat
Unemployment R
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersi
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peo
and Security
Rate of Total Kille
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbu
Distance
to Mersin cident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 1Q 
Correlations
1 .351** -.256** .030 -.290** .105 -.066 -.109 -.087
.000 .000 .653 .000 .119 .326 .105 .198
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
.351** 1 -.437** .263** -.639** .060 -.309** -.334** -.248**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .375 .000 .000 .000
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
-.256** -.437** 1 -.026 .328** .165* .371** .336** .198**
.000 .000 .705 .000 .014 .000 .000 .003
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
.030 .263** -.026 1 -.181** -.073 -.013 -.058 -.109
.653 .000 .705 .007 .279 .852 .389 .104
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
-.290** -.639** .328** -.181** 1 -.035 .540** .563** .425**
.000 .000 .000 .007 .600 .000 .000 .000
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
.105 .060 .165* -.073 -.035 1 .092 .126 .130
.119 .375 .014 .279 .600 .174 .060 .053
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
-.066 -.309** .371** -.013 .540** .092 1 .948** .749**
.326 .000 .000 .852 .000 .174 .000 .000
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
-.109 -.334** .336** -.058 .563** .126 .948** 1 .849**
.105 .000 .000 .389 .000 .060 .000 .000
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
-.087 -.248** .198** -.109 .425** .130 .749** .849** 1
.198 .000 .003 .104 .000 .053 .000 .000
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Rat
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident Ra
Legged Killed Peop
Security
Legged R_Killed Te
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
Legged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 1R 
Correlations
1 .260* -.465** .252* .000 -.491** -.149 -.297* -.355**
.040 .000 .046 .999 .000 .243 .018 .004
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
.260* 1 -.018 .173 -.532** -.567** -.234 -.288* -.249*
.040 .886 .175 .000 .000 .065 .022 .049
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
-.465** -.018 1 .234 -.138 .191 .393** .308* .130
.000 .886 .065 .282 .133 .001 .014 .308
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
.252* .173 .234 1 -.228 -.312* .047 -.042 -.173
.046 .175 .065 .072 .013 .713 .742 .175
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
.000 -.532** -.138 -.228 1 .618** .452** .552** .468**
.999 .000 .282 .072 .000 .000 .000 .000
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
-.491** -.567** .191 -.312* .618** 1 .195 .273* .269*
.000 .000 .133 .013 .000 .126 .030 .033
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
-.149 -.234 .393** .047 .452** .195 1 .923** .691**
.243 .065 .001 .713 .000 .126 .000 .000
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
-.297* -.288* .308* -.042 .552** .273* .923** 1 .824**
.018 .022 .014 .742 .000 .030 .000 .000
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
-.355** -.249* .130 -.173 .468** .269* .691** .824** 1
.004 .049 .308 .175 .000 .033 .000 .000
63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Transformed Net
Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident R
Legged Killed Peo
Security
Legged R_Killed T
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Transformed
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbu
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
egged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1S 
Model Summary
.726a .527 .516 147.341643
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist,
Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment
Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Distance to Istanbul, Incident Rate
a. 
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Appendix 1T 
ANOVAb
6969320 7 995617.164 45.861 .000a
6252353 288 21709.560
13221673 295
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist, Population Density Per Square
KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product, Distance to
Istanbul, Incident Rate
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 1U 
Coefficientsa
319.424 47.535 6.720 .000
-.352 .060 -.259 -5.878 .000 .847 1.180
-.112 .011 -.574 -10.376 .000 .536 1.866
-.030 .029 -.061 -1.028 .305 .461 2.170
19.151 4.041 .317 4.739 .000 .366 2.730
.168 .033 .209 5.044 .000 .953 1.049
.087 .074 .050 1.181 .239 .904 1.107
-11.042 2.855 -.244 -3.867 .000 .413 2.422
(Constant)
Population Density Pe
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 1V 
Model Summary
.773a .598 .561 118.554240
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist,
Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Population
Density Per Square KM, Gross Domestic Product,
Incident Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
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Appendix 1W 
ANOVAb
1589972 7 227138.849 16.161 .000a
1068188 76 14055.108
2658160 83
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist, Unemployment Rate, Distance
to Mersin, Population Density Per Square KM, Gross Domestic Product, Incident
Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 1X 
Coefficientsa
692.760 128.762 5.380 .000
-1.773 1.101 -.182 -1.611 .111
-.063 .038 -.155 -1.642 .105
-.473 .108 -.590 -4.369 .000
23.219 3.525 .708 6.588 .000
.393 .109 .477 3.608 .001
.274 .121 .182 2.270 .026
-8.302 2.648 -.373 -3.136 .002
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 1Y 
Model Summary
.707a .499 .483 151.660625
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment
Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Distance to Istanbul, Legged Incident Rate
a. 
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Appendix 1Z 
ANOVAb
4911487 7 701641.032 30.505 .000a
4922202 214 23000.945
9833689 221
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Population Density Per Square
KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product, Distance to
Istanbul, Legged Incident Rate
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2A 
Coefficientsa
308.721 56.409 5.473 .000
-.350 .070 -.263 -5.001 .000 .847 1.181
-.107 .013 -.551 -8.352 .000 .537 1.863
-.021 .035 -.043 -.602 .548 .451 2.219
15.580 4.774 .262 3.264 .001 .362 2.764
.160 .040 .200 4.037 .000 .956 1.045
.091 .110 .043 .832 .407 .888 1.126
-10.485 3.592 -.217 -2.919 .004 .424 2.360
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Legged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged R_Killed Terro
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2B 
Model Summary
.769a .591 .539 121.129769
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Unemployment Rate, Gross Domestic Product,
Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
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Appendix 2C 
ANOVAb
1164738 7 166391.130 11.340 .000a
806983.1 55 14672.421
1971721 62
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Unemployment Rate, Gross
Domestic Product, Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin, Legged
Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2D 
Coefficientsa
638.662 158.987 4.017 .000
-3.180 1.275 -.333 -2.495 .016 .417 2.398
-.021 .045 -.051 -.462 .646 .613 1.631
-.404 .130 -.507 -3.116 .003 .281 3.557
.346 .128 .422 2.695 .009 .304 3.289
.429 .183 .223 2.344 .023 .820 1.219
21.982 4.188 .668 5.249 .000 .459 2.177
-9.734 3.340 -.411 -2.915 .005 .375 2.667
(Constant)
Population Density Pe
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged Incident Rate
Legged R_Killed Terro
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
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Appendix 2E 
Correlations
1 .348** -.234** -.004 -.285** .103 -.046 -.091 -.093
.000 .000 .940 .000 .077 .430 .119 .110
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.348** 1 -.367** .214** -.696** .058 -.239** -.206** -.273**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .317 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.234** -.367** 1 -.089 .283** .149* .386** .349** .391**
.000 .000 .125 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.004 .214** -.089 1 -.242** -.123* -.116* -.117* -.112
.940 .000 .125 .000 .034 .047 .045 .054
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.285** -.696** .283** -.242** 1 -.035 .393** .352** .422**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .544 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.103 .058 .149* -.123* -.035 1 .104 .111 .103
.077 .317 .010 .034 .544 .075 .057 .076
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.046 -.239** .386** -.116* .393** .104 1 .917** .724**
.430 .000 .000 .047 .000 .075 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.091 -.206** .349** -.117* .352** .111 .917** 1 .710**
.119 .000 .000 .045 .000 .057 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.093 -.273** .391** -.112 .422** .103 .724** .710** 1
.110 .000 .000 .054 .000 .076 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peop
and Security
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
to Istanbul
Distance
to Mersinncident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2F 
Correlations
1 .035 -.497** .271* .037 -.482** -.437** -.460** -.419**
.752 .000 .013 .742 .000 .000 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.035 1 .197 .238* -.624** -.499** -.033 -.023 -.087
.752 .073 .029 .000 .000 .768 .835 .433
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.497** .197 1 -.013 -.133 .158 .452** .419** .442**
.000 .073 .910 .226 .152 .000 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.271* .238* -.013 1 -.323** -.339** -.162 -.156 -.139
.013 .029 .910 .003 .002 .142 .156 .208
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.037 -.624** -.133 -.323** 1 .618** .314** .319** .346**
.742 .000 .226 .003 .000 .004 .003 .001
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.482** -.499** .158 -.339** .618** 1 .213 .224* .202
.000 .000 .152 .002 .000 .052 .040 .065
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.437** -.033 .452** -.162 .314** .213 1 .959** .662**
.000 .768 .000 .142 .004 .052 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.460** -.023 .419** -.156 .319** .224* .959** 1 .692**
.000 .835 .000 .156 .003 .040 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.419** -.087 .442** -.139 .346** .202 .662** .692** 1
.000 .433 .000 .208 .001 .065 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersin
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peo
and Security
Rate of Total Kille
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersinncident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2G 
Correlations
1 .348** -.234** -.004 -.285** .103 -.048 -.089 -.089
.000 .000 .940 .000 .077 .406 .126 .126
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.348** 1 -.367** .214** -.696** .058 -.243** -.219** -.269**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .317 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.234** -.367** 1 -.089 .283** .149* .413** .378** .342**
.000 .000 .125 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.004 .214** -.089 1 -.242** -.123* -.110 -.105 -.111
.940 .000 .125 .000 .034 .059 .072 .057
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.285** -.696** .283** -.242** 1 -.035 .406** .365** .414**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .544 .000 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
.103 .058 .149* -.123* -.035 1 .103 .109 .112
.077 .317 .010 .034 .544 .076 .060 .054
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.048 -.243** .413** -.110 .406** .103 1 .922** .731**
.406 .000 .000 .059 .000 .076 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.089 -.219** .378** -.105 .365** .109 .922** 1 .804**
.126 .000 .000 .072 .000 .060 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
-.089 -.269** .342** -.111 .414** .112 .731** .804** 1
.126 .000 .000 .057 .000 .054 .000 .000
296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correla
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density 
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pro
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Rat
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident Ra
Legged Killed Peop
Security
Legged R_Killed Te
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
to Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
Legged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2H 
Correlations
1 .035 -.497** .271* .037 -.482** -.431** -.450** -.400**
.752 .000 .013 .742 .000 .000 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.035 1 .197 .238* -.624** -.499** -.020 -.035 -.130
.752 .073 .029 .000 .000 .860 .754 .240
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.497** .197 1 -.013 -.133 .158 .492** .452** .368**
.000 .073 .910 .226 .152 .000 .000 .001
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.271* .238* -.013 1 -.323** -.339** -.142 -.131 -.144
.013 .029 .910 .003 .002 .197 .236 .192
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
.037 -.624** -.133 -.323** 1 .618** .320** .317** .377**
.742 .000 .226 .003 .000 .003 .003 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.482** -.499** .158 -.339** .618** 1 .205 .221* .225*
.000 .000 .152 .002 .000 .061 .044 .040
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.431** -.020 .492** -.142 .320** .205 1 .938** .670**
.000 .860 .000 .197 .003 .061 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.450** -.035 .452** -.131 .317** .221* .938** 1 .790**
.000 .754 .000 .236 .003 .044 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
-.400** -.130 .368** -.144 .377** .225* .670** .790** 1
.000 .240 .001 .192 .000 .040 .000 .000
84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Rat
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Legged Incident Ra
Legged Killed Peop
Security
Legged R_Killed Te
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Legged
ncident Rate
Legged Killed
People and
Security
Legged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2I 
 
 
Model Summary
.628a .394 .379 168.170958
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist,
Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment
Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Incident Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
 
 
Appendix 2J 
ANOVAb
5299508 7 757072.588 26.769 .000a
8145064 288 28281.471
13444572 295
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist, Population Density Per Square
KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product, Incident
Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2K 
 
 
Coefficientsa
366.720 60.638 6.048 .000
-.305 .060 -.252 -5.097 .000 .859 1.164
-.097 .013 -.508 -7.732 .000 .486 2.056
-.049 .034 -.099 -1.433 .153 .439 2.278
3.976 5.909 .045 .673 .502 .463 2.161
.131 .038 .162 3.453 .001 .954 1.049
.063 .090 .034 .700 .484 .913 1.096
7.798 5.450 .098 1.431 .154 .451 2.215
(Constant)
Population Density Pe
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
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Appendix 2L 
Model Summary
.601a .361 .303 161.658467
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist,
Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rate,
Population Density Per Square KM, Incident Rate ,
Distance to Mersin, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
 
 
Appendix 2M 
ANOVAb
1123837 7 160548.091 6.143 .000a
1986143 76 26133.460
3109980 83
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Total Killed Terrorist, Gross Domestic Product,
Unemployment Rate, Population Density Per Square KM, Incident Rate , Distance
to Mersin, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2N 
Coefficientsa
765.886 208.627 3.671 .000
-1.186 1.572 -.128 -.754 .453
-.048 .052 -.116 -.935 .353
-.510 .172 -.587 -2.963 .004
5.481 6.244 .118 .878 .383
.348 .158 .390 2.207 .030
.209 .277 .077 .753 .454
13.084 5.866 .305 2.231 .029
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Total Killed
Terrorist
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
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Appendix 2O 
Model Summary
.629a .395 .381 167.998614
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment
Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
 
 
Appendix 2P 
ANOVAb
5316194 7 759456.266 26.909 .000a
8128378 288 28223.534
13444572 295
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Population Density Per Square
KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product, Legged
Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2Q 
Coefficientsa
365.366 60.672 6.022 .000
-.310 .060 -.256 -5.186 .000 .859 1.164
-.097 .013 -.511 -7.779 .000 .486 2.057
-.047 .034 -.095 -1.373 .171 .437 2.287
11.448 5.124 .153 2.234 .026 .449 2.225
.133 .038 .165 3.505 .001 .952 1.051
.062 .090 .033 .695 .487 .913 1.096
-1.381 3.894 -.024 -.355 .723 .447 2.238
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Legged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged R_Killed Terro
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
252
 
Appendix 2R 
Model Summary
.595a .354 .294 162.609737
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist,
Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rate,
Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
 
 
Appendix 2S 
ANOVAb
1100393 7 157199.024 5.945 .000a
2009586 76 26441.927
3109980 83
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Legged R_Killed Terrorist, Gross Domestic Product,
Unemployment Rate, Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Legged Incident Rate, Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 2T 
Coefficientsa
777.395 211.015 3.684 .000
-1.451 1.570 -.156 -.924 .358 .298 3.358
-.053 .052 -.127 -1.016 .313 .544 1.837
-.488 .174 -.562 -2.801 .006 .211 4.738
12.062 5.574 .300 2.164 .034 .443 2.257
.322 .158 .361 2.037 .045 .271 3.690
.217 .279 .080 .777 .440 .794 1.260
2.748 4.135 .091 .665 .508 .453 2.206
(Constant)
Population Density Pe
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Legged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Legged R_Killed Terro
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
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Appendix 2U 
Correlations
1 .325** -.353** -.090 -.280** .102 .097 -.049 -.072
.000 .000 .276 .001 .218 .239 .553 .384
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
.325** 1 -.397** .293** -.647** .088 -.105 -.193* -.186*
.000 .000 .000 .000 .289 .205 .019 .024
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.353** -.397** 1 .082 .271** .126 .267** .149 .165*
.000 .000 .325 .001 .128 .001 .070 .045
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.090 .293** .082 1 -.189* -.064 .088 .063 .056
.276 .000 .325 .022 .443 .286 .450 .497
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.280** -.647** .271** -.189* 1 -.035 .234** .374** .343**
.001 .000 .001 .022 .669 .004 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
.102 .088 .126 -.064 -.035 1 .050 .077 .100
.218 .289 .128 .443 .669 .543 .350 .229
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
.097 -.105 .267** .088 .234** .050 1 .695** .736**
.239 .205 .001 .286 .004 .543 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.049 -.193* .149 .063 .374** .077 .695** 1 .905**
.553 .019 .070 .450 .000 .350 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.072 -.186* .165* .056 .343** .100 .736** .905** 1
.384 .024 .045 .497 .000 .229 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Densit
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration
Unemployment R
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersi
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peo
and Security
Rate of Total Kille
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product et Migratio
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbu
Distance
to Mersinncident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2V 
Correlations
1 .062 .546** -.075 .067 -.468** -.424** -.315* -.390*
.698 .000 .636 .672 .002 .005 .042 .011
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
.062 1 -.120 .456** -.577** -.516** .173 .046 -.013
.698 .450 .002 .000 .000 .272 .772 .935
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
.546** -.120 1 -.360* .195 -.128 -.469** -.170 -.189
.000 .450 .019 .216 .420 .002 .281 .231
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.075 .456** -.360* 1 -.118 -.117 .275 .306* .250
.636 .002 .019 .455 .460 .078 .049 .110
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
.067 -.577** .195 -.118 1 .618** .109 .290 .276
.672 .000 .216 .455 .000 .491 .063 .076
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.468** -.516** -.128 -.117 .618** 1 .113 .172 .185
.002 .000 .420 .460 .000 .475 .277 .241
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.424** .173 -.469** .275 .109 .113 1 .698** .752**
.005 .272 .002 .078 .491 .475 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.315* .046 -.170 .306* .290 .172 .698** 1 .895**
.042 .772 .281 .049 .063 .277 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.390* -.013 -.189 .250 .276 .185 .752** .895** 1
.011 .935 .231 .110 .076 .241 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Corre
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic P
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanb
Distance to Mersin
Incident Rate
Rate of Killed Peo
and Security
Rate of Total Kille
Terrorist
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product
Net Migration
Rate
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersinncident Rate
Rate of Killed
People and
Security
Rate of
Total Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2W 
Correlations
1 .325** -.353** -.090 -.280** .102 -.008 -.071 -.080
.000 .000 .276 .001 .218 .925 .390 .331
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
.325** 1 -.397** .293** -.647** .088 -.140 -.144 -.175*
.000 .000 .000 .000 .289 .091 .082 .034
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.353** -.397** 1 .082 .271** .126 .240** .255** .235**
.000 .000 .325 .001 .128 .003 .002 .004
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.090 .293** .082 1 -.189* -.064 .102 .114 .083
.276 .000 .325 .022 .443 .217 .167 .315
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.280** -.647** .271** -.189* 1 -.035 .314** .298** .353**
.001 .000 .001 .022 .669 .000 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
.102 .088 .126 -.064 -.035 1 .057 .062 .093
.218 .289 .128 .443 .669 .488 .452 .263
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.008 -.140 .240** .102 .314** .057 1 .972** .961**
.925 .091 .003 .217 .000 .488 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.071 -.144 .255** .114 .298** .062 .972** 1 .944**
.390 .082 .002 .167 .000 .452 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
-.080 -.175* .235** .083 .353** .093 .961** .944** 1
.331 .034 .004 .315 .000 .263 .000 .000
148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density 
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration
Unemployment Rat
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Lagged Incident Ra
Lagged Killed Peop
Security
Lagged R_Killed Te
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
ProductNet Migration
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Lagged
ncident Rate
Lagged Killed
People and
Security
Lagged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 2X 
Correlations
1 .062 -.546** -.075 .067 -.468** -.374* -.392* -.401**
.698 .000 .636 .672 .002 .015 .010 .008
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
.062 1 .120 .456** -.577** -.516** .186 .227 .115
.698 .450 .002 .000 .000 .238 .147 .468
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.546** .120 1 .360* -.195 .128 .369* .367* .319*
.000 .450 .019 .216 .420 .016 .017 .040
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.075 .456** .360* 1 -.118 -.117 .417** .426** .339*
.636 .002 .019 .455 .460 .006 .005 .028
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
.067 -.577** -.195 -.118 1 .618** .178 .097 .252
.672 .000 .216 .455 .000 .258 .540 .107
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.468** -.516** .128 -.117 .618** 1 .140 .119 .178
.002 .000 .420 .460 .000 .376 .452 .259
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.374* .186 .369* .417** .178 .140 1 .979** .966**
.015 .238 .016 .006 .258 .376 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.392* .227 .367* .426** .097 .119 .979** 1 .936**
.010 .147 .017 .005 .540 .452 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
-.401** .115 .319* .339* .252 .178 .966** .936** 1
.008 .468 .040 .028 .107 .259 .000 .000
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correl
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pr
Net Migration
Unemployment Ra
Distance to Istanbu
Distance to Mersin
Lagged Incident Ra
Lagged Killed Peop
Security
Lagged R_Killed T
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
ProductNet Migration
Unemploy
ment Rate
Distance
o Istanbul
Distance
to Mersin
Lagged
ncident Rate
Lagged Killed
People and
Security
Lagged
R_Killed
Terrorist
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2Y 
Model Summary
.598a .357 .325 173.712213
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Killed People and
Security, Population Density Per Square KM,
Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross
Domestic Product, Distance to Istanbul, Incident Rate
a. 
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Appendix 2Z 
ANOVAb
2347461 7 335351.615 11.113 .000a
4224631 140 30175.933
6572092 147
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Killed People and Security, Population Density Per
Square KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Mersin, Gross Domestic Product,
Distance to Istanbul, Incident Rate
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 3A 
Coefficientsa
159.774 78.928 2.024 .045
-.320 .083 -.292 -3.872 .000
-.078 .019 -.388 -4.110 .000
-.016 .046 -.033 -.350 .727
198.306 48.031 .398 4.129 .000
.157 .055 .196 2.845 .005
.253 .121 .155 2.092 .038
-646.697 282.022 -.229 -2.293 .023
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Killed People
and Security
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 3B 
Model Summary
.733a .538 .443 156.923866
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Killed People and
Security, Gross Domestic Product, Population Density
Per Square KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to
Mersin, Incident Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
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Appendix 3C 
ANOVAb
975068.1 7 139295.448 5.657 .000a
837253.4 34 24625.100
1812322 41
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Rate of Killed People and Security, Gross Domestic
Product, Population Density Per Square KM, Unemployment Rate, Distance to
Mersin, Incident Rate , Distance to Istanbul
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 3D 
Coefficientsa
578.072 261.004 2.215 .034
-3.397 1.690 -.373 -2.011 .052
-.109 .088 -.214 -1.230 .227
-.204 .202 -.218 -1.013 .318
151.923 52.962 .510 2.869 .007
.022 .203 .023 .110 .913
.952 .355 .373 2.681 .011
-565.675 289.941 -.348 -1.951 .059
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Distance to Istanbul
Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Rate of Killed People
and Security
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 3E 
Model Summary
.552a .305 .276 179.962992
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Lagged Incident Rate,
Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to Mersin,
Unemployment Rate, Distance to Istanbul, Gross
Domestic Product
a. 
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Appendix 3F 
ANOVAb
2005570 6 334261.715 10.321 .000a
4566522 141 32386.678
6572092 147
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Lagged Incident Rate, Population Density Per Square KM,
Distance to Mersin, Unemployment Rate, Distance to Istanbul, Gross Domestic
Product
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 3G 
Coefficientsa
203.217 81.136 2.505 .013
-.271 .084 -.247 -3.214 .002 .836 1.196
-.082 .020 -.406 -4.147 .000 .515 1.942
-.040 .047 -.081 -.834 .406 .521 1.921
.147 .057 .183 2.574 .011 .973 1.027
.255 .125 .156 2.040 .043 .841 1.189
31.301 13.150 .180 2.380 .019 .857 1.167
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Produ
Distance to Istanbul
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Lagged Incident Rate
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 3H 
Model Summary
.661a .437 .341 170.698062
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment Rate,
Population Density Per Square KM, Distance to
Istanbul, Lagged Incident Rate, Gross Domestic
Product, Distance to Mersin
a. 
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Appendix 3I 
ANOVAb
792497.5 6 132082.923 4.533 .002a
1019824 35 29137.828
1812322 41
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment Rate, Population Density Per Square KM,
Distance to Istanbul, Lagged Incident Rate, Gross Domestic Product, Distance to
Mersin
a. 
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationb. 
 
 
Appendix 3J 
Coefficientsa
679.205 285.332 2.380 .023
-3.882 1.768 -.426 -2.195 .035 .426 2.345
-.086 .096 -.168 -.893 .378 .452 2.214
-.251 .213 -.267 -1.179 .246 .312 3.203
15.527 16.881 .156 .920 .364 .557 1.796
.020 .216 .021 .094 .926 .318 3.144
.794 .395 .311 2.010 .052 .672 1.487
(Constant)
Population Density Pe
Square KM
Gross Domestic Prod
Distance to Istanbul
Lagged Incident Rate
Distance to Mersin
Unemployment Rate
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. Tolerance VIF
Collinearity Statistics
Dependent Variable: Net Migrationa. 
 
 
Appendix 3K 
Descriptive Statistics
210 11.66 101.58 50.4747 20.42346
210 513.98 2621.21 1312.3525 451.47628
210 -109.300 776.206 260.94214 192.411468
210 16.94 697.01 140.3220 99.84644
210 .03 25.29 2.8935 4.60374
210
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Net Migration
Unemployment Rate
Incident Rate
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
261
 
Appendix 3L 
Residuals Statisticsa
-1.2149 6.9481 2.8935 1.70431 210
-2.411 2.379 .000 1.000 210
.368 1.862 .644 .173 210
-1.2854 7.0882 2.8789 1.69508 210
-4.77816 21.89689 .00000 4.27665 210
-1.107 5.071 .000 .990 210
-1.124 5.109 .002 1.004 210
-4.92947 22.23046 .01462 4.39509 210
-1.125 5.456 .007 1.027 210
.521 37.845 3.981 3.445 210
.000 .154 .006 .017 210
.002 .181 .019 .016 210
Predicted Value
Std. Predicted Value
Standard Error of
Predicted Value
Adjusted Predicted Value
Residual
Std. Residual
Stud. Residual
Deleted Residual
Stud. Deleted Residual
Mahal. Distance
Cook's Distance
Centered Leverage Value
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Dependent Variable: Incident Ratea. 
 
 
Appendix 3M 
Descriptive Statistics
210 11.66 101.58 50.474720.42346 .239 .168 -.789 .334
210 513.98 2621.21312.352551.47628 .557 .168 -.127 .334
210 -776.21 109.30260.942192.41147 -.877 .168 .204 .334
210 16.94 697.01 40.322099.84644 1.650 .168 4.710 .334
210 .03 25.29 2.8935 4.60374 2.533 .168 7.054 .334
210
Population Density P
Square KM
Gross Domestic Pro
Net Migration Rate
Unemployment Rate
Incident Rate
Valid N (listwise)
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
N MinimumMaximum Mean Std. Skewness Kurtosis
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Appendix 3N 
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Dependent Variable: Incident Rate
 
 
 
Appendix 3O 
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Dependent Variable: Incident Rate
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Appendix 3P 
 
5.02.50.0
Regression Standardized Residual
2.5
0.0
-2.5
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
St
an
da
rd
iz
ed
 P
re
di
ct
ed
 
Va
lu
e
Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: Incident Rate
 
 
 
Appendix 3Q 
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Appendix 3R 
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Dependent Variable: Incident Rate
 
 
 
Appendix 3S 
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Appendix 3T 
Correlations
1 .136* -.260** -.501** .107
.050 .000 .000 .123
210 210 210 210 210
.136* 1 -.117 -.006 .248**
.050 .091 .926 .000
210 210 210 210 210
-.260** -.117 1 .304** -.091
.000 .091 .000 .190
210 210 210 210 210
-.501** -.006 .304** 1 .163*
.000 .926 .000 .018
210 210 210 210 210
.107 .248** -.091 .163* 1
.123 .000 .190 .018
210 210 210 210 210
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Incident Rate
Net Migration
Unemployment
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product Incident Rate Net Migration
Unemplo
yment
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
Appendix 3U 
Model Summary
.356a .127 .110 .64073
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population
Density Per Square KM, Gross Domestic Product, Net
Migration
a. 
 
 
Appendix 3V 
ANOVAb
12.237 4 3.059 7.452 .000a
84.160 205 .411
96.397 209
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population Density Per Square KM, Gross
Domestic Product, Net Migration
a. 
Dependent Variable: Incident Rateb. 
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Appendix 3W 
Coefficientsa
.512 .310 1.654 .100
-.003 .003 -.105 -1.352 .178
.000 .000 -.075 -1.109 .269
.001 .000 .268 3.435 .001
-.223 .148 -.105 -1.503 .134
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Net Migration
Unemployment
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Incident Ratea. 
 
 
Appendix 3X 
Correlations
1 .303** -.137 .137 -.450**
.005 .214 .213 .000
84 84 84 84 84
.303** 1 -.284** .341** -.152
.005 .009 .001 .168
84 84 84 84 84
-.137 -.284** 1 .099 .339**
.214 .009 .372 .002
84 84 84 84 84
.137 .341** .099 1 .289**
.213 .001 .372 .008
84 84 84 84 84
-.450** -.152 .339** .289** 1
.000 .168 .002 .008
84 84 84 84 84
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Incident Rate
Unemployment
Net Migration
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product Incident Rate
Unemplo
yment Net Migration
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3Y 
Model Summary
.430a .185 .143 .55420
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population
Density Per Square KM, Gross Domestic Product, Net
Migration
a. 
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Appendix 3Z 
ANOVAb
5.498 4 1.375 4.475 .003a
24.264 79 .307
29.762 83
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population Density Per Square KM, Gross
Domestic Product, Net Migration
a. 
Dependent Variable: Incident Rateb. 
 
 
Appendix 4A 
Coefficientsa
.030 .410 .073 .942
.002 .004 .071 .589 .558
.000 .000 -.296 -2.598 .011
.001 .000 .296 2.353 .021
.193 .221 .105 .875 .384
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Net Migration
Unemployment
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Incident Ratea. 
 
 
Appendix 4B 
Correlations
1 .035 -.341** -.499** .155
.752 .001 .000 .158
84 84 84 84 84
.035 1 -.102 .040 .298**
.752 .355 .717 .006
84 84 84 84 84
-.341** -.102 1 .251* -.156
.001 .355 .021 .157
84 84 84 84 84
-.499** .040 .251* 1 .087
.000 .717 .021 .432
84 84 84 84 84
.155 .298** -.156 .087 1
.158 .006 .157 .432
84 84 84 84 84
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Incident Rate
Net Migration
Unemployment
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product Incident Rate Net Migration
Unemplo
yment
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Appendix 4C 
Model Summary
.380a .145 .101 .56656
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Net Migration,
Gross Domestic Product, Population Density Per
Square KM
a. 
 
 
Appendix 4D 
ANOVAb
4.288 4 1.072 3.339 .014a
25.358 79 .321
29.646 83
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Net Migration, Gross Domestic Product,
Population Density Per Square KM
a. 
Dependent Variable: Incident Rateb. 
 
 
Appendix 4E 
Coefficientsa
.748 .427 1.753 .084
-.007 .004 -.254 -2.055 .043
-8.6E-005 .000 -.066 -.609 .544
.000 .000 .137 1.118 .267
-.210 .217 -.109 -.968 .336
(Constant)
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Net Migration
Unemployment
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Incident Ratea. 
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Appendix 4F 
Correlations
1 .062 -.217 -.546** -.091
.698 .167 .000 .566
42 42 42 42 42
.062 1 .029 .120 .489**
.698 .854 .450 .001
42 42 42 42 42
-.217 .029 1 .198 .123
.167 .854 .210 .437
42 42 42 42 42
-.546** .120 .198 1 .354*
.000 .450 .210 .021
42 42 42 42 42
-.091 .489** .123 .354* 1
.566 .001 .437 .021
42 42 42 42 42
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Population Density Per
Square KM
Gross Domestic Product
Incident Rate
Net Migration
Unemployment
Population
Density Per
Square KM
Gross
Domestic
Product Incident Rate Net Migration
Unemplo
yment
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
 
Appendix 4G 
Model Summary
.248a .062 -.040 .50161
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population
Density Per Square KM, Gross Domestic Product, Net
Migration
a. 
 
 
Appendix 4H 
ANOVAb
.612 4 .153 .608 .659a
9.310 37 .252
9.922 41
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Population Density Per Square KM, Gross
Domestic Product, Net Migration
a. 
Dependent Variable: Incident Rateb. 
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